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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on International Finance and International Capital Markets
by
Qiaoqiao Zhu
Chair: Linda L Tesar
This dissertation consists of three essays examining informational and behavioral fric-
tions in international financial and capital markets. Chapter II investigates whether
characteristics of the home country capital market environment, such as informa-
tion disclosure and investor rights protection, continue to affect American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) cross-listed in the U.S. I find that characteristics of the home mar-
kets continue to be relevant, especially for emerging market firms. Less transparent
disclosure, poorer protection of investor rights and weaker legal institutions are asso-
ciated with higher levels of information asymmetry. My finding suggests that cross-
listing in the U.S. should not be viewed as a substitute for improvement in the quality
of local institutions. Chapter III addresses the question of whether it is possible to
profit from timing the exchange rate markets by examining foreign firms’ decision
to issue ADRs. Specifically, we test whether foreign firms consider currency market
conditions in their ADR issuance decisions. We find that foreign firms tend to issue
ADRs after their local currency has been abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar
and before their local currency becomes abnormally weak. Currency market timing
is especially significant for companies who are more likely to be affected by higher
xi
currency exposure and emerging market companies. It is more pronounced during
currency crises and after the market integration, and when the ADR issue raises cap-
ital. Currency market timing is also economically significant. These findings suggest
that some companies may have private information about foreign exchange market.
Chapter III examines behavioral bias in global financial markets. It investigates the
relation between lunar phases and stock market returns of 48 countries. The findings
indicate that stock returns are lower on the days around a full moon than on the days
around a new moon. The magnitude of the return difference is 3% to 5% per annum
based on analysis of global portfolios. The return difference is not due to changes in
stock market volatility or trading volumes. The lunar effect is not explained away by
announcements of macroeconomic indicators, nor is it driven by major global shocks.




Informational frictions have always been a major issue in finance. In our modern
financial world, markets expand wider and deeper, information is flowing seemingly
costlessly along our INTERNET connections. However, the information that is re-
quired to evaluate financial assets is not straightforward and not equally available to
all market participants. Research in the areas of home bias (e.g., Tesar and Werner
(1995)) and international capital flows (e.g., Brennan and Cao (1997), Portes and Rey
(2005)) all points to the evidence that information issues remain important in our
increasingly integrated but still segmented global financial markets. The consequence
of not fully understanding the information issues involved in our complex financial
world, meanwhile, could be very severe, as the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008
has witnessed. Information asymmetry affects asset prices and capital allocation, ex-
acerbates financial crisis and contagion, and distorts incentives in corporate financing
decisions. Also, since international capital markets are segmented by different invest-
ment laws and institution qualities of sovereign nations, corporate governance also
plays an important role in capital allocation.
Two chapters of this dissertation are related to this broad area. One chapter
(Chapter II) studies the impact of the home country capital market environment on
the adverse selection cost of the firms’ U.S. exchange listed depositary rights, and its
implications for government policies aimed at attracting global capital flows. Another
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chapter (Chapter III) studies firms’ ability to time transactions in the currency mar-
ket when raising capital internationally. In a broader sense, both chapters first try
to establish evidence that certain types of information asymmetry persist in interna-
tional financial markets.1 Chapter II then focuses on the implications of information
asymmetry for capital allocations, while Chapter III focuses more on its implications
for firms’ capital raising decisions, i.e., when to issue ADRs to raise capital.
Behavioral bias is another reason why financial markets can be less efficient than
a classical model predicts. Research evidence suggests that investors are subject to
various psychological and behavioral biases. Such biases may play a relatively more
important role in international market where informational problems are more pro-
nounced.2 Chapter IV investigates the lunar effect in asset prices. It presents a test
of a particular behavioral hypothesis using an exogenously identifiable variable, moti-
vated by psychological hypothesis. It finds global evidence of a significant correlation
between stock returns and lunar phases.
Cross-listing has increasingly become an important form of raising capital abroad.
Previous research on cross-listing argues that foreign firms can improve their disclo-
sure and governance by cross-listing in the United States in order to bond themselves
to U.S. security regimes. The degree of effectiveness of such bonding, however, re-
mains an open question. In Chapter II, we examine the cross-section of the infor-
mation asymmetry surrounding ADR firms, and relate it to information disclosure
quality, governance, and rule of law measures of the countries in which those firms
are domiciled. We find that less transparent disclosure, poorer protection of investor
rights, and weaker legal institutions in the countries of origin are associated with
higher level of adverse selection in ADRs, especially for firms from emerging markets.
Methodologically, Chapter II can be viewed as a crossover study between corporate
1In Chapter II’s case, information asymmetry of cross-listed firms in equity markets; and in
Chapter III’s case, information asymmetry of exchange rate movements in currency markets.
2e.g., Schmeling (2009)
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governance and market microstructure, with international cross-listing as the subject
of the study. It uses a novel approach to proxy for the degree of information asym-
metry of ADRs with market microstructure measures such as the bid-ask spread, its
adverse selection component, and revealed information in the volume-return relation-
ships. Market microstructure measures of information asymmetry capture adverse
selection between informed traders and uninformed traders, as well as the financial
market’s perception of information advantage held by firm insiders and the resulting
adverse selection cost. We measure ADR firms’ average quoted spread and effec-
tive spread. To extract adverse selection in our spread proxy, we also decompose
quoted spreads into an asymmetric-information component and a non-information
component. We show that microstructure measures of adverse selection of ADRs
are positively correlated with information opaqueness and poor protection of investor
rights in the capital market environment of the home countries, and this relation is
more pronounced among emerging market ADRs. In other words, the home stigma
exists among ADRs traded on the U.S. exchanges. In addition, we provide evidence
that this “home stigma” risk appears to be priced by the market.
Cross-sectionally, the difference is significant between firms from emerging markets
and firms from more mature capital markets. Among emerging market ADRs, the
connection between the home capital market environment and their adverse selection
in U.S. trading is much stronger than their developed market counterparts. Moreover,
information opacity of emerging markets does not appear to be solely due to the
lack of regulation. In fact, survey-based transparency measure fits them better than
accounting-rule-based measure, suggesting the lack of enforcement of the existing
rules. Among developed market ADRs, the home stigma phenomenon is weaker,
but there is evidence that home market accounting standards and quality of legal
institution continue to affect their level of adverse section in the U.S. trading.
Robustness of the results is rigorously checked by using alternative measures of
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adverse selection and statistical methods. We control our empirical regressions of
market condition and individual firm characteristics. Given that many firm-level
controls such as size, leverage, and book-to-market ratio are possibly correlated with
the level of information asymmetry, our tests are actually biased against finding addi-
tional adverse selection. We also augment our tests with analyst coverage and forecast
dispersion, which, prior research indicates, are associated with a firm’s disclosure and
information environment. Our results withstand those controls. To alleviate con-
cern about time variation in home-market information transparency, we confirm our
primary findings with alternative time-varying measures of information derived from
the average R2 of respective markets. To further substantiate our tests of adverse
selection in ADRs, we confirm our results utilizing an alternative proxy that is based
on the volume-return relationship. Finally, we also confirm our empirical tests with
several statistical methods.
Our finding that the home capital market environment continues to act as a cru-
cial factor in adverse selection of ADR firms makes an important contribution to the
bonding literature. The home capital market environment can affect a firm’s incen-
tive to adhere to a higher disclosure standard, and therefore affect the level of adverse
selection in their U.S. listed securities. Our results suggest that this is especially a
concern for emerging market firms. In terms of policy implications, Chapter II high-
lights the challenges presented to the emerging market firms when they try to attract
capital internationally. It illustrates that cross-listing in the United States is not a
substitute for improvement of local information transparency and protection of mi-
nority shareholders. Governments and policymakers should still focus on promoting
information disclosure and improving corporate governance in order to attract capital
flows to their countries. Our finding that quality of governance matters for the infor-
mation environment also suggests that policies aiming to improve domestic disclosure
should be complemented with policies promoting better investor rights protection.
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Chapter III examines asymmetric information in foreign exchange markets in rela-
tion to firms’ capital structure decisions. The core notion of the market timing theory
is that companies attempt to raise capital by issuing overvalued securities. From an
international perspective, the relative overvaluation of the currency may be crucial to
firms tapping into the foreign capital market as well. Chapter III examines the firms’
timing ability in exchange rate markets. Specifically, we test whether foreign firms
consider currency market conditions in their ADR issuance decisions, and thus dis-
play some ability to time their local exchange rate market. We find that foreign firms
tend to issue ADRs after their local currency has been abnormally strong against the
U.S. dollar and before their local currency becomes abnormally weak.
Chapter III employs two methods to investigate currency market timing ability.
We start by analyzing the behavior of exchange rate returns in proximity of ADR is-
suance dates using a standard event study methodology. More specifically, we regress
de-trended exchange rate returns on a set of event dates in a window of six months
before and after the ADR issuances. De-trending allows us to extract the expected
component of exchange rate fluctuations out of our measure of exchange rate returns.
Since the expected change of exchange rate returns may be already priced into the
ADR offering by the equity market, these changes give the issuing firm little incen-
tive to time the currency market. We find that (the detrended) cumulative abnormal
exchange rate returns display a U-shape pattern around ADR issue dates. They de-
crease before ADR issuance and increase afterward. This suggests that firms tend to
issue ADRs when their domestic currency is abnormally strong. In our sub-sample
analysis, we split our ADR sample into Capital-Raising (CR) issues and non-Capital-
Raising (non-CR) issues. Since non-CR ADRs generate no net revenue for the issuing
firm, it provides a natural control group to control for the reason of ADR issues other
than market timing. We find that these cumulative returns around CR ADR issue
dates display a much more pronounced U-shape profile than for the whole sample,
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while no such evidence is found in the control sample of non-CR ADRs.
Then we apply an alternative methodology of Poisson regressions. More specif-
ically we estimate the effect of both abnormal currency and local and U.S. stock
returns in the holding period on the probability of the ADR issue decision via a
Poisson regression model. This approach allows us to control for the effects of stock
return dynamics on the ADR issue decision, to take into account the multiple is-
sues in the same month, and to identify firms’ best timing horizons. The results are
consistent with the patterns we identified with the event study approach. Estimates
for the exchange rate return coefficients over the whole sample are negative for win-
dows prior to ADR issuances and mostly statistically significant, and positive for all
windows afterward. In the sub-sample regressions, we find that CR ADR issues are
significantly more likely than non-CR to occur after an excess appreciation of and
before an excess depreciation of the local currency. Our Poisson analysis also shows
that extent of the currency market timing varies greatly across regions. It is most
pronounced across the sub-sample of emerging market issuers. The more pronounced
currency market timing abilities of the emerging markets firms motivate us to look
closer into emerging market issuances, in particular, the effects of financial crisis and
market integration on the currency market timing. We find that emerging market
firms possess superior currency market timing ability in the proximity of crisis periods,
which suggests those firms are on average successful in recognizing the symptoms of
an impending dramatic depreciation of their local currencies. And this timing ability
is more pronounced after financial integration has occurred in emerging markets.
After documenting that firms are able to time foreign exchange market through
ADR issues, Chapter III then investigates what kind of issuances and firms are more
likely to time the exchange rate market. We investigate effects of relative ADR
issue size or issuing firm size, Tobin’s q, the firm’s industry, and the identity of the
underwriting investment bank, respectively. We find that relatively big issues from
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relatively small firms, firms with lower Tobin’s q, i.e., firms with relatively stable
market valuations, and firms in the manufacturing industry are more likely to be
able to time the exchange market. We do not find evidence that exchange market
timing abilities vary across investment bank groupings. This evidence corroborates
our intuition that firms whose valuations are more likely to be affected by exchange
rate fluctuations are more likely to try to time the market.
The finding in Chapter III suggests that some companies may have, at least oc-
casionally, information advantage about foreign exchanges. It also confirms the prior
evidence that emerging market firms have private information about economic fun-
damentals.3
Chapter IV asks a simple question: Do lunar phases affect security markets? If
investors make decisions strictly through rational maximization, then the answer is no.
However, research evidence suggests that investors are subject to various psychological
and behavioral biases. If lunar phases affect mood, by extension, these phases may
affect investor behavior and thus asset prices. Since the lunar cycle has little tangible
impact on people’s economic and social activities in modern societies, investigating
lunar effect on security returns is a strong test of whether investor behavior affects
asset prices. The causality is obvious.
To investigate the relation between lunar phases and stock returns, Chapter IV
first examines the association of lunar phases with the returns of an equally-weighted
and a value-weighted global portfolio of 48 country stock indices. The findings indi-
cate that global stock returns are significantly lower during full moon periods than
new moon periods. For the equally-weighted global portfolio, the cumulative return
difference between the new moon periods and the full moon periods is 40.26 Basis
Points (bps) per lunar cycle for the 15-day window specification and 27.48 bps per
lunar cycle for the 7-day window specification; both are significant at the 5% level. Es-
3Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005)
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timation of value-weighted global portfolio yields similar results. A sinusoidal model
of continuous lunar impact is then used to test for the cyclical pattern of the lunar
effect. The model suggests that the lunar effect is cyclical.
To fully utilize the cross-sectional and time series data, Chapter IV then estimates
a pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). We include in the
regression a lunar dummy that takes on a value of one for a full moon period and zero
for a new moon period. The coefficient on this variable indicates the difference in the
mean daily logarithmic returns between the lunar periods. The PCSE specification
adjusts for the contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity among country
index returns, as well as for the autocorrelation within each country’s stock index
returns. The results of pooled regression indicate that stock returns of the new moon
periods are significantly higher than those of the full moon periods. Regardless of
window specifications, the coefficients on the lunar dummy are negative. When all
countries are included in the analysis, the returns of the new moon periods are on
average 3.95 bps and 5.93 bps higher than returns of the full moon periods for the
15-day and 7-day windows, respectively. Both estimates are significant at the 5%
level. The estimated coefficients on the lunar dummy remain similar when country
group dummy variables are included. When country fixed effects are included, the
estimated coefficients become larger in magnitude and higher in statistical signifi-
cance. Interestingly, the extent of the lunar effect seems to vary across different levels
of market maturity. The strongest lunar effect is found among the emerging market
countries: a 5.60 bps daily difference for the 15-day window and an 11.27 bps daily
difference for the 7-day window; both are significant at the 5% level.
To further identify the lunar effect, we examine whether lunar effects are related
to stock capitalization, trading volume and market volatility, and macroeconomic
events. We find that the estimated lunar effect is stronger for NASDAQ stocks than
for NYSE and Amex stocks. Moreover, the lunar effect is in general stronger for
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smaller size deciles. Since large capitalization stocks have a higher percentage of
institutional ownership than small capitalization stocks, these findings are consistent
with the hypothesis that stocks with more individual investor ownership display a
stronger lunar effect and thus provide further evidence that mood or sentiment may
affect asset prices. We do not find evidence that lunar effect is due to patterns
of trading volume or stock market volatility. To test the possibility that the return
differential between the full moon and the new moon periods reflects the average effect
of macroeconomic events or common market shocks, we investigate the lunar effect on
the global portfolio, controlling for the following three types of events: macroeconomic
announcements, major global shocks, and movements in short-term interest rates.
Overall, the results indicate that lunar effect cannot be explained away by these
factors.
For further robustness tests, we examine whether the lunar effect can be explained
by other calendar anomalies: the January effect, day of week effect, calendar month
effect, and holiday effect including lunar holiday effect. We also check the robustness
by examining various lunar window lengths, alternative Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) specifications, and a test of random 30-day cycles. Over-
all, the findings indicate that lunar effect cannot be explained away by other calendar
anomalies and is robust to various lunar window lengths, alternative ARIMA speci-
fication of stock returns, and is not a result of some random 30-day cycle. The lunar




The Home Stigma: Adverse Selection in ADRs
and the Home Capital Market Environment
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines whether characteristics of the home-country capital market
environment, such as information disclosure and investor rights protection, continue
to be relevant for foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. We find that less trans-
parent disclosure, poorer protection of investor rights, and weaker legal institutions in
the countries of origin are associated with higher level of adverse selection in ADRs,
especially for firms from emerging markets. Poor home capital market environment
increases the average bid-ask spread by 10% with one standard deviation in disclosure
quality, and the effect is economically significant. Our finding illustrates that cross-
listing in the United States is not a substitute for improvement of local information
transparency and protection of minority shareholders.
Foreign issuers are subject to U.S. securities laws concerning disclosures and pro-
cedures for equity issuances and are required to reconcile their accounting statements
with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (using form 20-F).
Some studies (e.g., Coffee (1999), Stulz (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2002)) argue
that cross-listing in the U.S. serves as a substitute for weak investor protection laws
in the home country. Extending that logic, foreign firms can also bond themselves to
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stricter disclosure requirements and stricter enforcement in order to achieve a better
information environment and attract investors who would otherwise be reluctant to
invest.
A number of empirical studies have tested the bonding hypothesis, using proxies
to capture this effect. Doidge (2004), for example, finds that the premium between
voting and non-voting shares declines following cross-listing, an indication that mi-
nority investors become better protected. Reese and Weisbach (2002) interpret the
frequency and location of equity offerings that follow cross-listing as evidence of firms
from weak investor protection countries seeking to bond with the U.S. security regime.
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) find that cross-listed firms achieve greater analyst cov-
erage with improved forecast accuracy, and Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2006) find
evidence of higher liquidity. Other studies find that an enhancement in the share-
holder protection and information environment, in turn, is associated with higher
valuation of the cross-listed firm (Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Doidge, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2004), and Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2006)).
However, more recently, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of
bonding. There are several possible reasons why bonding might not be effective.
First, regulation and enforcement of U.S. corporate laws might not be as stringent
for foreign firms. Foreign issuers can obtain exemptions from various disclosure re-
quirements of exchanges and regulators. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the U.S.
stock exchanges and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are not as
stringent with foreign firms in enforcing listing standards. Siegel (2005) argues that
the lack of effective law enforcement by the SEC and minority shareholders against
cross-listed foreign firms adds to the ineffectiveness of regulatory bonding, since it
is very difficult to prosecute foreign perpetrators across the border. Further, rules
governing corporate bankruptcy and derivative actions against foreign insiders are
based on the laws in the companies’ home country. Second, mechanisms to credi-
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bly commit a firm to higher-quality information disclosure and governance may be
unavailable or prohibitively expensive in countries with poor investor protection and
insufficient economic development (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006), Ball (2001)).
Ball (2001) argues that changing accounting standards systems alone is not enough
to improve actual financial reporting and disclosure. Third, if firms want to misrep-
resent their information within the U.S. regulation, they have varieties of means to
do so. They can for example, engage in earnings smoothing, aggressive accounting,
or loss avoidance.
The question then remains whether bonding is sufficient enough to make U.S.
listed foreign firms equally transparent regardless of cross-sectional differences in the
home market information environment and corporate governance. This chapter seeks
to shed some light on this question.
It is conceivable that the home market information environment and corporate
governance still play an important role in cross-sectional differences in information
asymmetry of cross-listed foreign firms, even when bonding is effective. First, many
disclosure practices are voluntary. SEC and other regulatory rules mean to serve as
a floor for necessary reporting. In practice, companies can, and may in fact desire
to, disclose more than what SEC regulation requires. Therefore, actual levels of
voluntary disclosure may differ for firms from different markets. Second, firms from
different countries may have different costs and benefits in implementing measures
to improve governance and transparency. Hence their incentives to increase the level
of voluntary disclosure and to bond to the U.S. security regime through reputation
mechanism may differ. The incentive to improve is low if, for example, there are
large controlling blocks of shares and minority investors are not well protected, or
when a firm is difficult to effectively differentiate itself because the home market
information environment is poor. Doidge et al. (2006), for example, find country
characteristics play a dominant role in determining the level of disclosure, and the
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effect is significant for ADR firms. Third, even when all necessary information is
disclosed, it takes effort to decipher and disseminate useful information. This is
more challenging for firms from less transparent home markets. Lang, Lins, and
Miller (2004) argue that U.S.-based analysts are less likely to follow non-U.S. firms
with large family or management-owned controlling blocks of shares, especially for
companies with weak legal protections in the home market. It is also possible that the
added reporting and disclosure required by regulators for cross-listing could crowd out
or substitute for the collection of private information (Kim and Verrecchia (2001)).
Most of the existing empirical research on the bonding theory focuses on finding
support for the effectiveness of bonding. However, there is evidence that institutional
features of the local environment find their way into U.S. cross-listed firms. Lang,
Raedy, and Wilson (2006) show that U.S. cross-listed firms report financial statement
information systematically differently than equivalent U.S. firms despite the fact that
all firms use the same accounting standards. Foreign firms recognize losses in a less
timely manner and generally report more smoothed earnings. Therefore, a cross-
listed firm’s home environment continues to be relevant in explaining the quality of
its U.S. GAAP reported earnings. Doidge et al. (2006) find country characteristics
are significant for ADR firms, especially for those from emerging markets. Bailey
et al. (2006) report cross-sectional evidence in volume and volatility that suggests
cross-listed firms from emerging markets have lower information quality. Ferreira and
Fernandes (2008) show the improvement in price informativeness after cross-listing
is concentrated in developed market firms; cross-listing is negatively associated with
price informativeness in emerging market firms.
In this chapter, we examine the cross-section of the information asymmetry sur-
rounding ADR firms, and relate it to information disclosure quality, governance,
and rule of law measures of the countries in which those firms are domiciled. We
utilize market microstructure proxies to measure information asymmetry. Market
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microstructure measures of information asymmetry are designed to capture adverse
selection between informed traders and uninformed traders. Since the firm managers
and those close to them constitute an important subset of informed traders in the
market, market microstructure measures also should capture adverse selection faced
by ADR firms, albeit imperfectly. More important, those proxies capture the financial
market’s perception of information advantage held by firm insiders and the result-
ing adverse selection cost. Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) use microstruc-
ture proxies to establish the relationship between information asymmetry and capital
structure decisions. Heflin, Shaw, and Wild (2005) find that there is a negative asso-
ciation between disclosure quality and bid-ask-spread-based measures of information
asymmetry in the U.S. stock market.
We measure the opacity of a country’s information environment with the home
country financial opaqueness, since it is a direct concern as a source of adverse selec-
tion. A less transparent information environment cannot only lead to a firm’s poor
disclosure practice, but also downgrade the market’s perception about the quality of
its disclosure. We also include legal and governance measures in our investigation of
adverse selection. Although there are distinctions between financial opaqueness and
poor protection of investors, a country’s financial opaqueness is often coupled, and
mutually reinforced, with imperfect protection of shareholder rights and poor cor-
porate governance. Moreover, as discussed above, investor protection and corporate
governance can influence a firm’s incentive to adhere to a high level of information
disclosure, and ultimately affect adverse selection costs. Thus, we include legal insti-
tution and corporate governance variables not only as control variables to investigate
whether home country financial transparency remains as a significant factor of ad-
verse selection for ADR firms, but also to examine their direct impact on information
asymmetry.
Our primary empirical results indicate that the home market environment still
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matters for adverse selection of non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. ADRs
of firms from countries with greater financial opaqueness, and poorer investor pro-
tection and corporate governance experience a higher degree of adverse selection,
especially when issued by firms from emerging markets. Among those emerging mar-
ket firms, both quoted bid-ask spreads and effective spreads are negatively correlated
with the quality-of-disclosure and governance proxies. Among firms from developed
markets, there is weaker evidence that poorer home country information transparency
and firm governance lead to bigger quoted spreads. Instead, legal origin of busi-
ness laws (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)) appears to be
a consistent and significant factor in their level of adverse selection. To extract the
adverse selection in our spread proxy, we also decompose quoted spreads into an
asymmetric-information component and a non-information component. We find that
the asymmetric-information component of spreads exhibits a negative relation with
domicile market transparency and governance, especially for emerging market firms.
It gives additional support that our microstructure measure does indeed capture the
adverse selection of ADR firms. Our results complement Ferreira and Fernandes’
(2008) event study finding that cross-listing does not improve price informativeness
for emerging market firms. We also provide some evidence that the “home country
risk” is priced by the market. Abnormal return is larger for firms from countries of
less information transparency and weaker institution quality.
Our inferences appear to be quite robust. We control our empirical regressions of
the market condition and individual firm characteristics. Given that many firm-level
controls such as size, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio are possibly correlated
with level of information asymmetry, our tests are actually biased against finding
an additional adverse selection component. We also augment our tests with analyst
coverage and forecast dispersion, which prior research indicates are associated with a
firm’s disclosure and information environment (e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1996)). Our
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results withstand those controls. To alleviate concern about home market information
transparency measure, we confirm our primary findings with an alternative time-
varying measure of information environment advocated by Morck, Yeung, and Yu
(2000) and Jin and Myers (2006). We also confirm our empirical tests with several
statistical methods. Finally, to further substantiate our interpretation of spread-
based proxies as a measurement of adverse selection, we conduct our tests utilizing
an alternative proxy derived by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) that is
not spread-based. The results of the alternative dependent variable show that the
proxy of adverse selection is negatively correlated with home market transparency
and better governance for emerging market sub-sample, but not for developed market
firms. There are several possible explanations for the finding that developed market
firms show less evidence of a relation between the home market environment and the
adverse selection in ADRs than emerging market firms. Disclosure measures may
not capture capital market characteristics among developed market firms; the cost of
adopting better disclosure and governance practice may be small enough for developed
market firms to bond themselves more effectively.
Our finding that the home capital market environment continues to act as a cru-
cial factor in the adverse selection of ADR firms, especially for those from emerging
markets, has important policy implications. It illustrates that cross-listing in the
United States is not a substitute for the improvement of local information trans-
parency and the protection of minority shareholders. In a recent study, Ammer,
Holland, Smith, and Warnock (2008) document that if everything else is equal, cross-
listing has a smaller impact on U.S. investors’ holdings for firms from countries with
weaker shareholder protection. Our findings help explain such a home bias in ADR
holdings. Therefore, governments and policymakers should still focus on promoting
information disclosure and improving corporate governance in order to attract capital
flows to their countries.
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and
provides discussion on some institutional backgrounds. Section 2.3 empirically inves-
tigates the relation between ADR information asymmetry and home market environ-
ments. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Data
In this section, we describe sample selection and the institutional background, the
measurement of firm-specific adverse selection and the home country capital market
environment, and the control variables used in this study.
2.2.1 Sample Selection
To construct a uniform testing sample, we need to restrict our firms to similar
institutional requirements. Different choices of listing type have different institutional
requirements. Non-U.S. companies to be listed in the U.S. are required to file a
registration statement with the SEC and furnish an annual report on a Form 20-F
with reconciliation with U.S. GAAP. Level I ADRs trade over-the-counter and require
only minimal SEC disclosure and no GAAP reconciliation (exempt from Form 20-F
by Rule 12g3-2(b)). Level II and III ADRs are exchange-listed securities and they
require full SEC disclosure and compliance with the exchange’s own listing rules.
Level III programs raise capital and must file Form F-2 and F-3 for offerings. Finally,
SEC Rule 144a issues raise capital as private placements to qualified institutional
buyers and do not require compliance with GAAP.1 Ordinary listings require an exact
replication of settlement facilities as for U.S. securities and go beyond Level II and
1it may be that a firm that accesses the U.S. markets by way of a Rule 144a private placement or
OTC listing, which require little or no conformity with U.S. GAAP, actually chooses to disclose more
because it anticipates a subsequent upgrade to an exchange listing at some later point. Similarly, a
firm that chose to list its shares for trading on the NYSE or Nasdaq may have anticipated doing so for
some time before and thus had chosen to present its financial statements voluntarily in accordance
with IAS or U.S. GAAP in the years before the U.S. listing.
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Level III ADRs in requiring full annual and quarterly reports prepared in accordance
with U.S. GAAP. We focus on level II and III ADRs to ensure uniform regulatory
disclosure requirements. We identify our sample of exchange-listed ADR firms on
NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq from Bank of New York and other sources. To the extent
that level II and III ADRs are subject to stricter disclosure requirements than level I
and Rule 144a issuances, our sample is biased against finding a home market effect.
We restrict our sample of ADRs to issues that occurred no earlier than 1990,
and collect their price and volume information between 1994 and the end of 2006.
The purpose of our restriction on issuance and price data is two-fold. First, foreign
issuances become more active in the 1990s due to conscious effort by the U.S. to
attract foreign issues and financial liberalization in other parts of the world; further,
most emerging market ADRs are issued after 1990, and most emerging markets do
not have local stock market indices until after 1994. An ADR issued earlier is more
likely to be localized by the U.S. market. More important, most of our disclosure
measures are time-invariant, and are constructed with data from late 1990s and early
2000s. Our restriction is to keep the data relevant to the question we study. Instead
of focusing on a limited period of time (e.g., Lang et al. (2003)), we examine the
whole period of time when most price information is available. We also drop ADRs
for which institutional data is not available.2 We end up with 355 firms from 36
countries over 13 years.
To avoid drawing spurious inferences from extreme values and to filter out errors
in the data, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom 5% of the asymmetric
information measure and firm size over the whole sample period. Also the availability
of the specific control variables such as the number of analyst coverage might differ,
so the number of observations for each individual regression may vary.
Stock price and return data is from CRSP and Datastream. Non-U.S. Market
2We do not include cross-listings from Canada, which are unique in their regulatory requirements.
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returns and volatility are calculated based on Datastream total market indices. Firm
accounting data is from Compustat. Analyst forecast data is from IBES.
2.2.2 Home Capital Market Environment
We use several measures to characterize the information environment of the capital
market of a country. Financial transparency measures capture the intensity and
the timeliness of financial disclosures, and their interpretation and dissemination by
analysts. We draw our main proxy of disclosure, GCRSCORE, from The Global
Competitiveness Reports, which includes results from surveys about the level and
effectiveness of financial disclosure in different countries. The respondents were asked
to assess the statement “The level of financial disclosure required is extensive and
detailed” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), as well as to assess
“availability of information” on the same scale. For each country, we take the average
over responses to the two questions in the 2000 survey and form a disclosure score
GCRSCORE. Higher values of GCRSCORE indicate higher degree of information
transparency of home markets of ADR issuing firms. The advantage of this survey-
based proxy is that it is possible to reflect variations in information disclosure beyond
those stipulated in the accounting rules. This is most relevant for emerging markets
where existing regulations on the book are not always properly enforced. Jin and
Myers (2006) show that this survey-based measure works quite well as a proxy for
financial transparency of the markets.
We also use an accounting-based index to augment GCRSCORE disclosure mea-
sure, and to ensure the robustness of our results. The Center for International Fi-
nancial Analysis and Research (CIFAR (1995)) reports for each country a disclosure
index that represents a score based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items as re-
quired disclosures in the annual reports, with low scores indicating poor accounting
standards. These items fall into seven categories: general information, income state-
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ments, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and
special items. We denote this index as CIFAR.3
Figure 2.1 charts the values of CIFAR and GCRSCORE (scaled by 10 times) for
countries in our sample. GCRSCORE ranges from 3.8, of China, to 6.4, of Finland,
with a median of 5.65, about the level of disclosure for Ireland. CIFAR ranges from
the lowest score of 56 for Brazil, to the highest score of 85 for the U.K., with a
median of 73, the score for Hong Kong. CIFAR covers slightly fewer countries (31)
than GCRSCORE (34), and covers fewer emerging markets. Numbers of ADRs from
each country covered in our sample are also reported in Figure 2.1.
A country’s financial opaqueness is often coupled with imperfect protection of
shareholder rights and poor corporate governance. Nevertheless, there is a distinc-
tion between opaqueness and poor protection of investors, which can affect firms’
incentive to voluntary disclose. We thus include legal institution and corporate gov-
ernance variables, not only to investigate whether those remain as important factors
in determining degree of information asymmetry in ADRs, but also to check whether
our disclosure variables remain significant after controlling for the shareholder pro-
tection.
We use an index of anti-director rights compiled by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (henceforth, LLSV)(1998), denoted ANTIDIR, to proxy for
strength of corporate governance. It measures the ability of shareholders in a country
to challenge managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision-making
process. It ranges from zero to six, with higher score representing better investor
protection. LLSV (1998) show that ANTIDIR is a reasonable proxy for investor
rights protection. When applicable, we employ a dummy variable CIV IL, which
equals one if the home market legal rules are of Civil Law origin, and zero if legal rules
regarding investor rights are of Common Law origin. LLSV (1998) show that, broadly
3These variables are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
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speaking, common law countries afford the best legal protections to shareholders.
Table 2.1 reports the Spearman rank correlations among the disclosure and gov-
ernance measures, as well as the summary statistics of each measure. It shows that
the disclosure measures and the governance proxy are positively correlated with each
other and negatively correlated with the civil law dummy. The survey-based disclo-
sure measure GCRSCORE and accounting-based disclosure measure CIFAR have
a high correlation of 0.69. The governance measure ANTIDIR and legal origin are
more correlated with each other than with disclosure measures in terms of magnitude.
Correlation coefficient between ANTIDIR and CIV IL is −0.64, it is 0.13 between
ANTIDIR and GCRSCORE, and 0.36 between ANTIDIR and CIFAR.
Notice that our home environment measures are time-invariant, but our sample
spans over several years. Fortunately, institutional quality variables are relatively sta-
ble, and are very slow to change. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of our results,
we also use a time-varying measure of home country information environment follow-
ing Jin and Myers (2006) The details of that alternative measure will be explained in
the next section.
2.2.3 Asymmetric Information
Information asymmetry measures at the firm level are notoriously hard to estimate
and lack accuracy. Researchers have used IBES analyst dispersion of estimates, earn-
ing surprises, or firm’s accounting discrepancies to proxy for it, with varying degrees
of success. We use market microstructure measures to proxy for the degree of adverse
selection. Specifically, we first examine bid-ask spreads of ADRs. Presence of traders
who possess superior knowledge of the value of a stock can impose adverse selection
costs on liquidity traders and market makers. Bid-ask spread compensates liquidity
providers for bearing this cost and increases with degree of information asymmetry.
Previous research finds the bid-ask spread to be a reasonable proxy for information
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asymmetry. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), for example show firms with lower
spreads have a lower degree of information asymmetry or adverse selection costs.
We calculate the quoted spread in percentage terms with daily data as
S = 100 ∗ (askprice− bidprice)/1
2
(askprice+ bidprice), (2.1)
We then take the yearly average to obtain an average quoted spread, QS, for each
stock every year.
The first column of Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the average quoted
spread across all sample firms as well as across groups that are formed by the measures
of disclosure and institutional quality. Quoted spread has a mean of 1.71 (percent),
and a wide variation across firms and years with a standard deviation of 1.47. Firms
from markets of lower GCRSCORE, lower CIFAR, lower ANTIDIR, and firms
from countries of civil law origin and emerging markets all have relatively higher
QS. We note that the finding that firms from civil law countries have higher QS is
consistent with the findings in LLSV (1998) that civil law origin countries offer weaker
legal protection of investor rights. The differences in the means of sub-samples are
all significant except that of different GCRSCOREs. This gives us a first indication
that QS of ADRs, and hence the degree of information asymmetry, is dependent on
the information and legal environment of the home countries.
Quoted spread has components other than asymmetric-information reasons such
as inventory, transaction, and order-processing costs. George, Kaul, and Nimalendran
(1991) show a method of unbiasedly estimating the adverse selection component of
a stock’s spread by exploiting different stock return autocorrelations of uninformed
trading and informational speculation. In light of this consideration, we also estimate
the adverse selection component of the quoted spread and substitute that as the
dependent variable, following George et al. (1991) and Bharath et al. (2008).
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To substantiate our interpretation that quoted spread differences reflect the degree
of information asymmetry of ADRs, we also test for the presence of a home environ-
ment effect using an alternative non-spread-based dependent variable that measures
the relative importance of information-driven trading in stocks’ price fluctuations.
Llorente et al. (2002) show theoretically and empirically that accounting for the
intensity of trading volume accompanying stock return autocorrelation can help iden-
tify the extent of informed trading. We develop our alternative proxy following their
methodology. Specifically, we estimate
rit(τ) = c0it + c1itrit(τ − 1) + c2itTit(τ − 1)rit(τ − 1) + εit(τ), (2.2)
for each firm i in year t, where rit is the stock return of ADR i in year t, τ is an
indicator for days in year t, Tit(τ) is the natural logarithm of the daily turnover de-
trended by its mean over the past 200 observations. The measure of informed trading
is given by the coefficients c2it, yielding one observation for each firm-year. For firms
with considerable information asymmetry, c2it tends to be positive, as more volume
indicates more speculative trading and the stock exhibits positive return autocorre-
lation. For firms with low information asymmetry, c2it tends to be negative, as more
volume indicates liquidity-based (or noise) trading and the return exhibits negative
autocorrelation. The lower (higher) is the estimated c2it, the lower (higher) is firm i’s
degree of adverse selection.
2.2.4 Control Variables
We include a variety of firm characteristics variables to control for the cross-section
of individual firm idiosyncrasy, including firm size, asset tangibility, leverage, and the
book-to-market ratio.
SIZEit is defined as the logarithmic of firm i’s total asset in year t, DTAit is the
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debt-to-asset ratio, MTBit is the market-to-book ratio, TANGit is the tangibility
of firm assets, defined as the ratio of firm’s tangible assets (Property, Plant and
Equipment Total, Compustat fundamental data item PPENT) to total assets.
Our firm characteristics variables are all possibly related to the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry of firms. Smaller firms are likely to have more severe information
asymmetry problems. A firm with relatively less tangible assets, ceteris paribus, is
expected to have a higher degree of information asymmetry. Low MTB also may re-
flect more severe information problem between managers and investors. LLSV (2002)
show that firms with better investor protection have higher valuation relative to their
assets, i.e., higher MTB. If information asymmetry is an important determinant of
a firm’s debt issuance decisions, then its cumulative effect, leverage, is likely to be
higher for firms facing more severe information problems. Since our main interest is
to test whether the home country information disclosure and governance environment
have an effect on the information asymmetry of ADRs, controlling for the firm char-
acteristics helps control for the firm level idiosyncrasy. Since firm characteristics is
possibly endogenous to country-level characteristics, adding those controls will bias
against finding a home market effect.
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the firm-level control variables, along
with the means of the firm-level control variables for sub-samples of firms according
to whether home market disclosure and governance measures are above or below the
medians, or whether firms are from emerging or developed markets. It reports the
p-value of T-test of difference in means in parentheses. On average, ADRs from
emerging markets, compared with those from developed markets, are slightly smaller
(but the difference is not significant), have significantly higher proportion of tangible
assets, and have significantly higher leverage ratio and lower MTB. ADRs from more
transparent markets and markets of better investor rights protection, as well as ADRs
from countries of common law origin, are noticeably smaller in size, have significantly
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less tangibility, and have comparatively higher MTB ratio. Except for comparison
across ANTIDIR subgroups, they also appear to have comparatively lower level of
leverages, although the differences are not significant. These features in the data
are consistent with the hypothesis that higher disclosure level and better corporate
governance of home markets allow ADR issuers to keep a lower level of tangible
assets. Relatively lower level of leverage and higher market-to-book ratio of those
firms indicate comparatively smaller degree of information asymmetry.
Many authors have used analyst-following data to proxy for the firm-level infor-
mation environment (e.g., Lang et al. (2003)). We include two variables calculated
from IBES data to make for additional firm-level controls. NUMANALY S is mea-
sured as the number of analysts following in the annual consensus IBES forecast.
DISPERSION is the dispersion of analyst EPS forecasts measured as standard
deviation of analysts forecasts in months of calendar year prior to the end of fiscal
year, and normalized by absolute value of realized EPS and square root of the num-
ber of analysts (following Jin and Myers (2006)). While higher forecast dispersion
is generally believed to be associated with higher degree of information asymmetry,4
the relation between analyst following and information asymmetry is less conclusive
in the literature. A priori, we do not have expectations of how NUMANALY S or
DISPERSION is related to adverse selection, and control for it only to the extent
that it may affect an ADR firm’s information environment.
We also include U.S. and local market volatility, measured as standard deviation
of daily returns calculated from market indices (in percentages), to control for time-
specific variations.
4When information production is possible, more potential private information can be discovered
and traded upon when there is greater uncertainty regarding future earnings. However, Jiang, Lee,




We are interested in whether the home market information and governance envi-
ronment continue to be relevant factors in asymmetric information of ADR firms that
are subject to SEC regulation and U.S. GAAP reporting. We estimate the following
regression model:
ASijt = γ0 + γ1HMEj + γ2Xjt + γ3Xijt + υijt, (2.3)
where ASijt is the adverse selection measure of firm i from country j in year t, HMEj
is the institutional variables of market j where firm i is domiciled, Xijt is a set of
firm-level control variables, and Xjt is a set of market-level control variables that
include volatility of U.S. and home market. All panel test statistics are adjusted
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with robust errors. We also check our
estimation with cluster regression errors, which yield very similar results.5
We pay special attention to information disclosure environment, since intense and
timely financial disclosures, including interpretation and coverage by analysts and
the media, are crucial for inside managers to have credible ways of conveying hidden
firm-specific information to outside investors.
2.3.1 Average Quoted Spreads
This section discusses the results of regressions equation 2.3 with the average
quoted spread, QS, as the dependent variable. It provides us with the first evidence
to our investigation.
Table 2.3 reports the estimation results of our baseline regression. Examining
Table 2.3, we find that both GCRSCORE and CIFAR are negatively correlated with
the quoted spread, with similar magnitudes (the mean of GCRSCORE is 5.4 and the
5Cluster regression does not change coefficient estimates.
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mean of CIFAR is 71), indicating a higher spread for ADRs from less transparent
markets. The coefficient estimate of GCRSCORE is −0.06 with a p-value of 0.11.
The coefficient estimate of CIFAR is −0.01 with a p-value of 0.02. The significance
level of GCRSCORE is relatively weak. This is partly due to the fact that variations
of GCRSCORE are smaller relative to variations in spreads throughout the years.
It is also explained by the fact, which will transpire more clearly in our later sub-
sample and two-stage analysis, that developed markets are less well-characterized
by survey measures. The coefficient estimate of ANTIDIR is −0.12. The CIV IL
dummy shows a coefficient of 0.42. Both are highly significant. These estimates
suggest that firms with better protection of investor rights, measured either by the
anti-director rights or by common-law legal origin versus civil-law, on average have
lower spreads. The result that the legal and governance environment can affect an
ADR firm’s information asymmetry is somewhat counterintuitive at the first brush.
But recall our discussion that weak investor protection can reduce a firm’s incentive
to voluntarily disclose, can negatively affect analyst covering of the firm, and can
decrease investors’ desire to be informed about the firm, then the result isn’t all that
surprising.
On control variables, as expected, spreads are negatively correlated with firm size
and MTB, which are often used as proxies of information asymmetry. Spreads are
also positively and significantly correlated with U.S. market volatility. More volatile
local markets lead to higher spreads, but the estimates are not significant. Leverage
is positively correlated with spread, consistent with the suggestion that higher degree
of information asymmetry leads to higher leverage. One surprise is that tangibility is
positively correlated with the quoted spreads, since higher tangibility often suggests a
lower information asymmetry. We speculate that firms with higher adverse selection,
including those from less transparent home markets, tend to elect to have a higher
component of tangible assets.
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Table 2.4 focuses on the disclosure variable GCRSCORE, and further examines
the robustness of our baseline results of the quoted-spread regression with various
combinations of controls. Columns (1) and (2) estimate regressions without market
volatilities and tangibility, respectively. They show that the exclusion of TANG does
not affect the significance of our results. Column (3) includes an emerging market
dummy variable, EM, to the regression. It shows that GCRSCORE absorbs most of
the emerging market factor, but the significance level decreases. Column (4) includes
industry fixed effect;6 it shows that the industry fixed effect reduces home country
disclosure factor but the estimate on GCRSCORE is still negative.7 Columns (6),
(7), and (8) add CIV IL, ANTIDIR, and both to the list of regressors. The coeffi-
cient estimates of GCRSCORE remain negative and significant and their magnitude
actually increases, indicating that disclosure, although positively correlated with the
governance and the civil-law dummy, is a distinctive factor that affects spreads. The
estimates on CIV IL and ANTIDIR remain consistent with those of Table 2.3 and
are significant. Column (9) shows that home country disclosure effect is robust to
controlling of the analyst opinion dispersion and the analysts coverage. The coeffi-
cient estimate on DISPERSION is negative and on NUMANALY S is positive,
consistent with the argument that analysts dispersion of opinion is an indicator of
information asymmetry and the more analysts coverage reduces information asym-
metry.
Several authors have argued that ADR firms from markets of different matu-
rity behave differently when being integrated into the new information environment.
Ferreira and Fernandes (2008) find that cross-listing has an asymmetric impact on
stock price informativeness for emerging-market and developed-market firms. It is
therefore of interest to estimate our baseline regressions separately for the Emerging
6Industry classification according to 2-digit SIC
7Our Fama-Mcbeth estimates show that significance of GCRSCORE is robust to industry fixed
effect
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Market (EM) and the Developed Market (DEV) firms. Table 2.5 presents the re-
sults. For the EM sub-sample, the coefficient estimate on GCRSCORE is slightly
bigger (more negative, -0.08 compared to -0.06) than the whole sample, although
its significance is a reduced p-value of 0.19, possibly due to the reduced sample size
and variation in GCRSCORE; the coefficient estimate on CIFAR is negative but
not significant. While for the DEV sub-sample, GCRSCORE is much smaller (less
negative, -0.01 compares to -0.06) than the whole sample, and insignificant, but the
coefficient estimate on CIFAR remains negative and significant. It suggests that
survey-based disclosure measure is not as informative an indicator of market trans-
parency for the DEV markets as it is for the EM markets. Conceptually, it is harder
to distinguish matured markets by survey respondents. Accounting-based “hard”
measures are more appropriate for those markets. While for the EM markets, the
accounting-based “hard” measure is not enough to explain the level of market trans-
parency, probably due to the lack of enforcement of the existing rules. The survey-
based measure does a better job. Note also for our data, GCRSCORE covers more
EM country than CIFAR. After examining estimates on ANTIDIR and CIV IL,
we find that the governance and the legal origin effects are much larger for the EM
firms than for the DEV firms. ANTIDIR and CIV IL coefficients are −0.19 and
0.7, respectively, for the EM sub-sample, comparing to −0.02 and 0.2 respectively
for the DEV sub-sample. Both ANTIDIR and CIV IL estimates are significant for
the EM firms, but ANTIDIR is not significant for the DEV firms, suggesting that
corporate governance is less of a concern for the DEV firms than the EM firms. Taken
as a whole, results in our sub-sample tests are consistent with the hypothesis that
EM ADRs are more subjectable to the home capital market environment than DEV
ADRs.
Table 2.5 also shows an interesting difference between the EM and the DEV sub-
samples: Estimates on the local market volatility are bigger and significant for the EM
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firms, and smaller and not significant for the DEV firms. EM ADRs, whose adverse
selection costs are more dependent on their home capital market environment, are
more affected by their local stock market volatilities. This is especially interesting
since many of DEV ADRs have the bulk of their daily trading volume executed in
their home markets (Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Klapper (2007)),8 while EM ADRs tend
to have a larger proportion of volume executed in the U.S. exchanges. The fact that
EM ADRs have a larger portion of trading in U.S. exchanges makes our finding all
the more remarkable. It suggests that the home market effect for emerging market
firms is quite strong.
2.3.2 A Time-Varying Measure of Information Environment
One drawback of our disclosure proxies is that they are time invariant. While
evidence suggests a country’s information disclosure environment and underlying in-
stitutional structure are quite stable, we nevertheless try to check the robustness of
our results to time-varying degree of the home market information opaqueness with
the R2 measure advocated by Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006).
R2i in a market factor regression can be used as a measure of the extent to which
firm-specific information determines stock price movements, because R2i measures
precisely the percentage of firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility. A
high R2i thus indicates a high degree of stock price co-movement and a low observable
idiosyncratic risk. Morck et al. (2000) find that stocks have higher R2s in coun-
tries with less-developed financial markets. Jin and Myers (2006) confirm that R2
is correlated with a country’s financial opaqueness. Ferreira and Fernandes (2008)
use R2-based measure to show that emerging-market firms that cross-list in the U.S.
achieved less improvement in information environment than their developed-market
counterparts.
8Lower trading cost, better legal standing due to additional protection from U.S. security law
(Aggarwal et al. (2007)) are the possible reasons.
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We follow Jin and Myers (2006) to calculate R2it from the following regression:
riτ = αi + β1irm,jτ + β2irexus,jτ + β3irm,jτ−1 + β4irexus,jτ−1 + β5irm,jτ−2 (2.4)
+β6irexus,jτ−2 + β7irm,jτ+1 + β8irexus,jτ+1 + β9irm,jτ+2 + β10irexus,jτ+2 + εiτ ,
for each firm i included in the DATASTREAM stock database of country j in year
t, where riτ is the firm return, rm,jτ is the local market return from DATASTREAM
total return index of the country, rexus,jτ is the U.S. market index return adjusted
by exchange rate. The leads and lags in the regression are to correct for possible
non-synchronous trading. We then average across firms in country j in year t to get
our information measure R2jt, denoted RS, to substitute for disclosure measures in
equation 2.3.9 If quoted spread captures the degree of adverse selection, we expect
RS to be positively correlated with QS.
Table 2.6 reports the results of the RS regressions. Through inspection of panel
A, we find that RS measure confirms our finding in Table 2.3. RS coefficient estimate
is 1.2 when no additional controls are added, and it is significant at the 5% level.
After industry, governance, and legal origin are controlled for, respectively, estimates
of RS coefficient remain positive. They are significant except when CIV IL dummy
is added. Panel B and Panel C compare estimation results for the emerging and the
developed market sub-samples. Coefficient estimates of RS for the EM firms are all
positive, and are in general much more pronounced than those of the whole sam-
ple. Coefficient of RS in the regression without additional control, for example, goes
up to 2.18 and is highly significant. In contrast, three of four RS estimates for the
DEV firms are negative. We do not find significantly positive correlation between
the spreads and RS for the DEV sub-sample. This result is consistent with Ferreira
and Fernandes’ (2008) finding that DEV firms have improved their information en-
9Jin and Myers (2006) show that equally weighted averages perform as well as value-weighted
averages.
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vironment after cross-listing but EM firms do not. Therefore the EM firms continue
to have their degree of adverse selection affected by the home market information
environment while the DEV firms do not. We observe in Panel C, however, that
the coefficient estimates of CIV IL and ANTIDIR for the DEV firms have the ex-
pected signs. That is, consistent with Table 2.5, the coefficient estimate of CIV IL is
positive and the coefficient estimate of ANTIDIR is negative. CIV IL stays signifi-
cant for the DEV firms. Overall, our tests with RS as the home market information
opaqueness measure provide supporting evidence of a positive relation between the
adverse selection in ADR trading and the home market information opaqueness for
the emerging market firms. For the developed market firms, effects of legal institu-
tion on adverse selection withstand, but we do not find significant effect of the home
market information environment measured by idiosyncratic informativeness in stock
prices.
2.3.3 Fama-Macbeth Statistical Method
In the above regression method, we utilize a panel approach by correcting for ro-
bust regression error, or adjusting for year and country fixed effects (cluster regression,
not reported). If serial correlation in the error or heteroskedasticity is quite big, how-
ever, the above statistical methods might produce false significance. An alternative
solution is to use a Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-stage procedure, which estimates
a separate regression for each cross-section in each year and then takes the time series
mean of the coefficients. The relative advantage of the Fama-MacBeth procedure is
to minimize the serial correlated error and to maximize the cross-sectional variation
in the home country information and institution qualities.
We find that the resulting estimates from the two-stage method largely confirm our
earlier results. Table 2.7 reports an example as we reproduce the estimation of Table
2.3 and 2.4 using the two-stage regressing approach. Notice that the U.S. market
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volatility drops out of the cross sectional regressions. The resulting GCRSCORE
coefficient in Table 2.7 is −0.12 with a p-value of 0.08 when no additional controls
are added. Its magnitudes increase to around −0.20 when ANTIDIR or CIV IL or
both are added, as well as when analyst dispersion and coverage are controlled, with
significance levels within 5%. Consistent with results in Table 2.4, magnitude and
significance decrease when the industry fixed effects are added. Coefficient estimate
on ANTIDIR is negative, and on CIV IL is positive. They are significant when
entering regressions separately. Of the control variables, SIZE, DTA, and MTB have
signs as we expected. One notable difference is that TANG is no longer significant,
indicating the existence of autocorrelation in the panel data. Overall, the Fama-
MacBeth method confirms our earlier regression results.10
The Fama-MacBeth method provides with us an opportunity to examine economic
significance of home market effect since it presents direct cross-section comparisons.
For a coefficient estimate of −0.20 on GCRSCORE, average quoted spread decreases
by 0.15 (0.73 ∗ (−0.2))11 if a firm improves its disclosure score by one standard devi-
ation (0.73). This is economically significant, given that the average of these quoted
spreads is at 1.71. The hypothetical move almost reduces the average spread by 10%,
all else equal. Similarly, difference between a firm from common-law-legal-origin
country and civil-law-legal-origin country is 0.2.
Dividing the sample according to emerging and developed markets offers some
contrast between the two (not reported here). The resulting estimates for EM firms
are consistent with the estimates of the full sample, but GCRSCORE coefficient is
estimated positive for DEV firms (CIFAR remains negative but insignificant). CIV IL
estimate again remains positive. The effect of the home market information opaque-
ness is mostly driven by the EM firms; the DEV firms are more affected by their legal
10Sub-sample analysis of the Fama-MacBeth approach also confirms our earlier findings. These
results are not reported and are available upon request.
11Bid-ask spreads are in percentages.
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institutional differences.
2.3.4 Effective Spreads and Adverse Selection Component of Spreads
The quoted bid-ask spread is a raw measurement of trading cost and has its own
concerns. The quoted bid-ask spread may contain measurement problems, or actual
trading may take place mostly within the quotes. Roll (1984) derives a measure of
effective spread based on negative autocovariance of security returns, under the as-
sumption that market makers face only order processing costs. Moreover, Stoll (1989)
and others show that spreads could be decomposed of a non-information component,
such as order processing and inventory holding cost, and an asymmetric information
component of adverse selection cost. In our context, weak home market institution
and information opaqueness can possibly lead to an increase of all three components
of bid-ask spreads. Higher (unit) processing cost can be a result of less frequent trad-
ing, partly due to less transparent information; higher inventory holding cost also can
result from weak institutional protection; higher trading costs of ADRs from certain
countries can be a result of the lack of competition among exchanges, which in turn
reflects higher local trading costs due to institutional and informational problems.
Therefore, we are interested in the effect of the home market environment on both
ADRs’ effective spreads and the adverse-selection component of these spreads.12
We estimate Roll (1984)’s effective spreads and information component of spreads
with methods proposed by George et al. (1991). We estimate the former utilizing
the difference between returns based on transaction prices and returns calculated
using bid-to-bid prices. In the latter case, the adverse selection component of spread
is extracted by subtracting the non-information component calculated with auto-
covariance of expected return filtered return series from the yearly average quoted
12We estimate information component of spreads, not proportional information component, be-
cause with big enough spread, information component of a stock can still be relatively high even
with a low proportional measure.
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spread. Specifically, we calculate the non-information component by estimating Ŝi =
200
√
−cov(ητ , ητ−1), over a 60-day rolling sample in year t, where ητ is expectation-
filtered transaction return (see George et al. (1991) and Bharath et al. (2008) for
details); we then take the average to get the yearly estimate. We are interested
in seeing whether effective spreads and/or the information component of spreads
are correlated with our disclosure and institutional quality measures, and whether
GCRSCORE would remain a significant factor after controlling for other factors.
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 report the results of regressions in which effective spread
and adverse selection component of the spread are used as dependent variables, re-
spectively. Upon examining the tables, we find a consistent pattern of difference
between the EM and the DEV firms. The emerging market firms are more sensitive
to disclosure, measured either by GCRSCORE or CIFAR, and they are also sen-
sitive to governance measures; while the developed market firms are only sensitive
to legal origin measures. In fact, the coefficient of GCRSCORE for the developed
market firms in the effective spread regression appears to have opposite significance.
In the effective spread regressions, emerging market ADRs’ effective spreads are
negatively correlated with disclosure, measured either by GCRSCORE or CIFAR,
and protection of shareholder rights, measured by ANTIDIR. Slope estimates on
GCRSCORE ranges from −0.10 without additional control to −0.39 when legal
origin is controlled. GCRSCORE remains a significant factor after controlling for
CIV IL, ANTIDIR, and both, and after controlling for IBES forecast dispersion and
analysts coverage. Slope estimate of ANTIDIR is −0.13 and is highly significant.
CIV IL, the legal origin variable, however, is not significant, and appears to have
negative signs when augmented as a control variable. For the DEV firms, on the other
hand, local market opaqueness does not appear to be a significant factor that increases
effective spreads, nor does shareholder protection. GCRSCORE, in fact, appears to
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be positively correlated with effective spreads.13 However, CIV IL is positively and
significantly correlated with the effective spread, as expected, indicating that rule
of law based on different legal origins is an important home market factor for firms
from developed markets. As we find in quoted spreads, effective spreads are more
correlated with domestic market volatility for EM firms. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that emerging market ADRs have higher effective trading cost
due to local market conditions.
In the adverse-selection component regression results, reported in Table 2.9, the
EM firms with better local market financial disclosure have lower spreads attributed
to information asymmetry. Slope estimates on GCRSCORE ranges from −0.10 to
−0.29. GCRSCORE is significant at 10% level without additional controls, and sig-
nificant at 5% level when industry and IBES controls are added. It is highly significant
when legal origin is controlled. CIFAR has a slope estimate of −0.01, although the
p-value is 0.13 and not significant. CIV IL and ANTIDIR, in regressions where they
are used separately as the main institutional regressors respectively, are significant
and have signs as expected. For the DEV firms, CIFAR is negatively and significantly
correlated with adverse selection component of spreads. GCRSCORE estimates are
negative except when CIV IL is augmented as control variable, but they are not sig-
nificant. Therefore, unlike results in the effective spread regressions, adverse-selection
component of spreads of the DEV firms widens with more opaque home disclosure,
albeit less significantly comparing to that of the EM firms. Coefficient estimates of
CIV IL are consistently positive and significant across specifications, again indicating
legal origin of laws is an important factor in determining trading cost for DEV firms.
ANTIDIR has a slope estimate of −0.65 when estimated as the lone institutional
13The reason behind a positive relation between effective spreads and GCRSCORE among DEV
firms may be due to ADRs from more transparent markets being more actively traded and thus have
higher order processing cost and more volatile returns, which both contribute to higher effective
spread. When the information asymmetry component of spread is less affected by home market
information environment for DEV ADR firms, effects of other components of the bid-ask spread are
likely to dominate.
36
variable, but is not significant, and is otherwise positive. In contrast to results in the
effective spread regression, estimates of institutional quality variables for the whole
sample all have the expected signs and are significant. This is most likely due to
DEV firms’ responses of adverse selection component of spreads to disclosure and
governance variables are more “well behaved” than that of effective spreads.
Overall, we conclude that better local legal institution qualities and more trans-
parent information environment reduce adverse selection component of trading costs.
This effect is more pronounced for emerging market firms, which display significant
effects in both effective trading cost and adverse selection component of spreads than
for developed market firms. For firms from developed markets, local information
disclosure and corporate governance measured by anti-director rights do not appear
to adversely affect effective spreads, instead the rule of law based on different le-
gal origins appears to be the dominant institutional factor in affecting trading costs.
The adverse selection component of spreads of developed market firms are weakly
correlated with domestic institution qualities, but the non-information component is
not. Both information and non-information component of spreads of emerging market
firms are correlated with domestic institution quality. As a result, the overall sample
exhibits correlation between information component of spreads and home quality of
institutions.
2.3.5 Alternative Information Measure
So far, we have presented empirical evidence that information-based trading is
positively correlated with a more opaque domestic information environment and a
poorer institutional quality. More specifically, bid-ask spreads, and their information
component, appear to be higher for ADRs from markets of lower disclosure, poorer
investor protection, and of civil law legal origin, especially for emerging market firms.
To substantiate our interpretation of the relation between information asymmetry of
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ADR firms and the home country information and institutional quality, we test for
the relation with an alternative adverse selection measure that is not spread-based as
a dependent variable.
Llorente at al. (2002) develop an intensity-of-informed-trading measure that ac-
counts for the trading volume accompanying stock return autocorrelations. We follow
their method and construct our alternative proxy for each firm-year with resulting
coefficient estimates of C2it, denoted C2, from equation 2.2 for all NYSE and AMEX
listed firms in our sample.14 15 Within each year, higher values of C2 tend to indicate
more information-based trading and a higher degree of adverse selection.
Results of regressions using C2 (scaled by 100) as dependent variable are reported
in Table 2.10. To minimize the error driven by market factor, we estimate with the
two-stage regression approach and report the means of the estimates and p-values of
the related T-tests. The results for this alternative measure of stock price informa-
tiveness support the findings that domestic information environment and institutional
qualities matter primarily for emerging market ADRs. The coefficient estimates of
GCRSCORE and ANTIDIR for EM firms are negative and significant, while for
DEV firms they are positive. We do not find support that information asymmetry is
related to legal law of origin with the C2 measure. However, caution should be taken
against over-interpreting the C2 measure results, since the goodness-of-fit is relatively
poor. R2 of cross section regressions are at about 5% (consistent with Llorente at al.
(2002)).
2.3.6 Is the Home Country Institution Risk Priced?
With the evidence presented above, that domestic information environment and
institutional qualities continue to affect adverse selection costs of ADRs, especially
14Volume data for NASDAQ firms contains information from after-hour trading and therefore is
not as reliable.
15We also eliminate firms that have fewer than 60 available observations in a year.
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for emerging market firms, it is natural to ask the question: Is the risk posed by home
country information opaqueness and inadequate institutional quality priced? Previous
research finds evidence that poor shareholder protection (LLSV (2002)) and weak
legal institutions (Lombardo and Pagano (1999)) are penalized with lower valuations.
We’ve already seen that poorer home country institutions are associated with higher
capital costs in terms of higher bid-ask spreads of ADRs. This section presents some
preliminary evidence on the valuation effect of the home country institution risk.
In our context, our task in answering that question is a lot more difficult, because
ADR returns also reflect country factors other than the home country capital market
environment. It is difficult to differentiate the information factor from other country
risk factors in our context. Further, occasional bursts of international financial crisis
in emerging markets will likely distort our analysis. Nevertheless, to provide some
clue to that question, we analyze monthly excess ADR returns. We use returns after
2002 to avoid complication by the financial crisis. We first consider a hedge portfolio
similar to Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2004). More specifically, we extend the Fama-
French three-factor model by using a hedge portfolio based on home capital market
environment factor and substituting a world market return for market return. We
estimate for each firm-year:
rpτ − rfτ = α + β1(rwdτ − rfτ ) + +β2SMBτ + β3HMLτ + ζτ , (2.5)
where rpτ is the (equally weighted) monthly hedge portfolio return of going long in
ADRs from markets where GCRSCORE are below the sample median and going
short in ADRs from markets where GCRSCORE are above the sample median. rfτ
is the risk free rate, rwdτ is the U.S. dollar return of world market index; SMBτ and
HMLτ are, respectively, the Fama and French (1992) size and market-to-book factor
returns. We are interested in the estimate of α. A positive estimation of α suggests
39
that lower information quality needs to be compensated with higher expected returns.
Regression with monthly returns from 2002 to 2006 gives us an estimation of α of
0.67 with a T-stat of 1.5.
To investigate the question in more depth, we next adopt an approach similar to
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and OHara (2002). We first estimate factor loadings with returns
of 36 months prior to the month. For each firm i at month t we estimate:
rτ − rfτ = α + ωwd(rwdτ − rfτ ) + ωsmbSMBτ + ωhmlHMLτ + ζτ . (2.6)
We then estimate cross-sectionally (firm subscript is omitted):
rt − rft = λ0,t + λ1,tω̂wd,t + λ2,tω̂smb,t + λ3,tω̂hml,t + λ4,tHCME + %t, (2.7)
where HCME are our proxies for home capital market environment. We expect neg-
ative estimate of λ4 on GCRSCORE, CIFAR, and ANTIDIR if lower information
quality requires higher cost of capital. Table 2.11 reports the mean and P-value of
T-test of average λ4 loading from 2002 to 2006.
The resulting estimates show GCRSCORE, CIFAR, and ANTIDIR are nega-
tively correlated with the risk-adjusted excess return, and CIV IL is positively cor-
related with the risk-adjusted abnormal return. Lower information transparency,
poorer protection of investor rights, and civil law of origin are associated with a
higher cost of capital. Therefore, it suggests that risks due to home market informa-
tion opaqueness and lack of investor protection are taken into account by the market.
The significance of coefficient estimates in Table 2.11, however, is relatively weak,
with only GCRSCORE being significant at the 10% level. Nevertheless, it provides
us with some idea of the answer to the question. As we cautioned above, these excess
return analyses should be viewed with extra caution, since factors independent of the
home capital market environment effect are difficult to extract. Further research is
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warranted to draw a more conclusive answer to the question.
2.4 Conclusion
Cross-listing has increasingly become an important form of raising capital abroad.
U.S. investors hold ADRs as an alternative way to seek the benefit of international
diversification (Ammer et al. (2008)). Previous research on cross-listing finds evi-
dence in support of the bonding theory, which asserts that foreign firms can improve
their disclosure and governance by cross-listing in the United States in order to bond
themselves to the U.S. security regimes. The degree of effectiveness of such bonding,
however, remains an open question. In this chapter, we contribute to the bonding
literature by investigating whether the home capital market environment such as in-
formation disclosure and the protection of investor rights remains to have effect on
the degree of information asymmetry of ADRs cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges.
Our evidence supports an affirmative answer to that question, especially for emerging
market firms.
We show that both the average quoted bid-ask spread of ADRs and the informa-
tional component of the spread are positively correlated with information opaqueness
and poor protection of investor rights in the capital market environment of the home
countries, and this relation is more pronounced among emerging market ADRs. In
other words, the home stigma exists among ADRs traded on the U.S. exchanges. This
home stigma is robust to different measures of home market information environment
and different statistical estimation methods. Our evidence with spread-based mea-
sure implies that adverse selection cost in ADRs is significantly higher for ADRs from
less transparent and poorly governed capital markets, and our alternative non-spread-
based measure confirms that the pattern reflects an information problem. In addition,
we provide evidence that this “home stigma” risk appears to be priced by the market.
Cross-sectionally, the difference is significant between firms from emerging markets
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and firms from more mature capital markets. Among emerging market ADRs, the
connection between the home capital market environment and their adverse selection
in the U.S. trading is much stronger than their developed market counterparts. In-
deed, the “home stigma” problem of emerging market ADRs is so prominent that
it also drives their effective spread and overall trading costs. Information opacity of
emerging markets does not appear to be solely due to the lack of regulation itself.
In fact, the survey-based transparency measure fits them better than the accounting-
rule-based measure, suggesting lack of enforcement of the existing rules. Among
developed market ADRs, the home stigma phenomenon is weaker, but there is ev-
idence that home market accounting standards and the quality of legal institutions
continue to affect their level of adverse section in the U.S. trading.
Timely and intense financial disclosures, including interpretation and coverage by
analysts and the media, are crucial for inside managers to have credible ways of con-
veying hidden firm-specific information to outside investors. Although the regulatory
requirements of U.S. listing provide cross-listed firms with an opportunity to bond
with the U.S. market regime, much of the disclosure practice is voluntary and may be
subject to an individual firm’s costs and benefits. Home capital market environments
can affect a firm’s incentive of adhering to a higher disclosure standard, and therefore
affect the level of adverse selection in their U.S.-listed securities. Our results suggest
that this is especially a concern for emerging market firms. Given the fact that bond-
ing to the U.S. security regime is often cited as one of the reasons that firms cross-list
in the U.S., our finding of home stigma appears a bit puzzling. However, in a recent
study of deregister decision by cross-listed foreign firms following the SEC’s adoption
of Rule 12h-6 in March 2007, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2008) find evidence that
foreign firms are more likely to deregister once the benefit of raising low-cost cap-
ital disappears. Their finding suggests another possible channel that home stigma
may persist: Once foreign firms are listed in the U.S. and the prospect of requir-
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ing new capital diminishes, home capital market characteristics may creep back into
ADR firms. This is an interesting aspect of international corporate governance that
warrants further research.
Our results have important policy implications. Our results illustrate that cross-
listing in the United States is not a substitute for improvement of local information
transparency and protection of minority shareholders. Governments and policymak-
ers should still focus on promoting information disclosure and improving corporate
governance in order to attract capital flows to their countries. Our finding that qual-
ity of governance matters for the information environment also suggests that policies
aiming to improve domestic disclosure should be complemented with policies promot-




























































































Table 2.1: Correlation Between the Home Capital Market Environment Measures
This table reports the Spearman correlation coefficient of institution quality proxies. Summary
statistics of each proxy are also reported. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global
Competitive Report, and proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is an accounting-standard-
based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a
dummy variable that equals one if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of
common law origin.
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
GCRSCORE 1.00 0.69 0.13 -0.31
CIFAR 0.69 1.00 0.36 -0.43
ANTIDIR 0.13 0.36 1.00 -0.64
CIVIL -0.31 -0.43 -0.64 1.00
Mean 5.41 71.23 3.03 0.73
Std 0.73 8.91 1.31 0.45
Median 5.65 73.00 3.00 1.00
N 34 31 33 33
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics on ADRs
This table reports the summary statistics for our sample of level II and III ADRs. Means of quoted
spread, log size, tangibility, DTA, and MTB of firms from different sub-sample of markets are
reported, as well as the means and standard deviations of the whole sample. p-value of T-test of
difference in means are reported in parentheses. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage
of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book
ratio.
Quoted Spread SIZE TANG DTA MTB
GCRSCORE ≥Median 1.72 7.70 0.32 0.26 1.93
GCRSCORE < Median 1.75 7.95 0.46 0.27 1.70
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.52) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.30)
CIFAR ≥Median 1.70 7.63 0.34 0.26 1.95
CIFAR < Median 1.86 8.05 0.40 0.27 1.68
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.20)
ANTIDIR ≥Median 1.70 7.70 0.38 0.27 2.02
ANTIDIR < Median 1.79 8.03 0.40 0.26 1.49
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01)
COMMON 1.63 7.28 0.34 0.25 2.68
CIVIL 1.83 8.04 0.38 0.27 1.46
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.19) (0.00)
Emerging Market Firms 1.80 7.81 0.49 0.27 1.62
Developed Market Firms 1.67 7.84 0.29 0.25 2.01
T-test Difference (p-value) (0.05) (0.65) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
Sample Mean 1.71 7.82 0.39 0.26 1.82
Sample Standard Deviation 1.47 1.73 0.27 0.2 3.87
Number of Observation 1909 1909 1905 1909 1879
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Table 2.3: Quoted Bid-Ask Spread and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of average quoted spread on institution quality measures of home
capital markets. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global Competitive Report, and
proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is a accounting-standard-based measure of disclosure.
ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one
if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is
logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-
asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. P -values are calculated with White robust errors
and reported in parentheses. Error Degree of Freedom and adjusted R-squares are also reported at
the bottom. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept 2.72c 3.28c 3.05c 2.44c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure and Governance -0.06 −0.01b −0.12c 0.42c
(0.11) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
U.S. Market Volatility 1.37c 1.23c 1.29c 1.30c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Local Market Volatility 0.01 0.11c 0.004 0.005
(0.22) (0.00) (0.29) (0.39)
SIZE −0.33c −0.35c −0.35c −0.36c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.51c 0.42c 0.60c 0.50c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DTA 1.27c 1.24c 1.26c 1.25c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.05c −0.05c −0.04c −0.04b
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
EDF 1796 1607 1633 1633














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Effective Spread and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of effective spreads on measures of home capital market environment.
Panel A reports the regression results of the whole sample. Panel B reports the regression results of
the emerging market firms sub-sample. Panel C reports the regression results of the developed market
firms sub-sample. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global Competitive Report, and
proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is an accounting-standard-based measure of disclosure.
ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one
if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is
logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-
asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. NUMANALYS is measured as the number of
analysts following of that specific year. DISPERSION is dispersion of analyst EPS forecast measured
as standard deviation of analysts forecast in months of calendar year prior to the end of fiscal year,
and normalized by absolute value of realized EPS and square root of the number of analysts. P -
values are calculated with White robust errors and reported in parentheses. Error Degree of Freedom
and adjusted R-squares are also reported at the bottom. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: ALL Firms
Intercept 2.18c 2.83c 2.88c 2.46c 2.88c 1.87c 2.92c 2.30c 2.58c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE 0.00 −0.08a -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.05
(0.99) (0.07) (0.22) (0.68) (0.24) (0.13)
CIFAR −0.01c
(0.01)
U.S. Market Volatility 1.05c 0.99c 0.99c 1.05c 0.99c 1.07c 0.96c 0.99c 0.99c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Local Market Volatility 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.055c 0.002 0.001
(0.41) (0.92) (0.98) (0.58) (0.98) (0.42) (0.00) (0.61) (0.84)
SIZE −0.26c −0.28c −0.28c −0.27c −0.28c −0.20c −0.28c −0.27c −0.28c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.20b 0.15 0.20b 0.14 0.20b 0.32c 0.09 0.15 0.20b
(0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.24) (0.05) (0.00) (0.36) (0.12) (0.04)
DTA 0.60c 0.60c 0.61c 0.52c 0.61c 0.40c 0.57c 0.57c 0.59c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.03b −0.03b −0.03b −0.03b −0.03b -0.03 −0.03b −0.03b −0.03b
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
CIVIL 0.07 0.00 0.13c
(0.23) (0.98) (0.01)






Industry Fixed Effect yes
EDF 1769 1577 1577 1761 1576 1192 1577 1604 1604
Adj. R-square 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.29
Panel B: Emerging Market Firms
Intercept 2.57c 4.58c 4.00c 3.17c 3.90c 2.52c 3.65c 2.34c 2.90c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE −0.10b −0.39c −0.23b −0.14c -0.15 −0.12c
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.24) (0.01)
CIFAR −0.02c
(0.00)
U.S. Market Volatility 0.97c 0.84c 0.84c 0.93c 0.83c 0.96c 0.87c 0.85c 0.87c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Local Market Volatility 0.06c 0.04a 0.032 0.070c 0.030 0.042b 0.045b 0.058c 0.027
continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(0.00) (0.06) (0.11) (0.00) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.20)
SIZE −0.28c −0.33c −0.33c −0.31c −0.33c −0.25c −0.31c −0.29c −0.30c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.48c 0.24 0.25a -0.01 -0.04 0.10
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.13) (0.07) (0.94) (0.79) (0.52)
DTA 1.30c 1.55c 1.47c 1.18c 1.58c 0.99c 1.53c 1.46c 1.36c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.02a −0.02b −0.02a -0.01 −0.02a −0.07c −0.02c −0.02c −0.01c
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
CIVIL -0.05 -0.22 0.02
(0.65) (0.11) (0.85)






Industry Fixed Effect yes
EDF 858 687 687 850 686 595 703 714 714
Adj. R-square 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.28 0.27 0.30
Panel c: Developed Market Firms
Intercept 1.36c 0.49 1.56c 1.52c 0.33 0.90 2.39c 2.33c 2.23c
(0.01) (0.43) (0.00) (0.02) (0.60) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE 0.16a 0.30c 0.12 0.15a 0.25c 0.09
(0.06) (0.00) (0.21) (0.08) (0.02) (0.38)
CIFAR 0.00
(0.74)
U.S. Market Volatility 1.05c 1.05c 1.05c 1.07c 1.05c 1.13c 0.91c 1.06c 1.05c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Local Market Volatility 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.186 0.000 0.002
(0.26) (0.13) (0.28) (0.74) (0.19) (0.27) (0.17) (0.99) (0.59)
SIZE −0.26c −0.28c −0.26c −0.26c −0.29c −0.18c −0.26c −0.27c −0.26c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.13 0.20 0.10 -0.30 0.25a 0.31 0.14 0.19 0.11
(0.36) (0.19) (0.50) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.35) (0.19) (0.45)
DTA 0.20 0.24a 0.18 -0.03 0.23 -0.02 0.23a 0.27 0.19
(0.18) (0.10) (0.23) (0.83) (0.12) (0.89) (0.10) (0.07) (0.20)
MTB −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a −0.05a −0.04a -0.02 -0.04 −0.04a −0.04a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.26) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
CIVIL 0.23c 0.50c 0.12a
(0.01) (0.00) (0.09)






Industry Fixed Effect yes
EDF 903 881 881 895 880 587 866 882 882
Adj. R-square 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.31
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Table 2.9: Adverse-Selection Component of Spreads and Home Capital Market En-
vironment
This table reports the estimates of adverse selection component of spreads on measures of home
capital market environment. Panel A reports the regression results of the whole sample. Panel
B reports the regression results of the emerging market firms sub-sample. Panel C reports the
regression results of the developed market firms sub-sample. GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure
from Global Competitive Report, and proxies for information transparency. CIFAR is an accounting-
standard-based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL
is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it
is of common law origin. SIZE is logarithmic of firm size, TANG is percentage of tangible assets in
total assets, DTA is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB is the market-to-book ratio. NUMANALYS
is measured as the number of analysts following of that specific year. DISPERSION is dispersion
of analyst EPS forecast measured as standard deviation of analysts forecast in months of calendar
year prior to the end of fiscal year, and normalized by absolute value of realized EPS and square
root of the number of analysts. P -values are calculated with White robust errors and reported in
parentheses. Error Degree of Freedom and adjusted R-squares are also reported at the bottom.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: ALL Firms
Intercept 2.22c 2.34c 2.98c 2.48c 2.34c 2.05c 2.55c 1.66c 2.10c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE −0.09c −0.11b −0.18c -0.06 −0.11b −0.13c
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.13) (0.03) (0.00)
CIFAR −0.01c
(0.01)
U.S. Market Volatility 1.51c 1.44c 1.43c 1.50c 1.44c 1.56c 1.39c 1.43c 1.42c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Local Market Volatility 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.064c 0.006 0.007
(0.20) (0.47) (0.53) (0.21) (0.47) (0.21) (0.00) (0.29) (0.29)
SIZE −0.27c −0.28c −0.27c −0.29c −0.28c −0.25c −0.27c −0.28c −0.27c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.35c 0.35c 0.37c 0.58c 0.35c 0.68c 0.32c 0.36c 0.44c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
DTA 0.99c 0.97c 0.97c 0.94c 0.97c 0.97c 0.94c 0.94c 0.94c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.06b −0.05b −0.05b −0.05b −0.05b −0.04b −0.06b −0.05b −0.05b
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
CIVIL 0.32c 0.32c 0.39c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






Industry Fixed Effect yes
EDF 1480 1327 1327 1472 1326 1036 1326 1350 1350
Adj. R-square 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.34 0.33
Panel B: Emerging Market Firms
Intercept 3.11c 4.01c 3.86c 3.61c 4.02c 3.10c 3.60c 2.34c 3.33c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE −0.10 −0.29c -0.10 −0.13b −0.29b -0.07
(0.10) (0.00) (0.48) (0.03) (0.05) (0.33)
CIFAR -0.01
(0.13)
U.S. Market Volatility 1.57c 1.46c 1.47c 1.51c 1.46c 1.68c 1.51c 1.47c 1.48c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
continued on next page
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Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Local Market Volatility 0.111c 0.079c 0.075c 0.125c 0.079c 0.100c 0.085c 0.090c 0.068c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SIZE −0.41c −0.43c −0.44c −0.46c −0.43c −0.44c −0.41c −0.40c −0.41c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.46c 0.45c 0.44b 1.12c 0.45c 0.72c 0.22 0.23 0.32a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.24) (0.21) (0.07)
DTA 1.30c 1.12c 1.35c 1.06c 1.12c 0.95c 1.28c 1.04c 1.28c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.14c −0.12c −0.13c −0.06c −0.12c −0.12c −0.15c −0.11c −0.13c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CIVIL 0.56c 0.56c 0.61c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






Industry Fixed Effect yes
EDF 713 579 579 705 578 505 592 602 602
Adj. R-square 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.47 0.41 0.45 0.39 0.41 0.41
Panel C: Developed Market Firms
Intercept 1.97c 1.29 2.09c 1.77b 1.20 1.75b 2.74c 1.46c 1.53c
(0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GCRSCORE -0.09 0.03 -0.10 -0.12 -0.01 -0.16
(0.42) (0.83) (0.42) (0.26) (0.93) (0.17)
CIFAR −0.02c
(0.01)
U.S. Market Volatility 1.34 1.33c 1.32c 1.35c 1.34c 1.38c 1.37c 1.33c 1.32c
(0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Local Market Volatility 0.006c 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.007 -0.099 0.007 0.008
(0.00) (0.31) (0.40) (0.59) (0.35) (0.37) (0.45) (0.31) (0.21)
SIZE −0.20c −0.22c −0.21c −0.22c −0.23c −0.16c −0.20c −0.22c −0.21c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TANG 0.20 0.28a 0.21 0.13 0.31a 0.58c 0.21 0.28a 0.20
(0.22) (0.10) (0.21) (0.50) (0.07) (0.00) (0.20) (0.10) (0.23)
DTA 0.57c 0.63c 0.58c 0.36a 0.62c 0.64c 0.60c 0.63c 0.57c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MTB −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a −0.02a −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
CIVIL 0.20b 0.36c 0.19b
(0.04) (0.00) (0.02)






Industry Fixed Effect yes
EDF 759 739 739 751 738 521 726 740 740
Adj. R-square 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.28
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Table 2.10: C2 Adverse Selection Measure and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the estimates of alternative non-spread based adverse selection measure on mea-
sures of home capital market environment. Panel A reports the regression results of the whole
sample. Panel B reports the regression results of the emerging market firms sub-sample. Panel C
reports the regression results of the developed market firms sub-sample. Dependant Variable C2 is
estimated from the coefficients c2it of rit(τ) = c0it + c1itrit(τ − 1) + c2itTit(τ − 1)rit(τ − 1) + εit(τ),
where rit is the stock return of ADR i in year t, τ is an indicator for days in year t, Tit(τ) is
the natural logarithm of the daily turnover detrended by its mean over the past 200 observations.
GCRSCORE is a survey-based measure from Global Competitive Report, and proxies for informa-
tion transparency. CIFAR is a accounting-standard based measure of disclosure. ANTIDIR is a
measure of minority investor protection. CIVIL is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s
business law is of civil law origin, and zero if it is of common law origin. SIZE is logarithmic of firm
size, TANG is percentage of tangible assets in total assets, DTA is the debt-to-asset ratio, and MTB
is the market-to-book ratio. The regressions are estimated cross-sectionally for each year, and the
mean of resulting estimates are reported. P -value in parentheses are referenced from T-distribution.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Firms
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept 0.08 -0.08 0.51 1.25
(0.96) (0.98) (0.80) (0.48)
Disclosure and Governance 0.25 0.02 0.07 -0.47
(0.12) (0.43) (0.59) (0.33)
SIZE -0.31 −0.34a -0.26 -0.28
(0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.15)
DTA 1.11 0.67 1.32 1.47
(0.50) (0.70) (0.48) (0.43)
MTB −0.40b −0.34b −0.39b −0.41b
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Panel B: Emerging Market Firms
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept 8.41c 5.45 5.37c 3.60a
(0.01) (0.25) (0.01) (0.07)
Disclosure and Governance −0.68a -0.01 −0.31a 0.07
(0.06) (0.75) (0.06) (0.92)
SIZE −0.73c −0.70c −0.68c −0.63c
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
DTA 0.39 0.77 0.96 1.50
(0.80) (0.65) (0.56) (0.39)
MTB −0.70a -0.61 −0.76a -0.66
(0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11)
Panel C: Developed Market Firms
GCRSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Intercept −7.29a 1.09 -0.83 -0.14
(0.07) (0.81) (0.74) (0.96)
Disclosure and Governance 1.29a 0.00 0.45a -0.20
(0.08) (0.99) (0.08) (0.68)
SIZE -0.16 -0.28 -0.22 -0.16
(0.51) (0.29) (0.32) (0.54)
DTA 2.09 1.78 2.16 2.35
(0.38) (0.43) (0.37) (0.32)
MTB −0.55c -0.33 −0.52b 0.40a
(0.01) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07)
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Table 2.11: Excess ADR Returns and Home Capital Market Environment
This table reports the time series (monthly) means of λ4, the loadings on home capital market
environment. λ4,t of each month from 2002 to end of 2006 are estimated from
rt − rft = λ0,t + λ1,tω̂wd,t + λ2,tω̂smb,t + λ3,tω̂hml,t + λ4,tHCME + %t,
where HCME are our proxies for home capital market environment. ω̂wd,t, ω̂smb,t, and ω̂hml,t are
estimates for each firm month from
rτ − rfτ = α+ ωwd(rwdτ − rfτ ) + ωsmbSMBτ + ωhmlHMLτ + ζτ ,
with 36 months of data prior to the month. rwdτ is the U.S. dollar return of world market index;
SMBτ and HMLτ are, respectively, the Fama-French (1992) size and market-to-book factor returns.
P -value in parentheses are referenced from T-distribution. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
GRCSCORE CIFAR ANTIDIR CIVIL
Disclosure and Governance −0.51a -0.02 -0.18 0.63
(0.06) (0.51) (022) (0.18)
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CHAPTER III
Is There Timing Ability in Currency Markets?
Evidence from ADR Issuances
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine whether foreign firms issuing American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) have the ability to time their corresponding exchange rate market
when doing so.1 We find that these firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency
has been abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar and before their local currency
becomes abnormally weak.2 This result, to our knowledge novel to the literature,
is prima facie puzzling since i) the currency market is among the largest and most
1With the increasing integration of the world financial markets, an increasing number of firms
are raising capital abroad (Brian Henderson and Weisbach (2004); Karolyi (2006)). The U.S. ADR
market, in particular, has become one of the most important venues for foreign firms to raise equity
capital outside their local stock market.
2Many recent studies have found that firms are able to exploit temporary mispricings in their local
capital markets via the issuance of overpriced securities (e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and
Wurgler (2002), Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003)). Other studies have raised the possibility
that foreign firms may be able to time the world equity market by cross-listings. Foerster and Karolyi
(1999) and Miller (1999) found a statistically significant run-up and subsequent decline of abnormal
stock returns within horizons between one week and one year around ADR announcement and/or
listing dates. While Miller (1999) related this phenomenon to market segmentation, Foerster and
Karolyi (1999) attributed it to strategic market timing decisions by the management of the issuing
firms. Along those lines, in a recent study of security issues on the world capital markets, Henderson,
Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004) provided evidence that firms successfully time their equity issuances
when the corresponding stock markets appear to be overvalued.
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liquid financial markets, and ii) the inability to predict short to long-term exchange
rate fluctuations using macroeconomic fundamentals is one of the profession’s most
documented empirical facts.3 Yet, we provide evidence that this result is robust and
ultimately plausible. This result is potentially important as well since it suggests that
some foreign firms may have, at least occasionally, private information about their
local exchange rates.4 Therefore, our study has important implications for modeling
and understanding trading activity in currency markets.
We obtain this result by proceeding in three stages. First, we remove the pre-
dictable component of all currency returns in our sample. Second, to motivate our
analysis, we conduct a preliminary investigation of the dynamics of cumulative abnor-
mal returns in proximity of ADR issue dates using a standard event study methodol-
ogy. We find a pattern of increasing cumulative abnormal (i.e., unpredictable) local
currency returns before ADR issue dates and decreasing cumulative abnormal local
currency returns after ADR issue dates. However, the statistical significance of this
pattern is not uniform across different event window intervals evidenced by the con-
fidence interval but we find the results are statistically significant for some event
windows (e.g., at five percent level for [-6, -1] and [1,6] event windows). This might
be attributed to several known shortcomings of event studies, such as event cluster-
ing, endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and arbitrary horizon selection. For instance,
3Meese and Rogoff (1983a; 1983b) showed that exchange rates and fundamentals are largely dis-
connected. Later studies failed to dispute these basic results. Frankel and Rose (1995) provide a good
survey of the subsequent empirical exchange rate literature through the early 1990s. Mark (1995),
Mark and Choi (1997), and Mark and Sul (2001) presented some limited evidence that fundamentals
may affect only long-term exchange rate returns, but not their short-term fluctuations.
4Accordingly, our findings may also help interpret recent evidence on aggregate order flow ex-
plaining and predicting currency fluctuations (Evans and Lyons (2002), (2003), (2004)).
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the above approach does not control for the timing ability in local and U.S. stock
markets documented by Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999). These con-
siderations motivate us to further investigate the relationship between the likelihood
and clustering of ADR issuance activity and past and future abnormal currency re-
turns using Poisson regressions. The Poisson approach allows us to address explicitly
those shortcomings in the event study methodology.
The results from the Poisson analysis show that non-U.S. companies display eco-
nomically and statistically significant timing ability in the corresponding exchange
rate markets over and above any timing ability in the corresponding equity markets.
Specifically, firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency has been abnormally
strong against the U.S. dollar, and before their local currency becomes abnormally
weaker, even when controlling for past and future performance of the local and U.S.
stock markets.
The findings from the Poisson analysis is consistent with the idea that firms have
private information to take advantage of their temporarily high valuations. When
the exchange rate returns for a local currency versus the U.S. dollar have been “ab-
normally” negative (i.e., when the local currency has been abnormally strong), the
valuation of a local firm in terms of the ADR issuing currency (U.S. dollar) is likely
to be high as well, ceteris paribus for its valuation in the local currency. In other
words, when a local currency is abnormally appreciating versus the U.S. dollar, the
existing local shareholders are more likely to gain through an ADR issue, since the
latter is conceptually equivalent to a short position not only in the local equity but
also in the local currency.
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This interpretation is prima facie puzzling in light of the current state of the
exchange rate literature. After all, what private information could foreign firms pos-
sibly have that other market participants wouldn’t? Yet, additional investigation pro-
vides further support for it. First, currency markets are less efficient than commonly
thought. Second, we find that currency market timing ability is strongest exactly
when, consistent with our intuition above, foreign firms would possess the greatest
potential informational advantage, e.g., when they raise capital through their ADR
issuances, during financial crises, in emerging markets, or when their business is most
sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Lastly, our evidence is robust to a wide array
of alternative specifications of our basic methodology.
To begin with, temporary mispricings are rife in international financial markets
due to various tangible and intangible frictions and imperfections, such as barriers
to capital flows, borrowing and shorting constraints, information asymmetry and
heterogeneity, “home bias,” market segmentation, etc.5 In addition, most nominal
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar are very volatile. These fluctuations are often
driven by political considerations, by the actions of price manipulators like Central
Banks and other large speculators (e.g., Pasquariello (2004a; 2004b) and references
therein), as well as by the existence of exchange rate regimes. These features may in
turn offer foreign firms significant opportunities to time their corresponding currency
5There is a vast literature documenting these phenomena (e.g., French and Poterba (1991);
Bekaert (1995); Bekaert and Harvey (2002); Tesar and Werner (1995); Bertaut and Kole (2004);
Yuan (2005)). Consistently, many empirical studies of exchange rate dynamics suggest that the
covered interest parity holds for short-term interest rates (e.g., Clinton (1988)), yet find little or
no support for the uncovered interest parity (e.g., Froot and Thaler (1990)) or the covered interest
parity at longer maturities (e.g., Popper (1993)). According to Pasquariello (2006), inefficiencies
and market segmentation are even more pronounced during financial crises. Shleifer (2000) surveys
the literature on why mispricings are not always arbitraged away in capital markets.
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markets. Finally, exchange rate fluctuations constitute an important determinant of
the revenues stemming from an ADR issuance. For instance, assume that a Brazilian
firm planning to raise capital through an ADR issue expects the real to depreciate
against the U.S. dollar in the next three months. Ceteris paribus, it is optimal for
this firm to issue ADR shares sooner and to convert the proceeds later to maximize
the expected real-denominated revenues from the issuance.
Second, we are interested in determining which foreign firms may possess ex ante,
and display ex post greater ability to time the exchange rate market in issuing ADRs.
To that purpose, we conduct a natural experiment. Specifically, we split our sample
into two subsets made of either capital raising (i.e., Level III) or non-capital raising
(i.e., Level II) ADR issues. We find strong evidence of currency market timing ability
within the sample made of capital-raising ADRs, but no evidence of currency market
timing ability within the control sample made of non-capital raising ADRs. Our evi-
dence on currency market timing is economically significant as well, since it translates
into total savings for the issuing firms of about $646 million (or 1.86% of the total
capital raised via ADRs) over a one-year horizon surrounding the ADR issue dates.
These results allow us to derive two important conclusions. First, they show that
foreign firms issuing ADRs exhibit greater currency timing ability when they have
stronger incentives to do so, i.e., when such an ability has the potential to translate
into monetary savings. Second, they show that our inference is unaffected by why
those firms pursue cross-listings in the first place. There is an extensive literature on
this subject. Karolyi (1996; 2006) and Doige, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (1998)
provide extensive surveys. Within this literature, ADR issues have been motivated by
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liquidity, cost of capital, visibility, signaling, and corporate governance considerations,
among others. Any of these motivations may interact with exchange rate dynamics
around ADR issue dates, thus potentially biasing our inference. However, since those
motivations behind cross-listings are potentially relevant for both firms raising capital
via ADRs and firms that do not, lack of evidence of currency timing ability only for
the latter suggests that our inference is unbiased.
We further divide our sample of firms into different groups based on median issue
magnitude, median issuing firm size, Tobin’s q, and industry, as well as the identity of
the issue underwriter, and study the currency timing of ADR issue decisions for each
resulting subset. We find that our market timing result is largely driven by relatively
big issues by relatively small firms (although those firms are large in absolute terms,
especially in emerging markets), issues by firms of relatively low q, issues by firms
with higher currency exposure, and issues by manufacturing firms. Relatively large
ADR issues are more economically significant for relative small firms, thus exchange
rate return timing is more crucial to their capital structure decisions. The invest-
ment opportunity set of low q firms is relatively small, and their market valuations
relatively more stable. Hence, the effect of the exchange rate on their valuations
in the issuing currency is relatively more important, making them more selective in
choosing the timing of an ADR issue. Firms whose valuations are more sensitive to
local currency fluctuations prior to their ADR issuance may possess a deeper under-
standing of the currency market, hence may display greater currency timing ability
when issuing ADRs. Consistently, manufacturing firms, which are more likely to be
export-oriented, may develop a greater understanding of fundamentals driving the
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relevant exchange rates and use this skill to time the currency market. We also find
no evidence that this ability can be attributed to the underwriting investment banks,
further suggesting that it is instead intrinsic to the issuing firms.
Finally, we show that our evidence is robust to several alternative specifications
of our empirical strategies. For example, we consider event windows and currency
holding-period returns of up to six months before and after ADR issuances to account
for different firms’ timing horizons. We find that firms’ market timing ability is
generally, albeit not homogeneously, significant across all of those intervals. Our
basic evidence is even stronger during the occurrence of financial crises and controlling
for the timing of market integration. Intuitively, crisis periods are characterized by
more intense mispricing, hence currency market timing skills are more valuable to
corporations. We also estimate our models for different groups of countries depending
on geographical proximity or stage of economic development. Currency market timing
ability reveals to be especially relevant, and especially significant for emerging market
companies. This reflects the greater importance of exchange rate fluctuations in their
issuance decisions.
Overall, this additional evidence on the relationship between currency timing abil-
ity and firm-level, issuance, regional, and economic characteristics make our basic
result more intuitively convincing. Yet, this result also raises a further question: If,
in fact, managers of these firms had private information about future exchange rates,
why wouldn’t they simply trade on this information (or even concentrate exclusively
on this activity) instead of just issuing ADRs (or keeping pursuing their core busi-
ness activity)? After all, the total savings reported above would be much greater if
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these companies could divert more capital to time the exchange rate market. There
are several reasons why they may not do so. First, the information advantage that
may explain firms’ currency timing ability could stem from their core business ac-
tivity. For example, Evans and Lyons (2005) argued that private information about
macroeconomic news originates from micro-level dispersed information about pro-
duction technologies. Without those production technologies, firms would have no
information advantage in the currency market. Second, that information advantage
may be occasional, i.e., neither long-lasting nor recurrent enough to warrant its sys-
tematic exploitation. Third, in this study we argue neither that foreign firms use
their currency timing ability exclusively when issuing ADRs nor that exploiting their
ability is the most important benefit of those issuances. The literature has identified
many such benefits (e.g., Doige, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (1998)), and some
of them are arguably greater than any monetary savings from foreign firms’ ability
to time the local exchange rate. Instead, in this study we concentrate on those firms’
ADR issuances because this activity may allow us to empirically identify that ability.
Fourth, currency market timing is inherently risky as compared to riskless arbitrage
opportunities. Lastly, there may be several capital market frictions (e.g., transaction
costs, borrowing constraints, or taxes) preventing foreign firms from fully exploiting
their timing ability.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
and provides summary statistics on ADR issuances and currency and stock returns.
Section 3.3 investigates foreign firms’ currency market timing ability by examining
their ADR issuance decisions and perform several robustness checks. Section 3.4
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studies the relation between issue and firm characteristics and firms’ timing ability
in the exchange rate market. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Issue Statistics
ADRs are dollar-denominated negotiable certificates representing a specific num-
ber of a foreign company’s local shares held on deposit in the issuer’s domestic market.
Consistent with the discussion in the previous section, there are two types of ADR
issuances in our sample: Level III and Level II ADRs. Level III ADRs are depositary
receipts issued over new local equity, i.e., they raise new capital for the issuing firm.
Hence, we label these issuances CR ADRs. Since CR ADRs are sold in a public of-
fering, they have to meet the most stringent regulatory and listing requirements with
the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and the chosen exchange (either NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ). In contrast, Level II ADRs are depositary receipts issued over
existing local equity, i.e., they do not raise new capital for the issuing firm. We
therefore label them non-capital raising (non-CR) ADRs.
To construct the database used in analysis, we start by including all public CR
and non-CR ADR issues in the U.S. that were registered with the Security Exchange
Commission (SEC) between 1976 and 2003 in Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum
tapes. Notably, we do not include Level I and Rule 144A ADRs, as well as Global
Depositary Receipts (GDRs) in our sample. This choice is based on the following
argument. First, Level I ADRs, Rule 144A ADRs, and GDRs are subject to more
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diverse registration and reporting requirements than those for Level II and Level
III ADR issuances. To begin with, Level I ADRs are non-capital raising issuances
traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, while Rule 144A ADRs raise capital by
being privately placed to sophisticated institutional investors. Further, both programs
require little or no review by the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and the foreign
issuing firms are exempt from U.S. reporting requirements under Rule 12g3-2(b).
Lastly, GDR programs allow issuers to raise capital in two or more equity markets
(including the U.S.) simultaneously, as well as in the Rule 144A private market.
Hence, because of their heterogeneous nature, registration and reporting requirements
for GDR issuers may vary considerably depending on the specific structure of the U.S.
offering.6 In contrast to Level I ADRs, Rule 144A ADRs, and GDRs, both Level II
and Level III ADR programs must comply with a similar set of stringent registration
and reporting requirements, such as Form F-6 (registration statement), Form F-20
(financial disclosure), and the timely submission of US GAAP-reconciled financial
statements to the SEC.7 Second, according to the literature, regulatory requirements
underlie most of the extant explanations for why foreign firms cross-list in the U.S.
Therefore, firms issuing Level II and Level III ADRs are more likely to be motivated
by a similar set of considerations while the motivations behind Level I, Rule 144A,
or GDR programs are more likely to be diverse. As a result, inference drawn upon
comparing currency market timing ability within either Level II or Level III ADR
issuances is less likely to be biased than if drawn upon a larger database including
6For a detailed description of these features see Karolyi (1996) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999).
7Level III ADR programs further require the submission to the SEC of Form F-1 to register the
equity securities underlying the ADRs publicly offered in the U.S. for the first time.
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Level I ADRs, Rule 144A ADRs, or GDRs.8
We further restrict our sample to countries with at least five ADR issues over
the sample period, since too few issues from a country may indicate the existence of
significant barriers to raising capital in the U.S. stock market. These barriers may
in turn hinder the local firms’ ability to time the currency market through ADR
issues. We also exclude countries adopting fixed exchange rate regimes over the
sample period.9 Nonetheless, the inference that follows is robust to the inclusion of
both sets of countries in our sample. In the end we are left with 353 ADR issues from
20 countries.
In Table 3.1 we report summary statistics for these issues. In the sample there
are 167 ADR issues from firms in G7 countries, 95 from firms in other developed
countries, and 91 from firms in emerging economies. The United Kingdom is the
country with the most ADRs issued in the U.S., with 89, followed by Mexico with 40.
More than 65% of the ADRs issued from G7 countries are CR ADRs; this percentage
is slightly higher for firms from emerging markets. Table 3.1 also shows that the
time between the SEC filing date and the issue date, known as the “time spent in
registration,” varies from firm to firm and from country to country, with a median
duration of about a month for most countries.
Table 3.1 further reports, for each country, the total ADR issue volume, the median
ADR and CR ADR issue sizes, the relative issue size, firm size, and Tobin’s q before
the ADR issue. The volume of each ADR issue in U.S. dollars is computed as the
8Our sample choice is also consistent with previous research on the costs and benefits of cross-
listings, e.g., Doige, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (1998) and references therein.
9These countries are Argentina, China, and Hong Kong, whose currencies were all pegged at
some point to the U.S. dollar.
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number of ADRs issued times their issue price as reported in the SDC Platinum
database. Firm size and q values are obtained by matching the issues in the sample
with the COMPUSTAT database. Firm size (market capitalization in U.S. dollars)
before the issue is calculated by multiplying the firm’s average share price over the
months prior to the issue (within the same year) with the corresponding total number
of shares outstanding and then adjusting for the local exchange rate versus the U.S.
dollar; relative issue size is the ADR issue amount normalized by firm size. When the
ADR issue coincides with a firm’s initial public offering (IPO), firm size is instead
calculated by multiplying the issue price by the total offering amount in all markets,
while the relative issue size is calculated by dividing the amount issued in the U.S.
stock market by the total amount issued in all markets. Finally, a firm’s q before
an ADR offering is computed by dividing the firm’s market capitalization before the
issue by its corresponding book value. For Initial Public Offering (IPO) issues, we
replace the market price with the issuing price, and the book value before the issue
with the first available book value afterward in COMPUSTAT.
Not surprisingly, both the total and the median issue size by firms from G7 and
other developed countries are bigger than those from emerging market firms, with
the United Kingdom being the country with the biggest total ADR issue volume
($15,724 million) and Germany being the country with the biggest median issue size
($701.3 million). Among the emerging economies, Asian companies have the largest
offerings, especially those from South Korea and Taiwan. Issues from Latin America
are generally smaller. Interestingly, ADR issuing firms from emerging countries are
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bigger on average than their counterparts from G7 and other developed nations.10
Furthermore, with few exceptions (India and Chile), emerging CR ADR issues are
always larger in size than the corresponding non-CR issues. The opposite is true
for issues from developed economies (with the exception of Norway and Sweden).
Finally, and consistently with recent evidence in Gozzia, Levinea, and Schmukler
(2008), the median Tobin’s q of ADR issuers is significantly greater than one, albeit
heterogeneously so across our sample.
3.2.2 Currency and Equity Returns
We complement the above database with monthly exchange rate data. The adop-
tion of a monthly frequency is not casual. This choice is consistent with the median
duration in registration reported in Table 3.1, i.e., with a median delay between SEC
filing date and issue date of about a month for most countries in the sample. More
important, the monthly frequency allows us to control for market microstructure
effects and liquidity considerations in the exchange rate data. Finally, the monthly
frequency allows us to examine firms’ market timing ability over reasonably long (thus
more challenging) periods of time, facilitating the interpretation of the economic sig-
nificance of our results.
Monthly exchange rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
which collects average noon market buying prices, with the exception of the Chilean
peso and the Israeli shekel. Those exchange rates, often constrained within bands of
fluctuations and allowed to float later in the sample, are obtained from International
10The ADR issuers from South Korea and Taiwan are quite large compared to ADR issuers from
other countries. This explains their small median relative ADR issue size in the sample.
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Financial Statistics (IFS). The resulting dataset starts from January 1975 for G7 and
other developed countries; for emerging economies, the time series of exchange rates
starts from the first month when the local ADR market became officially available to
local issuers.11 The resulting total number of monthly observations for each country
is shown in Column C of Table 3.2.
Exchange rates are defined as units of local currency per U.S. dollar. We correct
the data for such disruptions as the adoption of the euro for six European Union
(EU) countries in 1999 and for Greece in 2001. Hence, exchange rate returns for the
euro versus the U.S. dollar are used for these countries after their respective switch-
ing dates. Mean and standard deviations of logarithmic exchange rate returns are
reported in Column A of Table 3.2, together with first-order autocorrelations (ρ(1)).
Average monthly exchange rate returns among G7 and other developed countries
range from −0.31% for the Japanese yen to 0.26% for the Italian lira, and among
developing economies from 0.25% for Asian countries to more than 100 basis points
for Brazil and Mexico. There is also some evidence of (weak) persistence in currency
fluctuations: First-order autocorrelations are positive and statistically significant, yet
never greater than 0.48 (Column A of Table 3.2). These facts suggest the need to
control for existing trends in these exchange return series. We do so in the next
section.
Finally, our sample includes local and U.S. monthly stock market returns. Log-
arithmic stock returns are computed from Datastream’s Total Market Indices for
each country in their respective domestic currencies. Column B of Table 3.2 reports
11These dates are from Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002).
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mean and standard deviation of those market returns over the same interval as for
the corresponding currency returns. As expected, monthly stock market returns are
characterized by significantly lower autocorrelations.
3.3 Timing Ability in Exchange Rate Markets
The core notion of the market timing theory of capital structure is that companies
would raise capital by issuing overvalued securities (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002)).
Within a national context, this argument translates into firms choosing equity over
debt and vice versa (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) or among different debt maturities
(Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003)) according to their perceived relative mispric-
ings. From an international perspective, the relative overvaluation or undervaluation
of the domestic currency may be crucial as well for firms tapping into foreign capital
markets. Hence, the level of the exchange rate at the time of a security issue is going
to affect the ensuing proceeds for the issuing firm. Moreover, since there is evidence
that security mispricing is more pronounced in international financial markets (e.g.,
Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach, (2004)), we would expect those markets to offer
greater ex ante market timing opportunities.
The U.S. market for ADRs represents one of the most important sources of funding
for foreign firms (e.g., Karolyi (1996); Bailey, Chan, and Chung (2002)). Ceteris
paribus for its funding needs and valuation in the corresponding local currency, one
such firm could maximize the U.S. dollar proceeds of its ADR offering if able to
execute the issue around the time when its local currency is or has been “abnormally”
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strong and/or before its local currency is going to be “abnormally” weak. The first
objective of this chapter is to test for the existence of this ability. More specifically,
the main hypothesis we test in this study is whether foreign firms consider currency
market conditions in their ADR issuance decisions and, in doing so, display some
ability to time the exchange rate market. In other words, we intend to test whether
exchange rate returns follow a pattern around ADR issue dates consistent with the
above considerations, i.e., whether ADR issues can be predicted by exchange rate
returns before their occurrence and whether ADR issues can predict exchange rate
fluctuations afterward.
We employ two methodologies to investigate the currency market timing abilities
of firms. The first is a traditional event study approach where we examine cumulative
abnormal exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates. The second is a Poisson
analysis where we investigate the relationship between the likelihood and clustering
of ADR issues and exchange rate returns over different investment horizons. We
describe these methodologies and our ensuing results below.
Before proceeding, a potential concern must be addressed. A firm should be
deemed to have timing ability in the exchange rate market only if quickly reacting to or
anticipating currency fluctuations which could not be predicted by time trends and/or
time-series models. The latter would be the case, for instance, of a currency in a slow
but prolonged depreciation/appreciation process against the U.S. dollar (such as in
“crawling” managed floating regimes). These exchange rate movements, being already
expected, may also be already priced into ADR offerings by the equity market, thus
giving the issuing firm little incentive and opportunity to time the currency market.
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Therefore, we argue that the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on firms’ decisions of
when to issue ADRs should be limited to its unexpected components. By removing
these trends in exchange rate returns, we attempt to isolate the market timing decision
from those considerations, and simultaneously provide a tighter benchmark against
which exchange rate market timing ability can be detected.
Thus, we detrend all the exchange rate returns for each country n in our sample
according to the following AR(2) model with a time trend:
exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt+ εnt, (3.1)
where exrretnt is the logarithmic exchange rate return for the currency of country n
against the U.S. dollar over month t. In Table 3.2, we report the corresponding R2
from the estimation of Eq. (3.1) and the Box-Ljung statistic (computed up to lag 6)
for the resulting series of estimated currency and stock return residuals εnt. Overall,
Eq. (3.1) appears to be successful in removing the predictable component of exchange
rate and equity returns: The null hypothesis that the detrended exchange rate series
(εnt in Eq. (3.1)) is white noise cannot be rejected in all cases except Chile, Israel, and
New Zealand. Similarly, the detrended local stock return series resemble white noise
series as well, with the sole exception of India. In addition, estimates for the first
order autocorrelation of εnt, not reported here, are statistically indistinguishable from
zero for all detrended currency and stock market returns in our sample. Finally, the
R2 from the estimation of Eq. (3.1) for exrretnt is generally small, ranging from 3%
(Israel) to 32% (South Korea). This suggests that the unexpected portion of monthly
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exchange rate fluctuations, i.e., unexplained by Eq. (3.1), is nonetheless economically
significant.12
This detrending procedure has no bearing on the results below. In fact, these
results are even stronger when we measure firms’ currency timing ability with re-
spect to the undetrended exchange rate series. In alternative to Eq. (1), we could
have employed a structural model of exchange rate determination. For example,
currency dynamics have been related to interest rate differentials, purchasing power
parity (PPP), budget and current account deficits/surpluses, or relative GDP growth.
Yet, most empirical evidence shows that macroeconomic fundamentals do not explain
monthly exchange rate changes (see Meese and Rogoff (1983a)). According to Evans
and Lyons (2005), the currency determination puzzle is “the most researched puzzle
in international macroeconomics.” This motivates our choice of a model-free approach
to control for the predictable component of exchange rate dynamics in this study.
3.3.1 Event Study Analysis
We start by analyzing the behavior of exchange rate returns in proximity of ADR
issuance dates (as in Foerster and Karolyi (1999)) using a standard event study
methodology. More specifically, for any j ∈ [−H,H] and for any country n, we
estimate the following model:
εnt = α +
H∑
j=−H
δjInt(j) + ηnt, (3.2)
12As expected, the R2 from the estimation of Eq. (3.1) for local and U.S. stock market returns is
instead much lower, ranging between 0.9% (Mexico) and 11% (Chile).
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1 if there is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+ j,
0 otherwise.
The choice of an appropriate event window (i.e., H) in Eq. (2) is important,
yet difficult to make. To help us capture evidence of currency market timing ability,
such windows must include foreign firms’ investment horizons in timing exchange rate
fluctuations. Furthermore, those horizons could be different across firms, nations, or
regions. We balance these considerations by adopting a relatively long estimation
window of H = 6 months prior to and after each ADR issuance event in the sample.
However, the results that follow are robust, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to
alternative choices for H.13 The estimated coefficient δj in Eq. (2) represents the
average marginal (i.e., monthly), abnormal exchange rate return j months before (if
j > 0) or j months after (if j < 0) an ADR issue from a firm in country n. Therefore,
successive sums of those dummy coefficients can be interpreted as measures of the
cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issuances on exchange rates. For example,∑6
j=−3 δj is a proxy for the cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issuances on the
corresponding exchange rate return from 6 months before the event occurred up to
13When implementing the analysis in Section 3 for H = 12, 24, 36, we found little or no evidence of
currency market timing ability over those longer horizons. This is not surprising, since it is unlikely
that firms would display longer-run currency timing ability over detrended exchange rate returns
series. These additional estimations, available on request, should nonetheless be interpreted with
caution, for longer windows considerably shrink the sample of available ADR issues, especially by
emerging market companies.
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3 months afterward. We estimate Eq. (2) using the pooled data of ADRs from all
countries and report the resulting estimated cumulative coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in
Figure 3.1, together with their 95% confidence intervals.14
In the top panel of Figure 3.1, cumulative abnormal exchange rate returns display
a U-shape pattern around ADR issue dates, i.e., they decrease before ADR issuances
and increase afterward. This pattern is due to point estimates of the marginal impact
of ADR issues on exchange rate returns (δj) being first negative and then positive.
Before ADR issues, exchange rate returns are below their trend, i.e., local curren-
cies are on average relatively strong against the U.S. dollar; following ADR issues,
exchange rate returns are instead above their trend, i.e., the local currencies are on
average relatively weak against the U.S. dollar, eventually reverting to pre-event trend
levels. Interestingly, the above pattern is centered around one month before the ADR
issue month; this is consistent with the average lag between ADR filing dates and
issue dates of 28 days reported in Table 3.1.
We further analyze the extent of currency market timing ability across the two
subsets of our sample made of only capital raising (CR) and non-capital raising (non-
CR) ADR issues, respectively. Recall that CR ADRs represent new equity issued
and non-CR ADRs instead represent existing local equity. Ex ante, we expect the
former (218 in our sample) to exhibit the greatest timing ability, since CR issues
are a crucial source of capital for the issuing corporation and as a result currency
movements could have a significant impact on the amount raised. By contrast, non-
14In this study, we do not measure currency market timing ability at the country level, since the
number of ADR issuances in each of the markets in our sample (in Table 3.1) is often not large
enough to allow for meaningful statistical inference.
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CR ADRs (the remaining 135 in our sample) generate no net revenue for the issuing
firm by definition.
More important, non-CR ADRs allow us to address potential omitted variable
biases in our empirical analysis. Specifically, as previously mentioned, foreign com-
panies may issue ADRs for a variety of reasons, such as to expand their shareholders’
base, to reduce their cost of capital, to gain greater international visibility, to in-
crease liquidity, to signal quality, or to commit to improve governance (see Doidge,
Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (1998) for a review). Our empirical methodology
does not explicitly control for any of these considerations. However, we account for
their presence by estimating the extent of currency market timing ability across CR
and non-CR issuances separately, since these considerations should apply to both.
Therefore, evidence of timing ability in the CR group and lack thereof in the non-CR
group would suggest that these potential biases do not affect our inference.
The resulting patterns (in the bottom panel of Figure 1) are striking: Cumulative
abnormal currency returns around CR ADR issue dates display a much more pro-
nounced U-shape profile than for the whole sample while no such evidence is found
in the control sample made of non-CR ADRs. This suggests that i) firms display the
greatest currency market timing ability when raising capital, i.e., when such ability is
most valuable and translates into monetary savings for the issuing firms, and that ii)
such timing ability cannot be attributed to omitted variable biases in our empirical
analysis.
The evidence presented so far is consistent with foreign firms successfully attempt-
ing to maximize their expected proceeds from ADR issuances by timing issue dates
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according to exchange rate fluctuations, hence consistent with those firms possessing
market timing ability in their local currency markets. Supply imbalance and signaling
considerations cannot explain this result. The former, which stem from the imperfect
substitutability of assets denominated in different currencies, would cause the local
currencies to appreciate versus the U.S. dollar in response to the sale of significant
U.S. dollar amounts from ADR proceeds (hence a reverse U-shape pattern), contrary
to our evidence of post-issuance depreciation displayed in Figure 3.1. Moreover, ADR
volumes, albeit significant, are much smaller than the average daily volume of trading
in most of the currencies under examination (e.g., BIS (2002)). The latter is also in-
compatible with the observed U-shaped patterns in exchange rate returns, since ADR
issuances represent good (rather than bad) news for domestic economies.
It is important to show that our finding of firms’ currency market timing ability is
not subject to the aggregate pseudo market timing bias described by Butler, Grullon,
and Weston (2005; 2006). Pseudo market timing, in our context, is the tendency for
foreign firms to issue ADR following a run-up in their currencies. In a small sample,
pseudo currency market timing could give the appearance of genuine currency mar-
ket timing. Yet, according to Stambaugh (1986, 1999), this bias, also known as small
sample predictive regression bias, is most severe when the sample size is small, pre-
dictors are persistent, and their innovations are highly correlated with returns. These
conditions do not pertain to our empirical analysis. First, our sample is relatively
large (monthly return observations around 353 ADR issues in 20 countries over 28
years). Second, the regressors we employ here are event dummy variables (Int(j) in
Eq. (3.2)) rather than persistent aggregates such as equity and debt issue volumes,
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dividend initiations, or corporate investments.15 Third, Baker, Taliaferro, and Wur-
gler (2004) show that the bias introduced by aggregate pseudo market timing is of
small empirical relevance (e.g., only about one percent of the predictive power of the
equity share in new issues). Nevertheless, to further analyze the robustness of our
results, we compute confidence intervals for cumulative abnormal currency returns
using a nonparametric bootstrap procedure in which we randomly draw returns from
the sample with replacement. The resulting 90% confidence bands constructed from
bootstrapped standard errors and centered around zero (also reported in Figure 3.1)
suggest that the most significant pattern is around CR ADR filing dates.
We also test whether firms in different regions or from countries at different stages
of economic development may have different ability or incentives to time the exchange
rate market. To that purpose, we estimate Eq. (2) for the various subsets of nations
specified in Table 3.1: G7 countries, other developed countries, emerging markets,
and, within the latter, emerging Asia and Latin America. We report the resulting
estimated cumulative coefficients in Figure 3.2, together with their 95% confidence
intervals. The plots for our regional groupings reveal some degree of heterogeneity
in currency market timing ability. G7 and emerging economies (especially in Latin
America) display a cumulative excess exchange rate return pattern similar to the
U-shaped one observed for the whole sample. Yet, the sequence of local currency
appreciation is much more dramatic for emerging currencies, i.e., up to almost 2.5%
over the six months leading to an ADR issue. In contrast, exchange rates of other de-
15We further explore the relationship between the cross-sectional and intertemporal dynamics of
those dummy variables and both currency and equity returns in the Poisson regressions in the next
section.
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veloped nations are relatively flat before ADR issues, but then depreciate significantly
(by almost 1.5%) in the following months. Finally, emerging Asian currencies display
an opposite pattern, for local exchange rates appreciate by about 150 basis points
over the last few months before an ADR issue and are relatively stable afterward.
Overall, this evidence suggests that, not only in aggregate but even within different
regions of the world, foreign firms may be able to time the foreign exchange market by
issuing ADRs following a run-up of their domestic currencies and before a reversion of
their trends, especially when issuing unseasoned equity; yet, the extent of this timing
ability seems to vary across regions and markets and statistically significance is not
uniform across event windows.
3.3.2 Poisson Analysis
The results reported in the previous section suggest the existence of timing ability
in the exchange rate market. However, the event study methodology we employed to
generate them suffers from several shortcomings ultimately affecting their statistical
significance as well as their interpretation. First, the regressions of Eq. (2) are univari-
ate, i.e., do not control for other factors affecting the timing of ADR issuances, such
as the dynamics of local and U.S. stock markets. Second, the cumulative abnormal
excess currency return estimates implicitly weigh each monthly marginal coefficient
equally, hence preventing us from identifying firms’ best timing horizons.16 Third,
16Many factors may affect the firm’s timing horizon in deciding when to issue, i.e., the horizon
over which that firm may time the exchange rate market with an ADR issuance. For example, since
the process leading to an ADR issue is lengthy and cumbersome, a firm may not be able to promptly
take advantage of every abnormal exchange rate return opportunity. In contrast, a firm has always
the option not to issue a registered ADR if its exchange rate expectations are not of its liking.
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this approach ignores the possibility that multiple ADRs may be issued in the same
month from different firms within the same country. In other words, that information
is lost in regressing exchange rate returns on the dummies around ADR issue dates
(Int(j)). Most importantly, under the alternative hypothesis that currency market
timing ability is present, ADR issue dates are endogenous to past and/or future ex-
change rate dynamics. A sufficiently large window around each event date, as well
as time trends and lagged dependent variables (in Eq. (1)), may attenuate but not
eliminate this endogeneity problem.
To address these issues directly, we employ an alternative methodology. More
specifically, we estimate the effect of both abnormal currency and (local and U.S.)
stock holding-period returns on the probability (thus the timing) of the ADR issue
decision via a Poisson regression model. Poisson regressions allow us to test for firms’
timing ability over different investment horizons while controlling for the clustering of
ADR issues within each month. Consistently with the patterns shown in Figure 3.1,
we would expect the likelihood of a firm to issue ADRs to be greater after its local
currency abnormally appreciated against the U.S. dollar; we also expect more firms
to issue ADRs the greater is the past abnormal appreciation of the domestic currency.
Along the same lines, we would expect the likelihood of a firm to issue ADRs to be
greater before its local currency abnormally depreciates against the U.S. dollar; and
similarly we also expect more firms to issue ADRs the greater is the future expected
abnormal depreciation of the domestic currency.
We proceed in three steps. First, we compute excess holding period returns over
horizons of length h ∈ [−H,H], labeled adjexrretnt(h), by summing up monthly
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excess exchange rate returns εnt from Eq. (1) up to and excluding the event month,
i.e., adjexrretnt(h<0) =
∑t−1
s=t+h εns for |h|-month horizons before the event month
t and adjexrretnt(h>0) =
∑t+h
s=t+1 εns for h-month horizons after the event month t.
Along the same lines, we compute excess holding period returns for the local stock
markets, adjmktretnt(h), and for the U.S. stock market, adjusrett(h), for each horizon
of length h. Second, we assume that the number of ADR issues from country n in
month t, numissuent, follows a Poisson distribution,
17
numissuent ∼ Poisson(λnt). (3.3)
Third, we estimate the following Poisson regression model:
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) +
β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h). (3.4)
Eqs. (3) and (4) are a generalized linear model which we estimate by maximum
likelihood for each horizon h ∈ [−6, 6], along the lines with the analysis of Section
3.3.1, except for the contemporaneous holding-period returns (h = 0). Within this
model, a positive and significant estimate of β3 (h) at horizon h < 0 indicates that
ADR issues in country n are more likely in month t when realized excess local currency
returns have been negative over the period t+h to t− 1, i.e., after the local currency
has been abnormally appreciating for |h| months prior to the event. Vice versa, a
17This assumption is reasonable since the sample average for numissuent is very close to its sample
variance for each of the countries in our database and over the entire set of ADR issue events.
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positive and significant estimate of β3 (h) at horizon h > 0 indicates that ADR issues
in country n are more likely in month t when realized excess local currency returns
over the period t+1 to t+h are positive, i.e., prior to a future abnormal depreciation
of the local currency over h months. We report estimates of Eq. (4) for all countries
in the sample and over the two subsets made of CR and non-CR ADRs in Table 3.3,
and for each regional subset in Table 3.4.
These results provide additional evidence of the existence of currency market
timing ability suggested by the event study analysis of Section 3.3.1. Consistent
with the patterns presented in Figure 3.1, estimates for the exchange rate return
coefficients β3 (h) over the whole sample are negative for all windows prior to ADR
issuances and mostly statistically significant, and positive for all windows afterward,
albeit statistically significant only for three- and six-month horizons (Panel A of Table
3.3). This suggests that firms in our sample are able to issue ADRs neither “too early”
nor “too late” relative to the dynamics of the local currency market. Further, and
again consistently with the analysis in Section 3.3.1, CR ADR issues are significantly
more likely than non-CR ADR issues to occur after an excess appreciation of and
before an excess depreciation of the local currency (Panels B and C of Table 3.3).
In particular, the estimated coefficients for excess holding-period currency returns,
β3(h) in Eq. (3.4), are negative and statistically significant at all horizons prior to
(h < 0 except when h = −4), and positive and statistically significant at all horizons
following (h > 0) CR ADR issue dates (Panel B of Table 3.3). In contrast, β3(h) is
always statistically indistinguishable from zero around non-CR issue dates (Panel C
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of Table 3.3).18
As in Section 3.3.1, we compute non-parametrically bootstrapped p-values for
each of the estimated parameters of Eq. (3.4) to analyze the robustness of the above
results. These p-values, also reported in Table 3.3, reinforce our earlier inference on
the existence of firms’ timing ability in currency markets. Additionally, our regressors,
i.e., the detrended currency and local and foreign equity returns, do not display
persistence, which according to Stambaugh (1986; 1999) would increase the severity
of the small-sample predictive-regression bias. Therefore, our Poisson analysis is not
susceptible to the aggregate pseudo market timing bias raised by Butler, Grullon, and
Weston (2005; 2006).
The evidence in Table 3.3 further suggests that the likelihood of ADR issuances
is affected not only by prior abnormal local currency returns but also by the prior
abnormal performance of foreign firms’ local stock markets. Specifically, we find that
estimates for the coefficient β1(h) in Eq. (3.4) for some horizons preceding ADR
issuances are positive and statistically significant for both the whole sample and the
subsample of NON-CR ADRs (Panels A and C of Table 3.3). These estimates indicate
that foreign firms are more likely to issue ADRs following an abnormal run-up in their
local stock market. This evidence is weaker for the subsample of CR ADRs (Panel B
of Tables 3.3), as well as with respect to the prior abnormal performance of the U.S.
stock market (the coefficients β2(h) in all panels of Table 3.3). Hence, foreign firms
18Country-specific factors, such as privatizations and political considerations, may have driven
some foreign firms’ ADR issuance decisions over our sample period, hence may have determined their
timing either regardless of or in accordance with the dynamics of the local currencies. Nonetheless,
the addition of country-level dummies to the specification of Eq. (3.4) did not meaningfully affect
our inference. These results are available from the authors on request.
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appear to be much less sensitive to the dynamics of the U.S. stock market prior to
their issuance decision. These results are largely consistent with the market timing
literature in the U.S. equity market (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and in international
equity markets (Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), Henderson, Jegadeesh,
and Weisbach (2004)). Nonetheless, it is important to note that in contrast to our
currency market timing results described above, we find no evidence of abnormal
dynamics in either the U.S. or any local stock market following Level II and Level III
ADR issuances.
Our Poisson analysis also shows that the extent of the currency market timing
ability varies greatly across regions, as in Figure 3.2. For example, only short-term
run-ups of the local currency (i.e., one and two-month horizons) significantly affect
the likelihood of G7 firms to issue ADRs (Panel A of Table 3.4). In contrast, ADR
issues from firms in other developed countries appear to be more likely only prior
to abnormal local currency depreciations over similarly short windows (Panel B of
Table 3.4). Currency market timing ability is even more pronounced when Eq. (4)
is estimated across the subsamples of emerging market issuers, although largely lim-
ited to the decision to defer the ADR issuance (Panels C, D, and E of Table 3.4).
More specifically, the ADR decision of these firms follows past abnormal local cur-
rency appreciations, yet appears to be independent from future abnormal currency
depreciations, as in Figure 3.2, except over the longest horizon (Panel C of Table
3.4). Intuitively, depreciation risk versus the U.S. dollar is often higher for emerging
currencies; thus, valuation risk is often higher for emerging market firms as well, mak-
ing foreign exchange market timing ability especially crucial for their issuing activity.
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Lastly, ADR issues appear to be preceded by an abnormally positive performance
of the corresponding local stock markets in most of the regions in our sample (i.e.,
β1(h) > 0 for some h < 0 in most panels of Table 3.4), consistent with Table 3.3.
A notable exception is represented by Latin American firms, which seem to prefer
to issue ADRs following local market downturns (β1(h) < 0 for h < 0 in Panel E
of Table 3.4). This suggests that Latin American companies assign greater weight
to currency rather than local equity market dynamics in making their ADR issuance
decisions.
Over which horizon is exchange rate market timing more successful? In other
words, which of the 12 holding-period returns around the event date t in the corre-
sponding 12 estimations of Eq. (4) across the selected country groupings is the most
relevant in explaining the likelihood of ADR issues to take place in month t? To
address this question, we could compare the magnitude of the resulting estimated
coefficients β3(h) across horizons of different length h. A word for caution is, how-
ever, necessary. We should keep in mind that the coefficients β3(h) are estimated
for holding-period returns computed over those different windows h. An adequate
comparison therefore requires that each coefficient estimate be divided by the corre-
sponding horizon length h. When doing so, we find that the average monthly effects
are strongest in the immediate proximity of issues (|h| = 1). Hence, foreign firms
seem to be most focused on the behavior of their local currencies one month prior to
the ADR issuance and most successful in anticipating their reversal within one month
afterward.
Interestingly, when examining the estimated coefficient for our set of control vari-
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ables, we find strong evidence of foreign firms’ timing ability in their local stock mar-
ket, and (more surprisingly, albeit weakly) in the U.S. stock market as well. According
to Tables 3.3 and 3.4, ADR issues in the past 28 years were more likely when local and
U.S. stock market returns had been abnormally high, i.e., after short or long periods
of excessively high market valuations. These results are largely consistent with the
market timing literature in the U.S. equity market (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and
for international equity markets (Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), Hen-
derson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004)). A noteworthy exception is represented by
Latin American firms, which seem to prefer to issue ADRs following local market
downturns (i.e., β1(h) < 0 for h < 0 in Panel E of Table 3.4). This suggests that
Latin American companies assign greater weight to currency rather than local equity
market dynamics in making their ADR issuance decisions.
The evidence in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 nests naturally into the above literature. Gen-
erally speaking, these papers suggest that firms should and will take advantage of
their relatively high valuations in domestic and international capital markets. Yet,
currency timing represents an alternative (and, in some cases, dominant, as in Latin
America) set of considerations made by foreign firms when selecting their international
capital structure. According to Tables 3.3 and 3.4, when local currencies abnormally
appreciate relative to the issuing currency of ADRs, the U.S. dollar, foreign firms ex-
pect abnormally high valuations of their assets in U.S. dollars, i.e., abnormally high
proceeds from ADRs, and, regardless of prior and expected stock market performance,
are more likely to issue them.
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3.3.3 Market Timing: Crises and Integration
The evidence presented so far indicates that foreign exchange market timing is
especially significant, both economically and statistically, for emerging market firms.
Yet, both Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3 also reveal that such ability seems to be limited to
the recognition of periods of excess appreciation of the local currency prior to ADR
issuance events. By contrast, issuers from developed economies display currency mar-
ket timing ability by expediting their ADR issuances as well. What are the reasons
for this apparent dichotomy? Academics and practitioners agree that emerging fi-
nancial markets differ from their developed counterparts, either for the nature of the
trading activity, their institutional features, sensitivity to broad market fluctuations,
dependence on foreign investments, or degree of liquidity, just to name a few. Do any
of these market characteristics explain the currency timing results described above?
We address this issue in this section. More specifically, we examine the robustness
of our market timing results to two crucial events affecting the economic and financial
well-being of both emerging and developed countries: Financial crises and market
integration. We do so because a majority of the emerging countries in our sample are
exposed to these events over a significant portion of our sample period. We start by
focusing on the effect of financial turmoil on our inference. To do so, we first amend
the event study model of Eq. (2) to control for crisis periods as follows:








nt(j) + ηnt, (3.5)
where I∗nt(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if any firm in country n issued ADRs
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in month t+j and month t+j is within a crisis period, and zero otherwise. We define
our crisis periods as December 1994 to January 1995 for the Mexican Peso Crisis, July
1997 to November 1997 for the Asian Crisis, and August 1998 to January 1999 for the
Russian Crisis.19 In Figure 3.3 we plot the resulting cumulative abnormal currency
returns in proximity of ADR issues within and outside the crisis periods for each of the
regional subsets listed in Table 3.1. In particular, the dotted lines represent estimates
for Σ6j∈[−6,6]δj, i.e., the cumulative abnormal currency returns around ADR issues
occurring over the portion of the sample period privy of financial crises, while the
solid lines represent estimates for Σ6j∈[−6,6]δj + δ
∗
j , the cumulative abnormal currency
returns around ADR issues occurring during financial crises.
Figure 3.3 reveals that cumulative abnormal exchange rate returns around ADR
issuances are of much greater absolute magnitude during periods of financial turmoil.
More interestingly, especially in comparison with Figure 3.1, the U-shape patterns
of those return aggregations are more important during crisis periods than during
stable periods. Cumulative abnormal currency returns are now downward sloping
prior to ADR issues and upward sloping afterward for emerging markets in general,
but especially for Latin America. Hence, foreign firms’ currency market timing ability,
far from disappearing, is actually stronger in correspondence with periods of financial
turmoil. This is plausible since crisis periods are exactly when this skill is most
valuable to a corporation and mispricing is generally deemed to be most intense.
For example, Pasquariello (2006) found that arbitrage violations are most frequent
19The use of two sets of dummies in Eq. (3.5) is necessary since these crisis periods do not span
the 13-month event window around ADR issuances.
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during periods of international financial instability. Figure 3.3 seems to suggest that
most foreign companies, but especially those based in Latin America (and, to a lesser
extent, Asia), have been able to effectively account for the likelihood of a currency
crisis in choosing their international capital structure.
To confirm these findings, we modify the Poisson regression model of Eq. (4) by
adding a term capturing the interaction between cumulative abnormal exchange rate
holding-period returns and the occurrence of a crisis. Specifically, we estimate
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + (3.6)
β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + β4(h)adjexrretnt(h) · Crisist + νnt(h)
where Crisist is a dummy variable equal to one if month t is within a financial crisis
period, and zero otherwise. Table 3.5 reports estimates for the parameters of the
above equation.20 As compared with Table 3.3, the coefficients measuring the effect of
excess holding period currency returns before (after) ADR issuances on the likelihood
of these issuances to take place during the event month are still negative (positive),
mostly (seldom) significant, and of generally smaller absolute magnitude. Yet, more
interestingly (and consistently with Figure 3.3), estimates for the additional impact of
currency returns on λnt during financial crises, β4(h), are mostly negative before ADR
issues, mostly positive afterward, and of generally greater absolute magnitude than
the corresponding estimates for β3(h), regardless of the selected timing horizon h.
20Estimates for the intercept in all the Poisson regressions that follow are similar in sign, mag-
nitude, and statistical significance to those reported in Table 3.3. Therefore, these estimates are
omitted for economy of exposition.
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Again, foreign firms appear to display better currency market timing ability in times
of crisis. Not surprisingly, this is especially true for emerging market companies. The
estimated sum of β4(h) and β3(h) for both emerging Asian and Latin American firms
is often negative prior to, and often positive following ADR issues. This suggests that
local currencies of emerging market firms possess a superior currency market timing
ability in proximity of crisis periods, i.e., that those firms are on average successful
in recognizing the symptoms of an impending dramatic depreciation of their local
currencies and in raising capital accordingly.
Next, we examine the relevance of another important feature of the international
financial market, the ongoing process of financial integration among local economies,
for the evidence on currency market timing ability established above. Over the course
of the last three decades, most of the emerging market countries in our sample have ex-
perienced not only those official capital market liberalizations making ADR issuances
possible, but also significant regulatory changes that have furthered their effective
financial integration with the rest of the world. The process of market integration
would clearly have a significant impact on the international capital structure deci-
sions of a firm. The same process also may reasonably affect the likelihood of foreign
companies to issue ADRs, therefore altering the dynamics of the relation between
exchange rate returns and ADR issuances described so far. Hence, we need to test
for the robustness of our evidence of firms’ foreign exchange market timing ability
to these implications of market integration. To that purpose, we amend again the
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Poisson regression model of Eq. (4) by estimating instead
lnλnt = α(h) + β1 (h) adjmktretnt(h) + β2 (h) adjusrett(h) +
β3 (h) adjexrretnt(h) + β5 (h) INTEGnt + νnt(h), (3.7)
where INTEGnt is a dummy variable equal to one if, on date t, country n has
already experienced a significant financial integration regime shift, according to the
endogenous chronology reported in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002, Table 3),
and zero otherwise.
The resulting coefficient estimates, in Table 3.6, reveal that, as expected, for-
eign firms become more active in the ADR market following the integration of their
domestic equity market with the rest of the world: β5 (h) is positive and strongly
significant (at the 1% level or less) in most cases.21 Yet, evidence of timing ability
in the foreign exchange (β3 (h)) and local stock (β1 (h)) markets is unaffected. The
introduction of integration dummies does not alter, but rather often magnifies either
sign or economic and statistical significance of both sets of coefficients over different
investment horizons h, namely negative and significant coefficients prior to, and pos-
itive and significant coefficients following ADR issuances. To test the robustness of
these findings, we also amend the event study regression of Eq. (2) to account for
21Eq. (7) is estimated only for the subset of the countries in the sample whose market integration
dates are later than the official liberalization dates, i.e., do not overlap with our sample period (e.g.,
South Korea and Taiwan).
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financial integration by estimating the following model:








nt(j) + ηnt, (3.8)
where IInt is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one firm in country n issued
ADRs in month t + j and month t + j is past the endogenous financial integration
date for country n estimated by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002, Table 3),
and zero otherwise. We report the resulting estimates in Figure 3.4, where the dotted
lines represent estimates for
∑6
j∈(−6,6) δj, i.e., the cumulative abnormal currency re-
turns around ADR issues occurring before financial integration took place, while the




j , the cumulative abnormal currency
returns around ADR issues occurring after financial integration. Figure 3.4 reveals a
distinct U-shape pattern for the latter but not for the former. These dynamics con-
firm the evidence in Table 3.6: Currency market timing ability is more pronounced
after financial integration has occurred, especially in emerging markets. Intuitively,
fewer barriers to international capital markets facilitate a company’s efforts at max-
imizing its proceeds from the issuance of securities to the public. Therefore, Table
3.6 and Figure 3.4 suggest that market integration strengthens, rather than weakens,
the basic finding of our study: Foreign firms display currency market timing ability
in issuing ADRs.
Finally, we explore the economic significance of the currency market timing re-
sults described above. In particular, we want to gauge the impact of firms’ currency
market timing ability on their bottom line. To that purpose, we employ the estimated
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cumulative coefficients from Eq. (3.2) for capital raising ADR issuances, plotted in
the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 3.1. We focus on CR ADRs since any currency
market timing ability exhibited in their issuance translates into monetary savings
for the issuing firms. Specifically, for each subset of countries under consideration,
we compute the negative of the cumulative abnormal returns from 6 months before
to 1 month before an ADR issue, −
∑6
j=1 δj, and the cumulative abnormal returns
from 1 month after to 6 months after an ADR issue,
∑−1
j=−6 δj. We then multiply
the resulting estimates by the corresponding median ADR issue size and total ADR
issue volume (both from Table 3.1). The ensuing numbers, reported in Table 3.7,
represent the average and the total U.S. dollar amounts foreign companies saved by
selling ADRs neither “too early” (if
∑6
j=1 δj < 0) nor “too late” (if
∑6
j=1 δj > 0), re-
spectively. Table 3.7 shows that this market timing ability is economically significant.
Over the sample period, foreign firms have saved on average about $0.65 million each
(i.e., $330 million in total) by deferring their ADR issuances and $0.62 million each
(i.e., $315 million in total) by expediting them. This amounts to economically and
statistically significant savings of about 1.86% of the total capital raised via ADRs
over the sample (i.e., $646 million). Not surprisingly, emerging market firms are the
biggest beneficiaries, especially in Latin America, where savings averaged $2.21 mil-
lion per issue (i.e., for a total of $203 million) over the five-month period before and
$0.98 million per issue (i.e., for a total of $90 million) over the five-month period
after their ADR issuances. These savings are of even greater magnitude when mea-
sured during financial crises (Figure 3.3) or after controlling for endogenous market
integration (Figure 3.4).
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3.4 Who Times the Exchange Rate Market?
In the previous section, we documented that firms are able to time foreign ex-
change market through ADR issues. The evidence is stronger after controlling for
the occurrence of financial crises and the timing of market integration. Moreover, we
found that the foreign exchange market timing ability is especially relevant for emerg-
ing market companies. In this section, we investigate further what kind of issuances
and firms are more likely to time the exchange rate market.
We first examine whether the relative size of an ADR issuance or the size of the
ADR issuing firm lead to differential market timing ability. Specifically, we first divide
our sample into four size groups based on the relative ADR issue size and the relative
firm size: (1) BigBig, which includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above the median
relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size)
in a country; (2) BigSmall, which includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above median
relative ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size); (3)
SmallBig, which includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR
issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a country; and
(4) SmallSmall, which includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative
ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a country.
We then re-estimate both the event study model of Eq. (2) and the Poisson regression
model of Eqs. (3) and (4) for each of these four size groups across all countries in the
sample. The results are reported in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.8 respectively.
When comparing Panel A of Table 3.3 to the corresponding results in Table 3.8,
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it is clear that the market timing result documented in Section 3 is driven mostly
by relatively big issues from relatively small issuers, although those firms are large
in absolute terms, especially in emerging markets (see Table 3.1). In particular, the
likelihood of a relatively large ADR issue by a relatively small firm is significantly
higher after an abnormal appreciation (β3(h) < 0 when h < 0 in Panel B of Table 3.8)
and prior to a future abnormal depreciation of the local currency (β3(h) > 0 when
h > 0 in Panel B of Table 3.8). Intuitively, large ADR issues are more economically
significant for small issuers, thus exchange rate return timing is more crucial to their
capital structure decision. The dynamics of cumulative abnormal returns around
ADR issuances across issue and firm size groups (Figure 3.5) are consistent with
these results, with the BigSmall grouping displaying the most significant U-shape
patterns.22
We then test whether a firm’s investment opportunity set (proxied by Tobin’s q) is
an indicator of its foreign exchange timing ability. We do so by first re-estimating the
Poisson regression model of Eq. (4) separately for firms with above median Tobin’s
q, i.e, growth firms, and for firms with below median Tobin’s q, i.e., value firms,
in each of the countries in our sample. The results reported in Table 3.9 suggest
that, on aggregate, the currency market timing evidence of Section 3 is largely driven
by firms with low q. Intuitively, the investment opportunity set of low q firms is
relatively small, and their market valuations relatively more stable. Hence, the effect
of the exchange rate on their valuations in the issuing currency is relatively more
22We also estimate both Eqs. (2) and (4) for each of the subsets of countries described in Table
3.2. The results, available upon request from the authors, are qualitatively consistent with those
reported in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.8.
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important, making them more selective in choosing the timing of an ADR issue.23
Again, similar results are obtained from the estimation of the event study model of
Eq. (2) across value (low q) and growth (high q) firms, reported in Figure 3.6.
Next, we test whether the currency market timing ability of firms issuing CR
ADRs is related to greater sensitivity of these firms’ business activities to currency
fluctuations. To that purpose, we first compare the currency exposure of issuers of
CR ADRs versus non-CR ADRs. We estimate this exposure by the absolute value of
the ”currency γ,” |γi|, from the following regression:
retint = ai + bimktretnt + γiexrretnt + εint (3.9)
where retint is the stock return of the ADR issuing firm i from country n at time t,
mktretnt is the return of the corresponding local stock market, and exrretnt is the
corresponding exchange rate return versus the U.S. dollar. Eq. (3.9) is estimated
over a period of no less than two and no more than five years prior to the ADR
issuing month. This restriction leaves us with a subset of 59 CR ADR and 34 non-
CR ADR issuing firms. We find that the median |γi| for CR ADR issuers (0.52 with a
standard error of 0.10) is almost 50% larger than the corresponding median for non-
CR issuers (0.32 with a standard error of 0.23). Hence, the valuation of CR ADR
issuing firms in the two-to-five year period prior to their decision to issue appears to
23When estimating Eq. (4) for low and high q firms across each of the regional groups in Table
3.2, we further find that this dichotomy in currency market timing ability disappears within emerg-
ing markets. This is not surprising, since (as suggested in Section 3) depreciation risk represents
an overriding concern for Latin American and Asian companies issuing ADRs. These results are
available on request from the authors.
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be more sensitive to fluctuations of their local currency than the valuation of firms
eventually issuing non-CR ADRs. This suggests that CR ADR issuing firms may have
developed greater understanding of the currency market than non-CR ADR issuers
prior to their issuance decision. This may in turn translate into greater currency
timing ability when issuing ADRs.
As a further test of this hypothesis, we examine whether there is differential cur-
rency market timing ability across firms in different industries. To that purpose, we
divide our sample into the following eight industries according to SIC codes: Agri-
culture, Construction, Mining, Manufacturing, Utility, Sales, Financial, and Service.
Then we estimate both the event study regression model of Eq. (2) and the Poisson
model of Eq. (4) over each resulting industry subset of our sample. We report the
corresponding estimates in Figure 3.7 and Table 3.10, respectively.24 Both sets of
results indicate that currency market timing ability is most pronounced among firms
in the Manufacturing industry. For instance, only the likelihood of a manufacturing
firm to issue an ADR is both negatively related to past abnormal currency returns
(β3(h) < 0 when h < 0 in Panel B of Table 3.10) and positively related to future
abnormal currency returns (β3(h) > 0 when h > 0 in Panel B of Table 3.10). Intu-
itively, the revenues of these firms are more likely to be generated in foreign markets.
Therefore, their management is more likely either to develop a deeper understanding
of the relevant currency markets, to affect the exchange rate through their business
activities, or to lobby for a more favorable currency policy with the corresponding
24Neither model could be estimated for the Agriculture and Construction groupings since they
covered a total of only five ADR issues.
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local government.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the currency market timing ability of
foreign firms originates from the investment banks underwriting the issuances rather
than from the foreign firms themselves. To do so, we first divide our sample of ADR
issue firms into subsets according to the identity of the underwriting institution; then
we estimate both Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) across the subsets made of issues managed
by the top six underwriting firms in the U.S.: Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB),
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon
Smith Barney.25 The results, reported in Figure 3.8 and column β3(h) of Table 3.11,
show little or no evidence of currency market timing ability across investment bank
groupings.26 This fact, together with our previous findings, indicates that currency
market timing ability is intrinsic to the issuing firms and not to their advisors.
Overall, the ability of a foreign firm to time the exchange rate market while
issuing ADRs appears to be related to important firm and issue characteristics like
size, Tobin’s q, and industry, as well as to the relative magnitude of the proceeds at
stake, but not to the identity of the underwriting investment bank. This evidence
corroborates our basic conclusions from Section 3, since it anchors them to intuitive
corporate finance grounds.
25We did not include in the analysis ADRs underwritten by other investment banks (representing
less than one third of the sample) because of the insufficient number of issuances in our sample for
each of them separately.
26Specifically, and consistently with the cumulative plots in Figure 3.8, only ADRs underwritten
by Morgan Stanley (55 in our sample) are more likely to be issued prior to an abnormal depreciation
of the local currency: β3(h) > 0 and statistically significant for h = 1, 3, 4, 6 in the corresponding
panel of Table 3.11. Interestingly, Table 3.11 also suggests that ADRs are more likely to be issued




In this chapter, we assess whether foreign firms can time their corresponding local
currency markets by studying the relationship between exchange rate returns and
all ADR issuances in the U.S. in the last 28 years. We provide economically and
statistically significant evidence of foreign firms’ timing ability in the exchange rate
market, especially when these firms raise capital through an ADR program. We
further show that currency market timing ability is most pronounced for companies
with higher currency exposure, value companies, manufacturing firms, relatively small
(yet large in absolute terms) companies issuing relatively large amounts of ADRs, and
emerging market companies, and especially during currency crises and following the
integration of their domestic market with the rest of the world; yet, this ability cannot
be attributed to the investment banks underwriting the issues.
Our study is the first to document the existence of currency market timing ability.
In addition, our findings also suggest that some market participants in the global
foreign exchange market (selected foreign firms issuing ADRs) may have, at least
occasionally, private information about currency movements. Thus, timing ability
in the exchange rate markets may contribute to interpret recent evidence on the
order flow explaining and predicting exchange rate fluctuations (Evans and Lyons
(2002), (2003), (2004)). Foreign exchange market timing ability in the ADR market
entails foreign firms either possessing private information about the fundamentals
driving the long-term dynamics of their local currencies, or being able to affect directly
those fundamentals. Therefore, any order flow aggregate containing these companies’
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trading activity in the local exchange rate markets, and information about it, would
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Poisson Regressions: ADRs and Financial Crises
This table presents the estimates of the following Poisson regressions for 12 event windows of
length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0:lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) +
β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + β4adjexrretnt(h) · Crisist + νnt(h) where the number of ADR issues from
country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess hold-
ing period local stock market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is
the excess holding period U.S. stock market return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h)
is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t; and Crisist is a
dummy variable equal to one if month t is within a financial crisis period and zero otherwise. An
event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t + h ,t] when
h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t + h] when h > 0). To compute
excess dollar exchange rate returns, we adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating
exrretnt = φ0n +φ1nexrretnt−1 +φ2nexrretnt−2 +φ3nt+ εnt, where exrretnt is the dollar exchange
rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period currency return from
month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h εns, and the excess holding period currency
return from month t to month t+ h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 εns. Excess holding period local
stock market returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess holding period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h),
are similarly defined. Crisis periods are defined as December 1994 to January 1995 for the Mexican
Peso Crisis, July 1997 to November 1997 for the Asian Crisis, and August 1998 to January 1999 for
the Russian Crisis. Panel A reports estimates for the whole sample; Panels B to F report estimates
for country groups. p-values (rounded to two decimal places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***)
indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h)
Panel A: All Countries Panel B: G-7 Countries
6 months before 1.52*** 1.01* -1.37 -4.33 1.52*** 0.30 -0.28 -1.84
(0.00) (0.09) (0.13) (0.38) (0.01) (0.74) (0.82) (0.83)
5 months before 1.66*** 1.13* -1.66* -8.33 1.75*** 0.06 -1.16 -4.93
(0.00) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.01) (0.95) (0.40) (0.58)
4 months before 1.53*** 0.82 -1.31 -5.46 1.65** -0.24 -0.70 -2.72
(0.00) (0.27) (0.24) (0.35) (0.03) (0.83) (0.66) (0.76)
3 months before 1.48*** 0.74 -1.71 -6.65 1.46* -0.56 -1.39 -6.47
(0.01) (0.39) (0.20) (0.27) (0.10) (0.66) (0.46) (0.45)
2 months before 1.70*** 1.22 -2.16 -12.64** 1.67 0.37 -3.02 -11.63*
(0.01) (0.25) (0.18) (0.02) (0.12) (0.81) (0.18) (0.09)
1 month before 1.51* 1.83 -5.03** -6.84 -0.20 2.53 -5.51* -4.78
(0.10) (0.21) (0.03) (0.47) (0.89) (0.23) (0.09) (0.73)
1 month after -0.62 1.94 -0.83 9.23*** -1.77 2.86 -2.30 24.17**
(0.51) (0.18) (0.72) (0.00) (0.25) (0.18) (0.48) (0.05)
2 months after 0.44 -0.29 0.92 5.23** -0.15 -0.78 1.94 9.15
(0.52) (0.78) (0.57) (0.05) (0.89) (0.60) (0.40) (0.36)
3 months after 0.25 -0.29 1.01 4.19* 0.75 -0.97 1.32 1.95
(0.64) (0.73) (0.44) (0.07) (0.42) (0.45) (0.48) (0.82)
4 months after 0.15 -0.22 0.86 2.44 0.64 -0.43 1.04 -0.56
(0.75) (0.76) (0.44) (0.34) (0.43) (0.70) (0.51) (0.94)
5 months after 0.06 -0.19 0.93 1.86 0.54 -0.51 1.07 2.84
(0.89) (0.77) (0.35) (0.45) (0.45) (0.62) (0.45) (0.66)
6 months after -0.07 0.21 1.99** 1.11 0.47 -0.18 1.04 2.22
(0.85) (0.72) (0.02) (0.63) (0.47) (0.85) (0.41) (0.71)
continued on next page
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h)
Panel C: Other Developed Panel D: Emerging Markets
6 months before 0.87 3.42*** 0.49 9.99 1.31** -0.41 -6.07*** -9.28*
(0.31) (0.01) (0.79) (0.11) (0.02) (0.71) (0.00) (0.09)
5 months before 1.37 3.31** 1.49 9.44 1.25** 0.19 -6.38*** -13.31**
(0.14) (0.02) (0.45) (0.24) (0.03) (0.88) (0.01) (0.03)
4 months before 1.82* 2.39 2.16 11.73 0.79 0.14 -7.06*** -9.99
(0.09) (0.12) (0.33) (0.23) (0.23) (0.92) (0.01) (0.17)
3 months before 3.06*** 1.35 2.74 11.49 0.26 1.03 -8.28*** -7.10
(0.01) (0.46) (0.28) (0.34) (0.74) (0.52) (0.01) (0.38)
2 months before 3.48** -0.39 4.53 9.03 0.42 2.83 -7.72** -10.06
(0.02) (0.86) (0.14) (0.55) (0.66) (0.16) (0.03) (0.25)
1 month before 3.41* 0.11 -1.54 16.43 1.57 2.10 -6.91 -12.95
(0.10) (0.97) (0.73) (0.41) (0.23) (0.44) (0.16) (0.34)
1 month after -0.18 3.80 8.50** 6.29 -0.40 -1.87 -10.19** 17.68***
(0.93) (0.19) (0.05) (0.71) (0.77) (0.48) (0.04) (0.00)
2 months after 2.13 1.37 5.59* 7.17 -0.39 -1.86 -8.49*** 13.07***
(0.16) (0.53) (0.07) (0.55) (0.69) (0.32) (0.01) (0.00)
3 months after 2.09* 1.80 3.10 -8.06 -1.04 -2.28 -5.42* 9.61***
(0.09) (0.32) (0.22) (0.47) (0.19) (0.12) (0.08) (0.01)
4 months after 1.67 0.21 2.18 1.72 -1.02 -1.35 -3.35 5.64
(0.12) (0.89) (0.32) (0.85) (0.14) (0.28) (0.20) (0.11)
5 months after 1.34 0.31 1.33 4.13 -1.02* -0.97 -1.71 2.79
(0.16) (0.82) (0.51) (0.58) (0.10) (0.37) (0.43) (0.42)
6 months after 1.11 0.16 1.66 3.58 -0.85 0.32 2.37 -0.58
(0.20) (0.90) (0.36) (0.60) (0.13) (0.74) (0.11) (0.84)
Panel E: Emerging Asian Panel F: Emerging Latin
6 months before 2.92*** -2.99 0.63 -9.28 0.12 -0.10 -5.71*** -14.34**
(0.00) (0.12) (0.91) (0.47) (0.89) (0.95) (0.01) (0.03)
5 months before 2.96*** -1.64 -6.13 -5.23 -0.52 0.19 -5.49** -18.78***
(0.00) (0.45) (0.37) (0.78) (0.57) (0.90) (0.02) (0.01)
4 months before 3.15*** -3.49 -18.10*** 52.79* -2.03** 0.45 -4.92** -26.85***
(0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.80) (0.05) (0.00)
3 months before 2.04 -0.70 -19.76** 14.21 -2.33** 0.95 -6.46** -20.01**
(0.08) (0.80) (0.02) (0.45) (0.04) (0.64) (0.03) (0.05)
2 months before 1.94 1.84 -25.26*** 13.86 -2.41* 3.29 -5.75* -19.52
(0.14) (0.61) (0.01) (0.47) (0.09) (0.20) (0.09) (0.13)
1 month before 3.18 -2.44 -31.46*** 18.51 -0.56 3.77 -2.89 -29.05
(0.08) (0.62) (0.00) (0.49) (0.80) (0.29) (0.52) (0.18)
1 month after 1.01 -7.29 -21.85* 26.09* -1.23 -0.06 -6.55 13.69**
(0.62) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.56) (0.99) (0.19) (0.02)
2 months after 0.82 -4.53 -23.80*** 25.94** -1.84 -0.54 -6.05* 11.32**
(0.56) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02) (0.19) (0.83) (0.08) (0.02)
3 months after 0.54 -5.59** -12.99 15.80 -2.61** -0.40 -4.51 8.02**
(0.67) (0.02) (0.15) (0.13) (0.02) (0.84) (0.13) (0.04)
4 months after 0.54 -4.09** -12.32 10.13 -2.77*** -0.10 -3.62 7.77**
(0.62) (0.05) (0.11) (0.40) (0.00) (0.95) (0.13) (0.05)
5 months after 0.69 -3.80** -14.71** 13.61 -2.57*** 0.19 -1.73 3.74
(0.48) (0.04) (0.03) (0.21) (0.00) (0.89) (0.37) (0.34)
6 months after 0.46 -2.12 -14.46*** 12.83 -2.34*** 1.34 1.63 0.70
(0.61) (0.22) (0.01) (0.22) (0.00) (0.29) (0.25) (0.82)
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Table 3.6: Poisson Regressions: ADRs and Market Integration
This table presents estimates of the following Poisson regressions for 12 event windows of length h ∈
[−6, 6] except h = 0:lnλnt = α(h)+β1(h)adjmktretnt(h)+β2(h)adjusrett(h)+β3(h)adjexrretnt(h)+
β4INTEGnt+νnt(h), where the number of ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson
distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local stock market return
of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S.
stock market return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period
dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t; and INTEGnt is a dummy variable equal
to one if, on month t, country n has already experienced a significant financial integration regime
shift, according to the endogenous chronology reported in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002,
Table 3), and zero otherwise. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation
month t (i.e., [t + h ,t] when h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t + h]
when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns, we adjust for autocorrelation and
time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt + εnt, where
exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess
holding period currency return from month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h εns,
and the excess holding period currency return from month t to month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as∑t+h
s=t+1 εns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess holding period
U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. Panel A reports results for the whole sample;
Panel B reports estimates for emerging market countries. p-values (rounded to two decimal places)
are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h)
Panel A: All Countries Panel B: Emerging Markets
6 months before 1.42*** 1.12* -1.41 0.44*** 1.22** -0.29 -7.10*** 0.72**
(0.00) (0.06) (0.11) (0.00) (0.02) (0.79) (0.00) (0.04)
5 months before 1.54*** 1.23* -1.80* 0.44*** 1.09* 0.32 -7.63*** 0.71**
(0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.79) (0.00) (0.04)
4 months before 1.41*** 0.93 -1.41 0.44*** 0.72 0.17 -8.08*** 0.70**
(0.00) (0.21) (0.20) (0.00) (0.27) (0.90) (0.00) (0.05)
3 months before 1.35*** 0.85 -1.90 0.43*** 0.23 1.10 -9.23*** 0.68**
(0.01) (0.31) (0.14) (0.00) (0.77) (0.49) (0.00) (0.05)
2 months before 1.51** 1.28 -2.82* 0.43*** 0.31 3.17 -8.99*** 0.66*
(0.02) (0.22) (0.08) (0.00) (0.74) (0.11) (0.00) (0.06)
1 month before 1.34 1.89 -5.30** 0.43*** 1.41 2.35 -8.39* 0.63*
(0.13) (0.19) (0.02) (0.00) (0.28) (0.39) (0.07) (0.07)
1 month after -0.79 2.24 2.65 0.45*** -0.57 -0.72 2.40 0.65*
(0.38) (0.11) (0.18) (0.00) (0.67) (0.78) (0.46) (0.07)
2 months after 0.28 -0.05 2.09 0.45*** -0.63 -1.00 -2.36 0.67*
(0.66) (0.96) (0.13) (0.00) (0.52) (0.58) (0.44) (0.06)
3 months after 0.14 -0.08 1.84 0.45*** -1.29* -1.40 -0.19 0.67*
(0.79) (0.92) (0.11) (0.00) (0.10) (0.32) (0.93) (0.06)
4 months after 0.12 -0.09 1.11 0.45*** -1.10* -1.02 -1.40 0.69**
(0.79) (0.90) (0.28) (0.00) (0.10) (0.40) (0.49) (0.05)
5 months after 0.04 -0.07 1.05 0.45*** -1.07* -0.84 -1.18 0.69*
(0.91) (0.91) (0.25) (0.00) (0.08) (0.43) (0.51) (0.05)
6 months after -0.04 0.30 1.96** 0.45*** -0.86 0.26 1.89 0.63*





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.8: Poisson Regression: ADRs Across Firm and Issue Size
This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression model across the following four subsets
of all firms issuing ADR in our sample: “BigBig” includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above the
median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a
country; “BigSmall” include all large ADR issues (i.e., above the median relative ADR issue size)
from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a country; “SmallBig” includes all
small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the
median issuing firm size) in a country; and “SmallSmall” includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below
the median relative ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a
country. The Poisson regression models for 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0:
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h), where
the number of ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt);
adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local stock market return of country n in month t for
an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S. stock market return in month t
for an event window h; and adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate return
of country n at month t. Excess returns are comupted with detrended returns as in Table 3.6. An
event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t + h ,t] when
h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t+ h] when h > 0). p-values (rounded
to two decimal places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
Panel A: BigBig Panel B: BigSmall
6 months before 2.35** -0.77 0.67 1.45** 1.71** -4.33***
(0.04) (0.68) (0.81) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
5 months before 2.54** 0.59 0.28 1.34** 1.78** -5.10***
(0.04) (0.78) (0.93) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
4 months before 1.17 0.44 1.34 0.97 1.40 -4.14***
(0.43) (0.85) (0.69) (0.14) (0.17) (0.01)
3 months before 1.80 -1.08 1.41 0.91 1.09 -4.88***
(0.29) (0.69) (0.72) (0.22) (0.35) (0.01)
2 months before 2.03 0.62 -0.41 1.07 2.19 -6.24***
(0.32) (0.85) (0.93) (0.24) (0.13) (0.01)
1 month before 2.57 -0.25 -0.62 0.54 3.24 -7.28**
(0.36) (0.96) (0.93) (0.67) (0.11) (0.02)
1 months after -2.82 3.74 -2.20 -1.22 3.60* 5.18**
(0.340) (0.40) (0.75) (0.34) (0.07) (0.04)
2 months after -2.38 4.74 0.39 0.13 -0.33 3.62**
(0.26) (0.15) (0.93) (0.89) (0.81) (0.05)
3 months after -0.41 0.78 1.28 -0.36 1.51 3.58**
(0.81) (0.77) (0.74) (0.64) (0.20) (0.02)
4 months after -0.59 2.93 2.8 -0.12 1.06 2.33*
(0.69) (0.21) (0.35) (0.85) (0.30) (0.09)
5 months after -0.47 1.70 2.25 -0.56 0.95 2.23*
(0.73) (0.42) (0.42) (0.33) (0.30) (0.07)
6 months after -0.49 2.21 1.13 -0.41 1.60** 4.41***
(0.69) (0.25) (0.67) (0.43) (0.05) (0.00)
Panel C: BigSmall Panel D: SmallSmall
6 months before 1.37*** 1.34 -1.25 2.22* -1.23 0.07
(0.01) (0.12) (0.33) (0.10) (0.57) (0.98)
5 months before 1.36** 1.26 -1.30 3.02** -2.02 0.61
continued on next page
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Table 3.8 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
(0.02) (0.19) (0.35) (0.04) (0.40) (0.86)
4 months before 1.13* 1.13 -0.90 3.66** -3.63 -3.43
(0.09) (0.29) (0.57) (0.02) (0.17) (0.41)
3 months before 1.42* 1.20 -2.72 3.11* -3.15 -5.76
(0.07) (0.33) (0.15) (0.10) (0.30) (0.24)
2 months before 1.68* 1.30 -4.42** 4.12* -3.7 -2.85
(0.07) (0.39) (0.05) (0.06) (0.31) (0.62)
1 month before 2.82** 1.45 -6.54** 2.97 -3.31 -7.09
(0.03) (0.49) (0.04) (0.36) (0.52) (0.38)
1 month after 0.78 1.83 0.73 -0.73 -4.65 1.57
(0.56) (0.37) (0.81) (0.83) (0.35) (0.84)
2 months after 1.94** -0.78 0.60 -2.39 -1.73 -2.29
(0.04) (0.60) (0.78) (0.32) (0.61) (0.69)
3 months after 1.53** -1.64 0.11 -2.59 -3.06 2.70
(0.05) (0.17) (0.95) (0.18) (0.28) (0.49)
4 months after 0.80 -1.21 -0.77 -1.60 -3.59 2.82
(0.25) (0.25) (0.62) (0.35) (0.15) (0.40)
5 months after 0.8 -0.95 1.02 -0.99* -3.83 4.23
(0.19) (0.31) (0.45) (0.51) (0.08) (0.14)
6 months after 0.25 -0.77 4.50*** -0.25 -2.64 2.59
(0.65) (0.35) (0.00) (0.86) (0.20) (0.39)
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Table 3.9: Poisson Regression: ADRs and Tobin’s q
This table presents estimates of the Poisson regression model across the following two
subsets of all firms issuing ADR in our sample: “High Tobin’s q Firms” includes all
ADR issues from firms with above median Tobin’s q in a country, and “Low Tobin’s
q Firms” includes all ADR issues from firms with below median Tobin’s q in a coun-
try. The Poisson regression models of 12 event window of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except
h = 0:lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h),
where the number of ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution,
Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local stock market return of country n in
month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S. stock market return
in month t for an event window h; and adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange
rate return of country n at month t. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the
observation month t (i.e., [t+h ,t] when h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t,
t + h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns, we adjust for autocorrelation
and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt+ εnt, where
exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess
holding period currency return from month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h εns,
and the excess holding period currency return from month t to month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as∑t+h
s=t+1 εns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess holding period
U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. p-values (rounded to two decimal places)
are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
Event Window Panel A: High q Firms Panel B: Low q Firms
6 months before 1.37*** 2.02*** -2.22* 1.69*** 0.34 -2.48**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.66) (0.03)
5 months before 1.29** 2.18*** -2.20* 1.80*** 0.29 -3.20***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.73) (0.01)
4 months before 0.93 1.78* -1.75 1.47*** 0.03 -2.77*
(0.13) (0.06) (0.23) (0.01) (0.98) (0.06)
3 months before 0.94 2.00* -1.99 1.70*** -0.59 -5.00***
(0.19) (0.07) (0.24) (0.01) (0.59) (0.00)
2 months before 1.26 2.84** -2.94 1.91** -0.15 -6.59**
(0.14) (0.04) (0.15) (0.02) (0.91) (0.00)
1 month before 2.57** 2.61 -4.14 1.00 1.03 -8.55***
(0.03) (0.17) (0.16) (0.40) (0.58) (0.00)
1 month after -0.47 1.13 2.25 -0.58 3.54* 3.16
(0.70) (0.54) (0.40) (0.63) (0.06) (0.23)
2 months after 0.76 -1.67 1.78 0.25 1.24 1.92
(0.39) (0.20) (0.35) (0.78) (0.36) (0.31)
3 months after 0.27 -0.98 1.97 0.2 0.61 2.11
(0.71) (0.37) (0.20) (0.78) (0.58) (0.16)
4 months after -0.19 -0.72 1.17 0.37 0.65 1.26
(0.77) (0.44) (0.38) (0.55) (0.50) (0.35)
5 months after -0.15 -0.34 1.73 0.07 0.16 2.08*
(0.78) (0.69) (0.14) (0.89) (0.85) (0.07)
6 months after -0.35 0.39 4.16*** 0.05 0.36 4.02***
(0.48) (0.61) (0.00) (0.92) (0.64) (0.00)
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Table 3.10: Poisson Regressions: ADRs Across Industries
This table presents estimates of the Poisson regression model for six major industry groups across all
ADR issuing firms in our sample. We use SIC codes to classify firms into 8 industries: Agriculture,
Mining, Manufacturing, Utility, Sales, Financial, Construction, and Service. The Poisson regression
models of 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0: lnλnt = α(h)+β1(h)adjmktretnt(h)+
β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h), where the number of ADR issues from country
n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding
period local stock market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the
excess holding period U.S. stock market return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h)
is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. An event window
is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t + h ,t] when h < 0), or as
h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t + h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar
exchange rate returns, we adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating exrretnt =
φ0n +φ1nexrretnt−1 +φ2nexrretnt−2 +φ3nt+ εnt, where exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return
of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period currency return from month
t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h εns, and the excess holding period currency return
from month t to month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 εns. Excess holding period local stock
returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess holding period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly
defined. The Poisson model could not be estimated for Agriculture and Construction industries since
less than 5 ADR issues were available for each. We also report number of ADR issuances within
each industry, in parentheses next to the corresponding industry. p-values (rounded to two decimal
places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
Panel A: Mining (20) Panel B: Manufacturing (147)
6 months before 0.62 1.15 -0.53 1.77** 0.21 -0.85
(0.70) (0.65) (0.88) (0.00) (0.81) (0.50)
5 months before 0.18 1.44 -3.56 2.03*** -0.08 -1.18
(0.92) (0.60) (0.39) (0.00) (0.94) (0.41)
4 months before -0.64 1.29 -4.07 2.02*** -0.53 -1.06
(1.29) (0.67) (0.39) (0.00) (0.62) (0.51)
3 months before -0.87 1.66 -3.95 2.10*** -0.85 -1.57
(0.71) (0.64) (0.47) (0.01) (0.49) (0.40)
2 months before 0.75 1.11 -1.26 2.13*** -0.01 -1.97
(0.79) (0.80) (0.85) (0.02) (0.99) (0.38)
1 month before -1.26 3.18 -2.03 1.64 0.21 -6.46**
(0.76) (0.60) (0.83) (0.21) (0.92) (0.05)
1 month after -1.90 2.96 2.25 -1.07 1.69 6.16***
(0.64) (0.63) (0.80) (0.43) (0.41) (0.01)
2 months after -0.59 1.46 6.54 -0.72 0.01 2.24
(0.84) (0.74) (0.22) (0.46) (0.99) (0.27)
3 months after 0.72 0.31 5.33 -0.35 -1.07 3.50 **
(0.76) (0.93) (0.25) (0.65) (0.37) (0.02)
4 months after 1.88 1.13 4.01 -0.15 -1.37 2.65*
(0.34) (0.72) (0.32) (0.83) (0.19) (0.06)
5 months after 1.32 0.57 3.69 0.07 -1.26 2.26*
(0.45) (0.84) (0.32) (0.91) (0.18) (0.08)
6 months after 0.73 -1.13 4.22 0.04 -0.60 2.66**
(0.65) (0.64) (0.20) (0.95) (0.48) (0.02)
Panel C: Utility (76) Panel D: Sales (13)
continued on next page
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Table 3.10 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
6 months before 1.69** 1.54 -2.46 0.96 5.86* -7.23*
(0.04) (0.24) (0.20) (0.67) (0.08) (0.10)
5 months before 1.85** 2.31 -2.23 1.51 7.79** -6.68
(0.04) (0.12) (0.29) (0.50) (0.03) (0.17)
4 months before 1.42 2.14 -1.30 2.64 3.81 -9.47*
(0.17) (0.19) (0.58) (0.30) (0.34) (0.09)
3 months before 0.66 3.00 -2.66 3.62 2.73 -6.32
(0.59) (0.11) (0.34) (0.22) (0.56) (0.34)
2 months before 0.99 3.98* -3.72 4.71 -0.97 -5.71
(0.50) (0.07) (0.28) (0.20) (0.86) (0.46)
1 month before 1.45 6.40** -4.00 7.87 -4.59 -4.31
(0.48) (0.05) (0.41) (0.12) (0.54) (0.69)
1 month after -0.35 -0.23 3.15 -1.88 1.27 -0.12
(0.87) (0.94) (0.46) (0.73) (0.87) (0.99)
2 months after 1.23 -1.87 4.67* -1.64 2.54 1.88
(0.41) (0.40) (0.09) (0.68) (0.64) (0.78)
3 months after 0.99 -1.33 3.71 -4.19 9.81** 1.06
(0.42) (0.47) (0.12) (0.16) (0.03) (0.83)
4 months after 0.91 -0.20 3.08 -6.06*** 6.81* -0.97
(0.39) (0.90) (0.14) (0.01) (0.07) (0.81)
5 months after 0.57 0.17 3.27* -6.20*** 9.94*** -2.22
(0.54) (0.91) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.57)
6 months after 0.14 0.72 2.44 -6.17*** 9.29*** -0.66
(0.87) (0.58) (0.16) (0.00) (0.01) (0.85)
Panel E: Financial (42) Panel F: Service (50)
6 months before 1.51 0.70 -1.13 1.51 1.67 -1.61
(0.17) (0.69) (0.66) (0.18) (0.30) (0.48)
5 months before 1.38 0.49 -1.77 1.59 1.14 -2.12
(0.25) (0.80) (0.54) (0.20) (0.52) (0.41)
4 months before 0.91 0.26 -0.27 1.92 1.58 -1.99
(0.51) (0.90) (0.93) (0.17) (0.43) (0.49)
3 months before 1.04 -0.03 -0.93 1.90 1.23 -3.22
(0.52) (0.99) (0.80) (0.24) (0.59) (0.35)
2 months before 0.77 -0.37 -5.10 2.68 1.15 -4.38
(0.69) (0.90) (0.27) (0.17) (0.68) (0.29)
1 month before 0.47 -0.68 -2.70 0.24 2.99 -8.82
(0.86) (0.87) (0.67) (0.93) (0.44) (0.13)
1 month after -1.26 3.82 -5.37 -0.40 8.29** 1.72
(0.64) (0.36) (0.41) (0.88) (0.03) (0.76)
2 months after 1.42 -0.07 -1.23 1.25 2.16 2.87
(0.47) (0.98) (0.78) (0.54) (0.45) (0.50)
3 months after 0.53 -0.40 -1.66 1.33 2.18 2.43
(0.75) (0.87) (0.66) (0.43) (0.38) (0.44)
4 months after -0.78 0.42 -2.19 1.69 0.70 1.25
(0.58) (0.84) (0.49) (0.24) (0.73) (0.65)
5 months after -0.90 0.41 -2.01 1.49 -0.17 0.88
(0.48) (0.83) (0.47) (0.25) (0.93) (0.73)
6 months after -0.26 0.09 1.15 1.06 1.39 3.28
(0.82) (0.96) (0.63) (0.37) (0.41) (0.13)
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Table 3.11: Poisson Regressions: ADRs Across Underwriters
This table presents estimates of the Poisson regression model for the subsets of ADRs underwritten
by each of the top six major ADR underwriting investment banks during our sample period: Credit
Suisse First Boston (CFSB), Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and
Salomon Smith Barney. The Poisson regression models of 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6]
except h = 0:lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) +
νnt(h), where the number of ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution,
Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local stock market return of country n in
month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S. stock market return
in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange
rate return of country n at month t. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the
observation month t (i.e., [t+h ,t] when h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t,
t + h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns, we adjust for autocorrelation
and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt+ εnt, where
exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess
holding period currency return from month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h εns,
and the excess holding period currency return from month t to month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as∑t+h
s=t+1 εns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess holding period U.S.
stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. We also report number of ADR underwritten by
each investment bank, in parentheses next to the corresponding investment bank. p-values (rounded
to two decimal places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
CSFB (18) Goldman Sachs (81)
6 months before 0.67 1.90 3.43 2.08*** 0.31 -1.31
(0.68) (0.47) (0.36) (0.01) (0.80) (0.48)
5 months before 0.20 1.46 2.77 2.83*** 0.16 -1.73
(0.91) (0.62) (0.50) (0.00) (0.91) (0.40)
4 months before -0.65 1.30 2.01 2.61*** 1.55 -1.64
(0.75) (0.69) (0.67) (0.01) (0.32) (0.48)
3 months before -2.31 2.69 -2.52 2.60** 1.32 -2.23
(0.34) (0.47) (0.67) (0.02) (0.46) (0.41)
2 months before -1.94 0.20 -4.70 3.00** 1.46 -3.98
(0.51) (0.96) (0.52) (0.02) (0.51) (0.23)
1 month before -1.68 8.45 3.59 3.82** 1.00 -3.75
(0.68) (0.18) (0.69) (0.03) (0.74) (0.42)
1 month after -6.68* 8.56 0.63 -1.07 1.94 3.67
(0.10) (0.16) (0.95) (0.58) (0.51) (0.37)
2 months after 0.87 -0.62 2.64 0.99 -0.31 4.46*
(0.76) (0.89) (0.70) (0.48) (0.89) (0.10)
3 months after -1.46 0.01 -2.95 0.09 -0.92 3.64
(0.55) (1.00) (0.62) (0.94) (0.60) (0.11)
4 months after -1.45 2.23 0.90 0.08 -0.57 1.85
(0.49) (0.49) (0.85) (0.94) (0.71) (0.38)
5 months after -1.94 2.24 1.17 0.04 -0.06 1.99
(0.30) (0.44) (0.78) (0.97) (0.97) (0.29)
6 months after -1.93 3.01 0.37 -0.24 0.26 2.66
(0.26) (0.27) (0.92) (0.77) (0.83) (0.11)
Lehman Brothers (21) Merrill Lynch (55)
6 months before 1.48 0.20 0.65 1.53* -0.25 -4.31*
continued on next page
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
(0.29) (0.94) (0.85) (0.09) (0.87) (0.07)
5 months before 1.79 2.59 -0.96 2.16** -0.53 -3.72
(0.23) (0.35) (0.81) (0.02) (0.75) (0.15)
4 months before 1.62 2.56 -1.66 1.94* -1.11 -2.66
(0.33) (0.41) (0.71) (0.08) (0.54) (0.36)
3 months before 2.14 3.84 -2.38 2.61** -1.88 -2.69
(0.26) (0.28) (0.65) (0.03) (0.37) (0.43)
2 months before 1.58 6.90 1.40 3.20** -2.26 -6.25
(0.50) (0.13) (0.81) (0.03) (0.37) (0.13)
1 month before 2.84 2.82 2.11 4.54** -3.16 -11.04
(0.38) (0.64) (0.80) (0.02) (0.37) (0.05)
1 month after -1.48 5.78 -1.69 1.89 0.03 -6.92
(0.68) (0.34) (0.85) (0.39) (0.99) (0.23)
2 months after 0.25 -2.08 -3.38 1.66 -2.88 -2.28
(0.92) (0.61) (0.60) (0.30) (0.24) (0.57)
3 months after -0.30 0.18 -2.30 0.84 -1.11 -3.40
(0.89) (0.96) (0.66) (0.52) (0.59) (0.31)
4 months after -1.06 1.36 -1.95 0.89 -1.89 -2.69
(0.55) (0.65) (0.66) (0.44) (0.29) (0.35)
5 months after -0.95 0.77 -1.22 0.91 -2.68* -2.48
(0.56) (0.77) (0.75) (0.37) (0.09) (0.33)
6 months after -0.57 0.70 -2.56 0.66 -1.90 -2.48
(0.70) (0.77) (0.49) (0.48) (0.18) (0.29)
Morgan Stanley (55) Salomon Smith Barney (21)
6 months before 2.20** 0.34 0.01 1.24 -0.17 -0.83
(0.02) (0.82) (0.99) (0.38) (0.95) (0.81)
5 months before 1.55 0.49 0.75 0.97 1.43 -1.42
(0.13) (0.77) (0.75) (0.53) (0.60) (0.71)
4 months before 1.69 0.49 2.28 1.90 -1.66 -4.82
(0.15) (0.80) (0.36) (0.27) (0.58) (0.29)
3 months before 0.97 0.25 3.64 1.62 0.74 -8.96*
(0.48) (0.91) (0.18) (0.41) (0.84) (0.10)
2 months before 1.92 0.07 2.50 -0.49 3.03 -8.27
(0.25) (0.98) (0.48) (0.85) (0.49) (0.19)
1 month before 2.52 0.85 -2.88 -3.67 4.16 -11.64
(0.27) (0.82) (0.61) (0.31) (0.48) (0.19)
1 month after -1.24 0.50 8.12** 4.73 -1.89 -16.60**
(0.59) (0.89) (0.03) (0.15) (0.76) (0.04)
2 months after -0.59 1.53 3.50 2.49 -1.57 -10.25*
(0.73) (0.56) (0.28) (0.31) (0.72) (0.09)
3 months after 1.16 -0.46 6.60*** 1.73 -4.29 -6.87
(0.39) (0.83) (0.00) (0.42) (0.20) (0.21)
4 months after 1.03 -0.16 4.49** 3.24** -5.18* -7.15
(0.38) (0.93) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12)
5 months after 1.34 -0.21 3.27 2.95* -3.91 -5.40
(0.20) (0.90) (0.13) (0.05) (0.15) (0.18)
6 months after 1.14 0.30 5.01*** 2.67** -2.58 0.02
(0.22) (0.84) (0.01) (0.05) (0.29) (1.00)
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate re-
turns around ADR issue dates, i.e., the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6






where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is
at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+ j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance
month. The estimated cumulative impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95%
confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines. We also display 90% confidence intervals, centered
around zero, constructed using bootstrapped standard errors. The bootstrap procedure consists
of randomly drawing returns from the observed time series with replacement and estimating the
aforementioned model with the resulting sample. After repeating this procedure 1000 times, we
compute the corresponding standard errors. The plots are displayed for the whole ADR sample as
well as two subsets of ADRs: Capital raising (Level III) ADRs and non-capital raising (Level II)
ADRs, i.e., CR ADRs and non-CR ADRs, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Re-
gional Groups
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate re-
turns around ADR issue dates, i.e., the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6






where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t + j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR
issuance month. The estimated cumulative impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their
95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Fi-
nancial Crises
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate re-
turns around ADR issue dates. More specifically, it plots the cumulative sum of estimated co-
efficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj , i.e., estimates for the cumulative abnormal currency returns around ADR
issues occurring over the portion of the sample period privy of financial crises (in dotted lines), and∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj + δ
∗
j , i.e., estimates for the cumulative abnormal currency returns around ADR issues











where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return, Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t + j and zero otherwise, and Int(j) is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if there is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t + j and month t + j
is considered a crisis period. Crisis periods are defined as December 1994 to January 1995 for the
Mexican Peso Crisis, July 1997 to November 1997 for the Asian Crisis, and August 1998 to January
1999 for the Russian Crisis.
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Mar-
ket Integration
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns
around ADR issue date for the whole sample and the subset of emerging markets. More specifically,
it plots the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj , i.e., estimates for the cumulative
abnormal currency returns around ADR issues occurring over the portion of the sample period
before market integration (in dotted lines), and
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj + δ
I
j , i.e., estimates for the cumulative
abnormal currency returns around ADR issues occurring after market integration (in solid lines).










where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return, Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is
at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+ j and zero otherwise, and IInt is a dummy variable
equal to one if at least one firm in country n issued ADR in month t+ j and month t+ j is past the
endogenous financial integration date for country n estimated by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine
(2002, Table 3) and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns around ADR Issues: Firm
and Issue Size
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns
around ADR issue dates across four subsets of all firms issuing ADR in our sample: “BigBig”
includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e.,
above the median issuing firm size) in a country; “BigSmall” include all large ADR issues (i.e., above
the median relative ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a
country; “SmallBig” includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR issue size)
from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a country; and “SmallSmall” include all
small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the
median issuing firm size) in a country. The cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues is measured
as the cumulative sums of estimated coefficients
∑6





where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance
month. The estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their
95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
125
Figure 3.6: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns around ADR Issues: To-
bin’s q
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns
around ADR issue dates for two subsets of all firm issuing ADR in our sample: “High q Firms”
includes all ADR issues from firms with above median Tobin’s q in a country; and “Low q Firms”
includes all ADR issues from firms with below median Tobin’s q in a country. The cumulative abnor-
mal impact of ADR issues is measured as the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj





where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance
month. The estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their
95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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Figure 3.7: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: In-
dustries
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns
around ADR issue dates for six major industry groups across all ADR issuing firms in our sample. We
use SIC codes to classify firms into eight industries: Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utility,
Sales, Financial, Construction, and Service. The cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues is
measured as the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6





where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance
month. The model could not be estimated for Agriculture and Construction industries since less
than five ADR issues were available for each of them. The estimated cumulative abnormal impact
of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
127
Figure 3.8: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns around ADR Issues: Un-
derwriters
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate re-
turns around ADR issue dates for the subsets of ADRs underwritten by each of the top six major
ADR underwriting investment banks during our sample period: Credit Suisse First Boston (CFSB),
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Smith Barney.
The cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues is measured as the cumulative sum of estimated
coefficients
∑6





where εnt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there
is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance
month. The estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their
95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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CHAPTER IV
Are Investors Moonstruck? Lunar Phases and
Stock Returns
“It is the very error of the moon. She comes more near the earth than she was
wont. And makes men mad.”
(Othello, Act V, Scene ii)
4.1 Introduction
The belief that phases of the moon affect mood and behavior dates back to ancient
times. The lunar effect on the human body and mind is suggested anecdotally as well
as empirically in the psychological and biological literature. Do lunar phases also
affect the securities markets?
If investors make decisions strictly through rational maximization, then the an-
swer is no. However, research evidence suggests that investors are subject to vari-
ous psychological and behavioral biases when making investment decisions, such as
loss-aversion, overconfidence, and mood fluctuation (for example, Harlow and Brown
(1990); Odean, (1998), (1999)). On a general level, numerous psychological studies
suggest that mood can affect human judgment and behavior (for example, Schwarz
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and Bless (1991) Frijda (1988)). The behavioral finance literature documents evi-
dence on the effects of mood on asset prices (for example, Avery and Chevalier (1999);
Kamstra et. al (2000), (2003); Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003); Coval and Shumway
(2005)). If lunar phases affect mood, by extension, these phases may affect investor
behavior and thus asset prices. If so, asset returns during full moon phases may be
different from those during new moon phases. More specifically, since psychological
studies associate full moon phases with depressed mood, this study hypothesizes that
stocks are valued less and thus returns are lower during full moon periods.
This study is motivated by a psychological hypothesis. In modern societies the
lunar cycle has little tangible impact on people’s economic and social activities. Con-
sequently, it would be difficult to find rational explanations for any correlation be-
tween lunar phases and stock returns. The causality would be obvious if there is such
an effect. Therefore, investigating the lunar effect on stock returns is a strong test
of whether investor behavior affects asset prices. Nevertheless, it is also important
to recognize the possibility that the relation between lunar phases and stock returns
could be spurious. As many researchers study the patterns of historical stock returns,
some will find significant results simply due to chance.1
To investigate the relation between lunar phases and stock returns, we first ex-
amine the association of lunar phases with the returns of an equal-weighted and a
value-weighted global portfolio of 48 country stock indices. The findings indicate that
1For example, Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) argue that data snooping biases occur
when a given set of data is used more than once for the purpose of model selection or inference.
When such data reuse happens, there is always a possibility that results are due to chance rather
than any merits inherit in the method. They quantify the data-snooping bias and adjust for its
effect in the context of technical trading rules.
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global stock returns are significantly lower during full moon periods than new moon
periods. For the equal-weighted global portfolio, the cumulative return difference be-
tween the new moon periods and the full moon periods is 40.26 bps per lunar cycle
for the 15-day window specification and 27.48 bps per lunar cycle for the 7-day win-
dow specification; both are significant at the 5% level. For the value-weighted global
portfolio, the corresponding return difference is 30.44 bps for the 15-day window spec-
ification and 25.87 bps for the 7-day window specification, which are significant at
the 10% and the 5% levels respectively. These numbers translate into annual return
differences of 3% to 5%. The differences in the average daily logarithmic returns
between the new and the full moon periods are consistent with the above findings.
A sinusoidal model is also estimated to test for the cyclical pattern of the lunar
effect. According to this model, the lunar effect reaches its peak at the time of full
moon and declines to a trough at the time of new moon, following a cosine curve
with a period of 29.53 days (the mean length of a lunar cycle). The results indicate
a significant cyclical lunar pattern in stock returns.
To fully utilize the panel data, a pooled regression was estimated with panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) for all 48 countries and for the following subgroups
of countries: the G-7 countries, the other developed countries, and the emerging-
market countries. The PCSE specification adjusts for the contemporaneous correla-
tion and heteroskedasticity among country index returns, as well as for the autocor-
relation within each country’s stock index returns. When all countries are included
in the analysis, a statistically significant relation is found between moon phases and
stock returns for both the 15-day and 7-day window specifications. Stock returns
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are, on average, 4 bps lower daily (about 5% annually) for the 15 days around the
full moon than for the 15 days around the new moon. Using a 7-day window, stock
returns are, on average, 6 bps lower daily (about 4% annually) on the full moon days
than on the new moon days. The estimated effect remains similar when country group
fixed effects are included. When country fixed effects are included, the estimated lu-
nar effect becomes stronger. Another interesting observation is that the magnitude
of this lunar effect is larger in the emerging market countries than in the developed
countries.
To study the relation between the lunar effect and investor sentiment, we examine
whether the lunar effect on stock returns is related to stock size, and thus individual
versus institutional decision-making, since institutional ownership is higher for large
cap stocks. Indeed, for U.S. stocks, we find evidence that the lunar effect is more
pronounced for NASDAQ and small cap stocks than for NYSE-AMEX and large cap
stocks.2 Thus, the evidence suggests that the lunar effect is stronger for stocks that
are held mostly by individuals. This finding is consistent with the notion that lunar
phases affect individual moods, which in turn affect investment behavior.
To better understand the relation between lunar phases and stock markets, we
investigate whether lunar phases relate to stock trading volumes and return volatility.
No evidence is found that the lunar effect observed in stock returns is associated with
trading volumes or risk differentials during the full moon and the new moon periods.
We then examine whether the lunar effect can be explained by macro-economic events
2The exception is for the smallest size decile in NASDAQ stocks. Market microstructure and
liquidity-related issues are more likely to have a significant impact on the pricing of extremely small
stocks.
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and other documented calendar anomalies. The findings indicate that the lunar effect
is not due to the average effect of macro-economic announcements and the changes
in short-term interest rates. Nor can the lunar effect be fully explained by global
shocks. The lunar effect remains similar after we control for other calendar-related
anomalies, such as the January effect, the day-of-week effect, the calendar month
effect, and the holiday effects (including lunar holidays). Thus, we conclude that the
lunar effect is unlikely a manifestation of these calendar anomalies. We further check
the robustness of the lunar effect using various lunar window lengths, alternative
ARIMA specifications, and a test of random 30-day cycles.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
literature on how lunar phases affect human mood and behavior. Section 3 describes
the data. Section 4 discusses the methodology and results. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
One difficulty in testing whether psychological biases and sentiments affect in-
vestor trading behavior and asset prices is to find a proxy variable for sentiment or
mood that is observable and exogenous to economic variables. Nonetheless, there
have been several creative attempts. For example, Avery and Chevalier (1999) show
that sentimental bettors can affect the path of prices in football betting. Saunders
(1993) and Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), drawing on psychological evidence that
sunny weather is associated with an upbeat mood, find that sunshine is strongly cor-
related with stock returns. In a study of the seasonal-variation of risk premia in stock
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market returns, Kamstra et. al (2003) draw on a documented medical phenomenon,
Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD), to proxy investor mood and find a statistically
significant relation between SAD and stock market returns. In another study, Kam-
stra, Kramer, and Levi (2000) relate yearly daylight fluctuations to mood changes
and in turn to stock market returns.
This chapter exploits the popular perception that lunar phases affect mood and
behavior, and analyzes the relation between lunar phases and stock returns. The
hypothesis is that the lunar effect is an exogenous proxy for mood since lunar phases
do not have tangible effects on economic and social activities. Furthermore, while the
level of sunshine studied in Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) is specific to geographical
locations, lunar cycles are the same around the globe. Thus the lunar effect does not
depend on the geographical locations of investors. Lunar cycles are also predictable.
A relation between lunar cycles and stock returns will indicate that stock prices are
predictable in a way uncorrelated with economic fundamentals, which is a strong
violation of the efficient market hypothesis.
The idea that the moon affects individual moods has ancient roots. The moon
has been associated with mental disorder since ancient time, as reflected by the word
”lunacy,” which derives from Luna, the Roman goddess of the moon. Popular belief
has linked the full moon to such disparate events as epilepsy, somnambulism, crime,
suicide, mental illness, disasters, accidents, birthrates, and fertility.
Biological evidence suggests that lunar phases have an impact on the human body
and behavior. Research on biological rhythms documents a circatrigintan cycle, which
is a moon-related human cycle. The most common monthly cycle is menstruation. A
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woman’s menstrual cycle is about the same length as a lunar cycle, which suggests
the influence of the moon. Law (1986) finds a synchronous relationship between the
menstrual cycle and the lunar phases. Studies also find a lunar effect on fertility; for
example, Criss and Marcum (1981) document that births vary systematically over
lunar cycles with peak fertility during the third lunar quarter. In addition, lunar
phases affect human nutrient intake: De Castro and Pearcey (1995) document an 8%
increase in meal size and a 26% decrease in alcohol intake at the time of full moon.
Much attention has been paid to the lunar effect on human mood and behavior in
the psychology literature. A recent study by Neal and Colledge (2000) documents an
increase in general practice consultations during the full moon phase. Lieber (1978)
and Tasso and Miller (1976) indicate a disproportionately higher number of criminal
offenses occur during the full moon phase. Weiskott (1974) reports evidence that the
number of crisis calls is higher during full moon and waning phases. Hicks-Caskey and
Potter (1991) suggest an effect of the day of a full moon on the acting-out behavior of
developmentally delayed, institutionalized women. Sands and Miller (1991) document
that a full moon is associated with a significant but slight decrease in absenteeism
after controlling for the effects of the day of the week, month, and proximity to a
holiday.
Overall, the effect of the moon has been studied informally and formally for years.
However, despite the attention this effect has received, psychological evidence for the
lunar hypothesis in general is not conclusive even though biological evidence is strong.
For example, in a review of empirical studies, Campbell and Beets (1978) conclude
that lunar phases have little effect on psychiatric hospital admissions, suicides, or
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homicides. On the other hand, researchers argue that this lack of relation does not
preclude a lunar effect. It may simply mean that the effect has not been adequately
tested due to small sample sizes and short sample time periods (Cyr and Kaplan
(1987); Garzino (1982)). Moreover, the psychology literature has mainly focused on
trying to link the moon’s phases to extreme behavioral problems in a few disturbed
people, rather than a less drastic effect on human beings in general. By studying the
relation between lunar phases and asset prices, this chapter extends the literature of
the lunar effect on behavior.
In addition, survey evidence suggests a wide belief in the lunar effect. Rotton and
Kelly (1985b) find that 49.4% of the respondents to their survey believe in lunar phe-
nomena. Interestingly, among psychiatric nurses, this percentage rises to 74% (Agus
(1973)). Vance (1995) reports a similar result. Danzl (1987) finds survey evidence
that 80% of the nurses and 64% of the physicians in the emergency department be-
lieve that the moon cycle affects patients. Scientific explanations have been proposed
to account for the moon’s effect on the brain: sleep deprivation, heavy nocturnal dew,
tidal effect, weather patterns, magnetism and polarization of the moon’s light (Kelley
(1942); Katzeff (1981); Szpir (1996); Raison, Klein, and Steckler (1999)).
Given the extensive documentation of the correlation between lunar phases and
human feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, more specifically, the correlation between
full moon periods and sleep deprivation, depressed mood, and suicidal events, the
hypothesis in this study is that investors may value financial assets less during full
moon periods than during new moon periods due to the changes in mood associated
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with lunar phases.3
This chapter is not the first attempt to link lunar phases to stock returns. Rotton
and Kelly (1985a) cite a working paper by Rotton and Rosenberg (1984) that investi-
gates the relation between lunar phases and Dow-Jones average closing prices. They
find no significant relation between lunar phases and the Dow Jones Index prices.4
The current study differs in that it examines returns rather than prices. In addition,
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations are corrected for in the return series, thus
providing a more precise test for the relation. Most importantly, a broad sample
of 48 countries is examined, which constitutes a more comprehensive and powerful
test. Dichev and Janes (2003) also report a significant lunar effect on stock returns.
Their study is concurrent with and independent of this study. Their findings and the
findings of this chapter complement each other. Dichev and Janes (2003) focus more
on the U.S. market, while this chapter provides global evidence on 48 countries with
different levels of market development.
4.3 Data
A lunar calendar was obtained from the United States Naval Observatory (USNO)
website.5 This site provides the date and time (Greenwich Mean Time) of four phases
of the moon for the time period of 1700 to 2015. The four phases are: new moon,
3We follow the evidence and argument in Hirshleifer and Shumway (2001) that good mood is
associated with high asset returns. Since we assume that investors’ mood follows a sinusoidal model
and positive mood is associated with high asset returns, the hypothesis corresponds to a cycle in
returns that meets its peak at new moon and its trough at the full moon.
4We were unable to obtain the working paper by Rotton and Rosenberg (1984). Our comments
are based on the discussion provided in Rotton and Kelly (1985a).
5http://aa.usno.navy.mil/AA/
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first quarter, full moon and last quarter. For the year 2000, the length of the mean
synodic month (new moon to new moon) is 29.53059 days.
Stock market information on returns and trading volumes was obtained through
Datastream. The sample period is from January 1973 to July 2001. The return sample
consists of 48 countries listed in Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) as
developed markets or emerging markets. The country index calculated by Datastream
(Datastream Total Market Index) was used unless a country did not have this series for
at least five years; in these cases, the country index from other sources in Datastream
was used. All returns were measured as nominal returns in local currencies. Trading
volume data was collected for 40 of the corresponding 48 stock indices. Eight of these
48 indices did not have trading volume data in Datastream. Summary statistics
appear in Table 4.1.
4.4 Empirical Findings
This section describes the empirical results of testing the hypothesis that stock
returns are associated with lunar phases. We first report findings using an equal-
weighted and a value-weighted global portfolio of the 48 country stock indices. This
set of results indicates the significance of lunar effect on global stock returns.
Next, a panel regression was estimated using the entire panel of countries as well as
panels of the following country categorizations: the G-7 countries, the other developed
countries, and the emerging market countries.
To better understand the lunar effect on stock returns, we examine whether such
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an effect is related to stock capitalizations, patterns in trading volumes and stock
market volatility. We also investigate whether the lunar effect is driven by macroe-
conomic announcements, global shocks, and calendar-related anomalies, such as the
January effect, the day-of-week effect, the calendar month effect, the holiday effect,
and the lunar holiday effect. Finally we check the robustness of the lunar effect to
various lunar window lengths, several ARIMA specifications, and a test of random
30-day cycles.
4.4.1 Lunar Effect on the Global Portfolios
Since lunar cycles are common across the globe, we examine the lunar effect on
an equal-weighted and a value-weighted global portfolio of 48 countries.6 Specifically,
we compare the returns of the full moon periods to the returns of the new moon
periods for the global portfolios. Table 2 reports the test results. Panel A presents
average cumulative returns; Panel B presents average daily logarithmic returns. The
results indicate that the returns during the new moon periods are significantly higher
than those during the full moon periods.7 The effect is stronger for the 7-day window
specification than for the 15-day window specification. The effect is also stronger for
the equal-weighted portfolio than for the value-weighted portfolio. The findings are
consistent regardless of using cumulative returns or daily logarithmic returns.
6At each point of time, we form the global portfolio using countries for which the return infor-
mation is available.
7A full moon period is defined as N days before the full moon day + the full moon day + N days
after the full moon day (N = 3 or 7). Similarly, a new moon period is defined as N days before the
new moon day + the new moon day + N days after the new moon day (N = 3 or 7). In the case of
the 15-day window, a new moon period can be less than 15 days since a lunar month may be less
than 30 days. In these cases, the new moon period is defined as the remaining days of the lunar
month.
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In Table 4.2, Panel A, the cumulative return difference is -40.26 bps per lunar
cycle for the 15-day window specification and -27.48 bps per lunar cycle for the 7-day
window specification. A trading strategy with a long position in the portfolio during
the new moon periods and a short position during the full moon periods on average
yields a return of 40.26 bps for a lunar month using the 15-day window specification.
A similar strategy using the 7-day window specification yields a return of 27.48 bps.
These numbers translate into annual returns of 4.8% (40.26 bps *12) and 3.3% (27.48
bps *12) for the trading strategies, both significant at the 5% level. For the value-
weighed portfolio, the corresponding return differences are -30.44 bps for the 15-day
window and -25.87 bps for the 7-day window. These numbers translate into annual
returns of 3.7% (30.44 bps *12) and 3.1% (25.87 bps *12) for the corresponding
trading strategies using the value-weighted portfolio. To further gauge the economic
significance, the transaction cost of implementing this trading strategy was estimated
using exchange-traded-funds. The bid-ask spread for emerging market Exchange-
Traded Funds (ETFs), such as iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF,8 typically is
around 0.10% of the traded value. Since the trading strategy used here involves 12
round-trip transactions (i.e., 24 transactions), a rough estimate of the transaction cost
is 1.2%. Hence, the annual returns net of transaction costs for the trading strategies
range from 1.9% to 3.6%.
Consistent with the evidence in Panel A, Panel B shows that the mean daily
logarithmic returns are lower for the full moon periods than for the new moon periods.
8The ticker symbol of ishares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF is EEM and was incepted on April
7, 2003.
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The average daily return difference for the equal-weighted portfolio is -3.53 bps for
the 15-day window specification and -4.94 bps for the 7-day window specification.
For the value-weighted portfolio, the average daily return difference is -2.80 bps for
the 15-day window specification and -4.82 bps for the 7-day window specification.
These numbers translate into annual returns of 4.4% (=3.53 bps *125) and 3.1%
(=4.94 bps *62) for the corresponding trading strategies using the equal-weighted
portfolio and annual returns of 3.5% (=2.80 bps *125) and 3.0% (=4.82 bps *62)
for the trading strategies using the value-weighted portfolio respectively. Again, the
lunar effect is stronger for the 7-day window specification and for the equal-weighted
portfolio. Figure 1 plots the corresponding average daily logarithmic returns of the
equal-weighted global portfolio for the full moon periods versus the new moon periods.
The documented return differences in both panels in Table 2 are statistically
significant. The results are similar when alternative AR specifications of the Newey-
West estimates are used. The bootstrapped p-values further confirm that the return
differences are unlikely driven by the non-normality of the return distributions and
by pure chance. The p-values of the nonparametric signed-rank test are all less than
5Next, a sinusoidal model of continuous lunar impact is used to test for the cyclical
pattern of the lunar effect. According to the model, the lunar effect reaches its peak
at the time of the full moon and declines to the trough at the time of the new moon,
following a cosine curve with a period of 29.53 days (the mean length of a lunar cycle).
The following regression is estimated for the portfolios:
Rt = α + β cos(2πdt/29.53) + et, (4.1)
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where d is the number of days since the last full moon day and the β coefficient
indicates the association between stock returns and lunar cycles. There is a negative
relation ( β = -2.88) between the global stock returns and lunar cycles. The test
result is statistically significant at the 1% level (Figure 2). Overall, the sinusoidal
model suggests that the lunar effect is cyclical.
In summary, we find global evidence of a significant correlation between stock
returns and lunar phases. We document that on average returns are higher during
the new moon periods than during the full moon periods.
4.4.2 Panel Analysis
A panel of country level average daily logarithmic returns for each lunar period is
set up to fully utilize the cross-sectional and time series data. We estimate a pooled
regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) as the following:
Rit = αi + βLunardummyt + et, (4.2)
Rit is the average daily logarithmic return during a full moon or a new moon period
for country i at time t. Lunardummy is a dummy variable indicating a full moon
or a new moon period; it takes on a value of one for a full moon period and zero for
a new moon period.9 The coefficient on this variable indicates the difference in the
mean daily logarithmic returns between the lunar periods. The PCSE specification
adjusts for the contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity among country
9For the 7-day window specification, we only include days of a full moon period and a new moon
period. Other days of a lunar month are excluded from the regression.
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index returns, as well as for the autocorrelation within each country’s stock index
returns (Beck and Katz, 1995).
Table 4.3 presents estimation results of the pooled regression for both the 15-day
and the 7-day window specifications. The results indicate that stock returns of the
new moon periods are significantly higher than those of the full moon periods. Re-
gardless of model specifications, the coefficients on Lunardummy are negative. When
all countries are included in the analysis, the returns of the new moon periods are
on average 3.95 bps and 5.93 bps higher than returns of the full moon periods for
the 15-day and 7-day windows respectively. Both estimates are significant at the 5%
level. The estimated coefficients on the Lunardummy remain similar when country
group dummy variables are included. When country fixed effects are included, the
estimated coefficients become larger in magnitude and higher in statistical signifi-
cance. Interestingly, the extent of the lunar effect seems to vary across different levels
of market maturity. The strongest lunar effect is found among the emerging market
countries: a 5.60 bps daily difference for the 15-day window and an 11.27 bps daily
difference for the 7-day window; both are significant at the 5% level. The lunar effect
in the other developed markets and the G-7 countries is less strong: a 3.21 bps daily
difference for the 15-day window and a 3.19 bps daily difference for the 7-day window
for the other developed markets; and a 2.43 bps daily difference for the 15-day window
and a 2.45 bps daily difference for the 7-day window for the G-7 countries10
In summary, the panel analysis confirms the earlier findings using the global port-
10R2 statistics for these regressions are between 0.1% and 0.5%. The values are low but not very
surprising since we do not expect that the lunar effect would explain a large proportion of variations
in stock returns.
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folio: Stock returns of the new moon periods are significantly higher than those of the
full moon periods, more so for the emerging market countries. Maturity of the stock
markets and the percentage of institutional investors might explain the differences in
the magnitude of lunar impact in these markets.
4.4.3 Large vs. Small Capitalization Stocks
In this section, we examine whether the lunar effect is related to stock capital-
ization. This test is motivated by the empirical finding that institutional ownership
is positively correlated with stock capitalization.11 Specifically, large capitalization
stocks have a higher percentage of institutional ownership than small capitalization
stocks. Since investment decisions of individual investors are more likely to be affected
by sentiments and mood than those of institutional investors, we expect the lunar
effect to be more pronounced in the pricing of small capitalization stocks. To assess
the relation between lunar phases and stock capitalization, 10 stock portfolios were
formed based on market capitalization for stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ. Returns and market capitalization for the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks were obtained from CRSP.
Table 4.4 reports results of a regression of daily returns of market capitalization
ranked portfolios on lunar phases. The estimated lunar effect is stronger for NASDAQ
stocks than for NYSE and AMEX stocks. Moreover, the lunar effect is stronger for
smaller size deciles with the exception of the smallest decile in NASDAQ.12 The
11For example, see Sias and Starks (1997).
12Liquidity and market microstructure related issues are likely to have a first-order effect in pricing
extreme small stocks rather than mood; hence, a weaker lunar effect for stocks that are extremely
small in capitalization is not entirely surprising.
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Spearman rank correlation is -0.81 for the NYSE and AMEX deciles and significant
at the 1% level. The correlation is -0.65 for the NASDAQ deciles and significant at
the 10% level (excluding the smallest decile).
Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that stocks with more
individual investor ownership display a stronger lunar effect and thus provide further
evidence that mood or sentiment may affect asset prices.
4.4.4 Trading Volume and Market Volatility
In order to determine whether the observed lunar effect is related to trading
volumes and return volatility, we estimate the following regressions for an equal-
weighted portfolio and a panel of 48 countries for the 15-day full moon window:
normvolumejt = αj + λjLunardummyt + ejt, (4.3)
volatilityjT = αj + λjLunardummyT + ejT , (4.4)
where the variable, normvolume, is the daily trading volume normalized by av-
erage daily volume in the month and t is the time index for each day; the variable,
volatility, is the standard deviation of daily logarithmic stock returns in a lunar
period, and T is the time index for a lunar period.
Test results for Equation 4.3 are reported in Table 4.5, Panel A. The coefficient
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on Lunardummy is not significant for the portfolio, nor is it significant for the pooled
regression of 48 countries, which indicates that there is little evidence that trading
volumes are related to lunar phases in a systematic manner. Therefore, the observed
lunar effect is not due to patterns in trading volume that are related to lunar phases.
Test results for Equation 4.4 are reported in Table 4.5, Panel B. The coefficients on
Lunardummy of the portfolios and the panel regression are of different signs and
are both insignificant, which indicates that stock market volatilities are not related
to lunar phases in a systematic manner. Hence, the observed lunar effect in stock
returns cannot be explained by the risk differentials between the full moon and the
new moon periods.
4.4.5 Macroeconomic Events
It is possible that the return differential between the full moon and the new
moon periods reflects the average effect of macroeconomic events or common market
shocks. In this section, we examine to what extent the estimated lunar effect is
explained by macroeconomic events. Specifically, we investigate the lunar effect on
the global portfolio, controlling for the following three types of events: macroeconomic
announcements, major global shocks, and movements in short-term interest rates.
We estimate the lunar effect on the daily logarithmic returns of the global portfolios,
controlling for macro-economic events. Initially, a base case of lunar effect is identified
by estimating the following regression for the portfolios at the daily frequency:
Rt = α + βLunardummyt + et, (4.5)
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where Rt is the daily logarithmic return, and t is the time index of daily frequency.
The Newey-West adjusted standard errors are used, assuming an AR1 process. The
indicator variable, Lunardummyt, is set equal to one if day t falls in a full moon
period and zero if day t falls in a new moon period. Equation 4.5 is then re-estimated,
controlling for macroeconomic announcements, major global shocks, and changes in
short-term interest rates.
The test results are reported in Table 4.6. Model 1 reports the base case. The
coefficient on Lunardummy is -4.26 (-5.40) bps for the equal-weighted portfolio and
-3.47 (-4.77) bps for the value-weighted portfolio, for the 15-day (the 7-day) window
specification. All estimates are significant at the 5% level. These results confirm the
earlier finding that stock returns are higher during new moon periods than full moon
periods.
To examine whether the return differences between the new moon and the full
moon periods are due to macroeconomic announcements, two tests are performed.
In the first test, Equation (5) is re-estimated by excluding the days with specific
macroeconomic announcements: Consumer Price Index, Federal Reserve Open Mar-
ket Committee announcements, Gross National Product, Retail Sales, Employment
Report, Employment Cost Index, Trade Deficit, and National Association of Pur-
chasing Managers Survey Index (Gerlach (2004)). The resulting estimates, reported
in Table 6, Model 2, are similar to those of the base case for the 15-day window
specification and larger in magnitude for the 7-day window specification, indicating
that the lunar effect cannot be explained by the average effect of macroeconomic
announcements. In the second test, the number of days with macroeconomic an-
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nouncement during the new moon and the full moon phases is plotted to compare the
distribution of announcements across the lunar periods. Figure 3 shows that macro-
announcements occur quite evenly during the two periods for both the 15-day and
the 7-day window specifications. Overall, the evidence indicates that the lunar effect
is unlikely due to macroeconomic announcements.
Next, the relevance of global shocks to the lunar effect is examined. Equation
4.5 is re-estimated excluding various global shocks. As reported in Table 6, Model 3,
the estimates are still negative, albeit smaller in magnitude and lower in statistical
significance than the base case. The lunar effect remains negative and significant for
the equal-weighted portfolio; the coefficients on Lunardummy are negative but not
statistically significant for the value-weighted portfolio. Thus, excluding the periods
of global shocks from the analysis weakens the lunar effect to some extent; however,
these shocks cannot fully explain the documented lunar effect.
Finally, the lunar effect is examined by controlling for changes in the short-term
interest rates. Equation 4.5 is modified by including short-term interest rates as an
explanatory variable in the following regression:
Rt = α + βLunardummyt + δshortterminterestratet + et, (4.6)
where the shortterminterestrate is the three-month Treasury bill rate. The results
are presented in Table 6, Model 4. The coefficients on the short-term interest rate
are negative for all specifications, indicating that higher interest rates are correlated
with lower stock prices. The estimated lunar effect remains similar although slightly
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weaker, which indicates that changes in short-term interest rates do not explain the
observed lunar effect. Overall, the evidence indicates that the lunar effect cannot
be explained away by macro-economic announcements, common shocks in the stock
markets, and changes in short-term interest rates.
4.4.6 The Lunar Effect and Other Calendar Anomalies
This section examines whether the lunar effect can be explained by other calendar
anomalies.
4.4.6.1 The January Effect
The lunar effect is unlikely a manifestation of the January effect,13 since lunar
months do not correspond to calendar months. Nevertheless, to test for the relation
between the lunar effect and the January effect, a January dummy variable was added
to the following regression:
Rt = α + βLunardummyt + δjanuarydummyt + et, (4.7)
Januarydummy is a dummy variable equal to one in the month of January and zero
otherwise.
Table 7, Model 1, shows both a significant January effect and a significant lunar
effect. Compared with the base case findings in Table 6, where the January effect is
not controlled, the magnitude and significance of the lunar effect become only slightly
13The January effect has been documented by, for example, Rozeff and Jr. (1976) and Reinganum
(1983)
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smaller; thus, the January anomaly is not a driving force behind the observed lunar
effect.
4.4.6.2 Day-of-Week Effect
If most full moon days fall on Mondays, it is possible that the Monday effect
may explain the observed lunar effect. Figure 4 shows that the full moon days fall
evenly on each day of the week in the sample. In an unreported panel regression
of all countries, the estimated lunar effect becomes stronger when the day-of-week
fixed effects are included; thus, the lunar effect on stock returns is not related to the
day-of-week effect.
4.4.6.3 Calendar Month Effect
Ariel (1987) shows that the mean U.S. stock return for days during the first half of
a calendar month is higher than the mean stock return during the second half of the
month. Thus, it is conceivable that the lunar effect documented in this chapter may
be a manifestation of the calendar month effect. To test for this possibility, a calendar
dummy is added in the regression and Equation 4.5 is re-estimated, as follows:
Rt = α + βLunardummyt + δCalendardummyt + et, (4.8)
Calendardummy is a dummy variable equal to one for the first half of a calendar
month and zero otherwise. As shown in Model 2 of Table reftable:lunar7, the calendar
month effect is not significant for the portfolios; nevertheless, the magnitude and
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significance of the Lunardummy is consistent with the earlier results. Thus, the test
statistics suggest that the calendar month effect cannot explain the observed lunar
effect.
4.4.6.4 Holiday Effect
Ariel (1990) documents that, on the trading day prior to holidays, stocks advance
with disproportionate frequency and show high mean returns averaging nine to 14
times the mean returns for the other days. To examine this effect, the day before
a holiday is excluded for each country. Equation (5) is then re-estimated using the
holiday-adjusted global index returns. As reported in Model 3 of Table 7, the lunar
effect is significant at the 5% level for both portfolios and for both the 15-day and
7-day window specifications. Thus, the lunar effect does not appear to be driven by
the holiday effect.
4.4.6.5 Lunar Holidays
Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004) show that Jewish holidays have a significant
impact on the U.S. equity market. They find that returns are significantly positive
around Rosh Hashanah and significantly negative around Yom Kippur. Two tests
are used to check the robustness of the lunar cycle effect: 1) lunar holiday dummy
variables are added to Equation 4.5 because many Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, Chinese,
Japanese, and Korean holidays fall on the fixed days of a lunar-based calendar (Table
7); and 2) lunar holiday dummy variables are added to the estimation of the lunar
effect at the country level for relevant countries (Table 8).
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Table 4.7 reports the estimates on the lunar dummy and the lunar holiday dum-
mies for two Jewish holidays: Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. The coefficients for
these two holidays are not significant for the portfolios. The coefficient on the lunar
dummy for the equal-weighted portfolio is -3.76 for the 15-day window specification
and -4.33 for the 7-day window specification, which are significant at the 5% and
10% levels respectively. The coefficient on the lunar dummy for the value-weighted
portfolio is -2.57 for the 15-day window specification and -3.54 for the 7-day window
specification, both statistically insignificant.
Interestingly, in the country level analysis, the Jewish holiday dummies are sta-
tistically significant for the U.S. and the Israeli markets while the lunar holiday dum-
mies for other countries are not significantly different from zero (except in Korea).
These results are consistent with the findings for the U.S. stock market in Frieder
and Subrahmanyam (2004). For both the U.S. and Israeli market, the returns are
lower around Yom Kippur (a somber holiday) and higher around Rosh Hashanah (a
cheerful holiday). Nevertheless, the coefficients on the lunar dummies do not change
much when the lunar holiday dummies are included, which indicates that the lunar
holiday effect is probably independent of the lunar cycle effect. Thus, the observed
lunar effect is not likely just a manifestation of other documented calendar anomalies.
4.4.7 Additional Robustness Checks
The robustness of the lunar effect was further checked by examining various lu-
nar window lengths, alternative ARIMA specifications, and a test of random 30-day
cycles.
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4.4.7.1 Lunar Window Length
To address the concern that the estimated lunar effect may be due to the choice of
window length, Equation 4.5 is re-estimated for window lengths of one to 15 (Table
4.9). The stock returns are higher during the new moon phases than the full moon
phases for all window lengths for both portfolios. Except for the one-day window,
the p-values of all estimates are lower than the 10% level of significance. Consistent
with the earlier findings, except for the three-day window, the lunar effect is stronger
and more significant for the equal-weighted portfolio than for the value-weighted
portfolio. Since the return differences are quite consistent across the window lengths,
it is unlikely that the lunar effect is due to the choice of window length.
4.4.7.2 ARIMA
Different ARIMA specifications are used to adjust the returns of the portfolios.
Equation 4.5 is then re-estimated (Table 4.10). Both the magnitude and the sta-
tistical significance of the estimates are consistent across the different specifications,
indicating that the documented lunar effect is not due to the time-series properties
of stock returns.
4.4.8 30-Day Cycle Effect
To test whether the observed lunar effect reflects a general pattern in stock returns,
rather than a lunar-driven cycle, the lunar phase is shifted by one to 29 days. That is,
a 30-day cycle is started on day one to 29 after the first full moon day, and the 30-day
cycle effect is estimated for each specification, using the following pooled regression
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with PCSE:
Rit = αi + β30daydummyt + eit, (4.9)
where Rit is the daily logarithmic return for country i and date t, and 30daydummy
is a dummy variable that indicates the phase of a 30-day cycle. The 30daydummy
takes on a value of one for 7 days before the starting day + the starting day + 7 days
after the starting day, and a value of zero otherwise.
Table 4.11 shows that the 30-day cycle effects for the cycles starting one to eight
days and 24 to 29 days after the full moon display negative signs. Moreover, the
statistical significance of the estimated 30-day cycle effect declines as these 30-day
cycles deviate more from the lunar cycle. In fact, for the cycles starting 10 to 23
days after the full moon, the pattern is reversed. Figure 5 graphs the estimates
of the 30-day cycle effect and shows that the documented lunar effect cannot arise
from any 30-day cycle except for those that closely track the lunar cycle. Overall,
the findings indicate that the lunar effect on stock returns is robust to various lunar
window lengths, alternative ARIMA specifications of the stock returns, and a test of
random 30-day cycles.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the relation between lunar phases and stock returns for
a sample of 48 countries. Strong global evidence indicates that stock returns are lower
on days around a full moon than on days around a new moon. The return differences
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are statistically and economically significant during the sample period. Since lunar
phases are likely to be related to investor mood and are not related to economic
activities, the findings are thus not consistent with the predictions of traditional
asset pricing theories that assume fully rational investors. The positive association
identified between lunar phases and stock returns suggests that it might be valuable
to go beyond a rational asset pricing framework to explore investor behavior.
The psychology literature has provided numerous theories on how mood affects
perceptions and preferences. One theory is that mood affects perception through
misattribution: attributing feelings to wrong sources leads to incorrect judgments
(Schwarz and Clore (1983); Frijda (1988)). Alternatively, mood may affect people’s
ability to process information. In particular, investors may react to salient or irrel-
evant information when feeling good (Schwarz (1990); Schwarz and Bless (1991)).
Finally, mood may affect preferences (Loewenstein (2000); Mehra and Sah (2000)).
This chapter is a first step toward documenting the possible effect of mood on asset
prices. It would be interesting to better understand how mood affect asset prices. In
a survey paper, Hirshleifer (2001) pointed out that one area of future research is to
conduct experimental testing of behavioral hypotheses. In a related vein, future work
could study the effect of mood on asset prices in an experimental setting. For exam-
ple, does investment behavior in experimental settings differ during different phases
of a lunar cycle?
155
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for the 48 country stock indices. All sample periods end
on July 31, 2001. All returns are in basis points.
Country Code Starting Date Number of Mean Daily Std Dev of
Observations Log Return Daily Log Return
Argentina TOTMKAR Jan-88 3510 28.42 360.6
Australia TOTMKAU Jan-73 7213 3.35 111.79
Austria TOTMKOE Jan-74 6355 2.55 86
Belgium TOTMKBG Jan-73 7124 2.96 82.26
Brazil BRBOVES Jan-72 2475 57.11 646.73
Canada TOTMKCN Jan-73 7226 2.97 84.13
Chile TOTMKCL Jul-89 3013 8.14 103.21
China TOTMKCH Jan-91 2443 11.36 291.94
Czech CZPX50I Apr-94 1750 -5.5 127.19
Denmark TOTMKDK Jan-74 6377 5.34 108.49
Finland TOTMKFN Jan-88 3339 5.46 183.89
France TOTMKFR Jan-73 7264 4.17 111.26
Germany TOTMKBD Jan-73 7192 2.72 95.33
Greece TOTMKGR Jan-88 3385 7.86 191.51
Hong Kong TOTMKHK Jan-73 7103 3.97 192.03
Hungary BUXINDX Feb-91 2629 7.17 177.12
India IBOMBSE Apr-84 2903 6.29 188.61
Indonesia TOTMKID Apr-84 2761 -1.18 251.78
Ireland TOTMKIR Jan-73 7103 4.69 108.82
Israel ISTGNRL Jan-84 4179 14.25 143.62
Italy TOTMKIT Jan-73 7445 4.33 134.2
Japan TOTMKJP Jan-73 7145 1.81 101.45
Jordan AMMANFM Nov-88 2176 2.68 86.07
Korea TOTMKKO Jan-75 3322 1.04 207.68
Luxembourg TOTMKLX Jan-92 2370 5.65 100.19
Malaysia TOTMKMY Jan-88 3349 3.52 164.16
Mexico TOTMKMX Jan-88 3436 11.71 170.9
Morocco MDCFG25 Dec-87 1820 11.99 91.44
Netherlands TOTMKNL Jan-73 7219 3.51 95.83
New Zealand TOTMKNZ Jan-88 3409 1.71 114.76
Norway TOTMKNW Jan-80 5419 3.99 142.43
Pakistan PKSE100 Dec-88 2795 2.63 162.94
Peru PEGENRL Jan-91 2597 15.25 158.34
Philippines TOTMKPH Sep-87 3464 4.86 154.32
Poland TOTMKPO Jan-94 1803 -2.07 231.97
Portugal TOTMKPT Jan-90 2858 1.76 93.31
Russia RSMTIND Sep-94 1676 18.85 369.42
Singapore TOTMKSG Jan-73 7128 1.2 144.94
South Africa TOTMKSA Jan-73 7170 5.53 135.84
Spain TOTMKES Jan-88 3623 3.34 116.1
Sweden TOTMKSD Jan-82 4903 6.07 134.73
Switzerland TOTMKSW Jan-73 7174 2.87 85.17
Taiwan TOTMKTA Sep-87 3371 1.89 223.19
Thailand TOTMKTH Jan-88 3349 2.09 200.12
Turkey TOTMKTK Jan-88 3467 21.28 298.62
United Kingdom TOTMKUK Jan-73 7258 3.78 103.42
United States TOTMKUS Jan-73 7216 3.26 98.8
Venezuela TOTMKVE Jan-90 2829 12.72 249.88
Global Portfolio Equal-weighted Jan-73 7456 5.38 58.93
Global Portfolio Value-weighted Jan-73 7456 3.07 67.4
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Table 4.2: Lunar phases and stock returns: the global portfolio
This table compares the returns of the equal-weighted and value-weighted global portfolio between
the full moon and the new moon periods. We define the full moon and the new moon periods using
the 15-day and the 7-day windows. In the 15-day window analysis, the full moon period is 7 days
before and after the full moon day plus the full moon day; the new moon period is defined as the
rest of the lunar month. In the 7-day window analysis, the full (new) moon period is 3 days before
and after the full (new) moon day plus the full (new) moon day. Panel A examines the average
cumulative returns and Panel B examines the average daily logarithmic returns. We report Newey-
West adjusted T-statistics, p-values t2.20 from bootstrap analysis and signed-rank test. The returns
are in basis points.
15-Day Window 7-Day Window
The Global Portfolio Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted
Panel A: Average Cumulative Returns
Full Moon Return C New Moon Return -40.26 -30.44 -27.48 -25.87
Newey-West adjusted T-statistic (AR1) (-2.40) (-1.87) (-3.46) (-2.40)
Newey-West adjusted T-statistic (AR2) (-2.82) (-1.94) (-3.46) (-2.39)
Newey-West adjusted T-statistics (AR3) (-2.99) (-1.99) (-3.54) (-2.37)
Bootstrapped p-value -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0
Signed-Rank Test (p-value) 0 -0.02 0 -0.01
Panel B: Average Daily Logarithmic Returns
Full Moon Return C New Moon Return -3.53 -2.8 -4.94 -4.82
Newey-West adjusted T-statistic (AR1) (-2.61) (-1.75) (-2.68) (-2.02)
Newey-West adjusted T-statistic (AR2) (-2.82) (-1.82) (-2.74) (-2.03)
Newey-West adjusted T-statistics (AR3) (-2.95) (-1.86) (-2.81) (-2.04)
Bootstrapped p-value -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03
Signed-Rank Test (p-value) 0 -0.02 0 -0.02
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Table 4.3: Lunar Phases and Stock Returns: Joint Tests
This table reports the estimates of a pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE):
Rit = αi + βLunardummyt + et for the 15-day window and 7-day window, respectively, where Rit
is average daily logarithmic returns for country i in lunar month t for each full moon and new moon
period. Lunardummy is a dummy variable equal to one if it is a full moon period and zero if it is
a new moon period. We define the full moon and the new moon periods using the 15-day and the
7-day windows. In the 15-day window specification, we define the full moon period as 7 days before
and after the full moon day plus the full moon day, and define the new moon period as the rest of
the lunar month. In the 7-day window specification, we define the full (new) moon period as 3 days
before and after the full (new) moon day plus the full (new) moon day. The PCSE specification
adjusts for the contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity among country indices and for
the autocorrelation within each countrys stock index. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses.
The daily returns are in basis points. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Lunar Dummy (β)
15-Day Window 7-Day Window
G7 -2.43 -2.45
(-1.53) (-1.09)
Other Developed Markets -3.21** -3.19
(-2.08) (-1.47)
Emerging Markets -5.60** -11.27***
(-2.11) (-3.12)
All Markets -3.95** -5.93**
(-2.25) (-2.44)
All Markets with Country Group Dummies -3.94** -5.92**
(-2.24) (-2.43)
All Markets with Country Fixed Effects -4.63*** -8.19***
(-3.54) (-3.59)
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Table 4.4: Lunar Effect and Stock Sizes
This table reports results from estimating a regression of daily returns of market capitalization ranked
portfolios on lunar phases. The portfolios are constructed using stocks traded in the U.S. markets:
NYSE and AMEX, and NASDAQ, respectively. Decile 1 corresponds to the largest market capital-
ization stocks. The following regression is used for each portfolio: Rit = αi + βLunardummyt + eit,
Lunardummy is a dummy variable indicating the phase of a lunar cycle, equal to one during a full
moon period and zero during a new moon period. The full moon period is 7 days before and after
the full moon day plus the full moon day, and the new moon period is the rest of the lunar month.
T-statistics with the Newey-West robust standard errors are in the parentheses. The daily returns
are in basis points. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,
using a two-tailed test.
Lunar Dummy (β)





















Deciles 1-10 Deciles 1-10 Deciles 1-9
Spearman Rank Correlation (p-value) -0.81*** -0.2 -0.65*
-0.005 -0.578 -0.056
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Table 4.5: Lunar Phases, Trading Volumes, and Volatility
Panel A reports test results from estimating the following regressions of daily trading volume on
lunar phases for the global portfolio and a pooled sample of 48 countries: normvolumejt = αj +
λjLunardummyt+ejt. normvolume is daily trading volume normalized by average daily volume in
that month. Panel B reports the following regression estimates for the global portfolio and a pooled
sample of 48 countries: volatilityjT = αj + λjLunardummyT + ejT . Volatility is the standard
deviation of daily logarithmic stock returns in the full moon and the new moon period for each
lunar month. Lunardummy is a dummy variable equal to one during a full moon period and zero
during a new moon period. The full moon period is 7 days before and after the full moon day plus
the full moon day, and the new moon period is the rest of the lunar month. The estimates of a
pooled regression use panel corrected standard errors. The estimates of an OLS regression use the
Newey-West robust standard errors with one lag. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Trading Volumes
Lunar Dummy (λ)
Global Portfolio (equal-weighted) 36.27
-0.64
Pooled Regression of 48 countries 48.802
-1.01
Panel B: Return Volatility
Global Portfolio (equal-weighted) 0.1
-0.05
Pooled Regression of 48 countries -0.11
(-0.10)
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Table 4.6: Lunar Phases, Stock Returns, and Macro-Variables
This table compares the returns of global portfolios between the full moon and the new moon
periods, excluding macroannouncement dates, periods of major global shocks, or controlling for
short-term interest rates. We define the full moon and the new moon periods using the 15-day
and the 7-day windows. In the 15-day window specification, we define the full moon period as 7
days before and after the full moon day plus the full moon day, and define the new moon period
as the rest of the lunar month. In the 7-day window specification, we define the full (new) moon
period as 3 days before and after the full (new) moon day plus the full (new) moon day. Model 1
estimates the following regressions: Rt = α + βLunardummyt + et, where Rt is daily logarithmic
returns. Lunardummy is a dummy variable equal to one if it is a full moon period and zero if it is
a new moon period. Model 2 estimates the model excluding dates for eight macroannouncements:
Consumer Price Index, Federal Reserve Open Market Committee announcements, Gross National
Product, Retail Sales, Employment Report, Employment Cost Index, Trade Deficit, and National
Association of Purchasing Managers Survey Index. Model 3 excludes periods of global shocks: the
1987 U.S. stock market crash (October 19, 1987), the Gulf War (January 17, 1991 to February 17,
1991), the Mexican Peso crisis (December 20, 1994 to January 31, 1995), the Asian financial crisis
(July 2, 1997 to December 3, 1997), and the Russian crisis (August 11, 1998 to January 15, 1999).
Model 4 estimates the following regression: Rt = α+βLunardummyt+δshortterminterestratet+et,
where shortterminterestrate is 3-month Treasury bill rate. Newey-West adjusted T-statistics (with
one lag) are reported in the parentheses. The daily returns are in basis points. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
15-Day Window 7-Day Window
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted
Global Portfolio Global Portfolio Global Portfolio Global Portfolio
Model 1: Global Portfolio (Base Case)
Lunar Dummy -4.26*** -3.47** -5.40** -4.77*
(-2.81) (-2.03) (-2.40) (-1.89)
Model 2: Excluding Macro-announcement Dates
Lunar Dummy -4.30** -3.65* -6.21** -5.37*
(-2.40) (-1.84) (-2.40) (-1.82)
Model 3: Excluding Major Global Shocks
Lunar Dummy -3.65** -2.57 -4.07* -2.87
(-2.51) (-1.50) (-1.90) (-1.15)
Model 4: Controlling for Short-term Interest Rates
Lunar Dummy -4.08** -3.02* -4.92** -4.02
(-2.66) (-1.72) (-2.16) (-1.56)
Short-Term Interest Rate -0.94*** -0.69** -1.12*** -1.30***
(-3.51) (-2.32) (-3.05) (-3.21)
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Table 4.7: Lunar Phases, Stock Returns, and Other Calendar Anomalies
This table reports regression results of daily logarithmic stock returns on lunar phases (as in Table
4.6) with controls for other calendar anomalies. Model 1 controls for the January effect. Model 2
controls for the calendar month effect. Model 3 controls for the holiday effect. Model 4 controls
for lunar holiday effects. Yomcum dummy is equal to 1 for the day of and the day following Yom
Kippur. Roshcum dummy is equal to 1 for the first day of Rosh Hashanah and the following day.
Islamic, Hindu, Chinese, and Korean lunar holidays are also controlled for (the coefficient estimates
for these lunar holidays are not reported). Newey-West adjusted T-statistics (with one lag) are
reported in the parentheses. The daily returns are in basis points. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
15-Day Window 7-Day Window
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted
Global Portfolio Global Portfolio Global Portfolio Global Portfolio
Model 1: January Effect
Lunar Dummy -3.98*** -3.00* -4.77** -3.96
(-2.58) (-1.70) (-2.09) (-1.52)
January Dummy 13.81*** 8.20** 16.67*** 7.96
-4.4 -2.54 -3.47 -1.63
Model 2: Calendar Effect
Lunar Dummy -3.99*** -3.01* -4.73** -3.92
(-2.59) (-1.71) (-2.07) (-1.51)
Calendar Month Dummy 0.66 0.56 -1.34 -1.19
-0.43 -0.32 (-0.60) (-0.47)
Model 3: Holiday Effect
Lunar Dummy -4.24*** -4.78*** -4.82** -7.74***
(-2.79) (-2.59) (-2.13) (-2.78)
Model 4: Lunar Holiday Effect
Lunar Dummy -3.76** -2.57 -4.33* -3.53
(-2.42) (-1.44) (-1.84) (-1.31)
Yomcum Dummy -17.85 -34.84** 5.43 -11.83
(-1.18) (-2.23) -0.69 (-0.81)
Roshcum Dummy 0.46 7.21 4.49 11.93


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.9: Lunar Phases, Stock Returns, and Varying Lunar Window Length
TThe following regressions are estimated: Rt = α + βLunardummyt + et, where Rt is daily loga-
rithmic returns. Lunardummy is a dummy variable indicating the phase of a lunar cycle. We define
a full moon period as N days before the full moon day+the full moon day+N days after the full
moon day (N =0 to 7). Similarly, we define a new moon period as N days before the new moon
day+the new moon day+N days after the new moon day (N =0 to 7). Lunardummy is equal to
one during a full moon period and zero during a new moon period. Window length is 2*N +1.
Newey-West adjusted T-statistics (with one lag) are reported in the parentheses. The daily returns
are in basis points. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,














U.S. 3.67** -1.89 6.81 -39.39** 17.44*
-2 (-0.78) -1.56 (-2.27) -1.67
Israel 19.01*** -11.17** 8.49 -54.39 71.00**
-5.74 (-2.41) -0.91 (-0.80) -2.15
China 14.71 -8.45 7.34 34.36
-1.51 (-0.70) -0.48 -0.93
Japan 3.41* -4.57* 8.71* 0.23
-1.82 (-1.81) -1.79 -0.03
Korea -2.49 1.96 27.62* 94.32*
(-0.74) -0.27 -1.74 -1.77
India 9.96* -8.15 7.98 -11.87
-1.84 (-1.11) -0.62 (-0.48)
Indonesia 7.77 -19.23** 25.66 -48.29
-1.28 (-2.23) -1.48 (-0.52)
Jordan 2.54 -1.23 8.9 -1.26
-0.91 (-0.32) -1.29 (-0.10)
Malaysia 7.16* -8.28 0.26 23.58
-1.73 (-1.43) -0.02 -1.6
Morocco 12.15*** -1.39 9.03 -9.37
-3.84 -0.31 -0.91 (-1.13)
Pakistan 3.46 -1.17 -2.3 -3.1
-0.74 (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.14)
Turkey 22.98** -12.62 52.28** 3.08
-2.95 (-1.20) -2.4 -0.1
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Table 4.10: Lunar Phases, Stock Returns, and ARIMA Specifications
ARIMA specifications are estimated for the daily logarithmic returns of the portfolios and then the
following regression is estimated: Rt = α + βLunardummyt + et, where Rt is the residual of the
ARIMA model. Lunardummy is a dummy variable indicating the phase of a lunar cycle, equal to
one during a full moon period and zero during a new moon period. The full moon period is 7 days
before and after the full moon day plus the full moon day, and the new moon period is the rest of
the lunar month. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The daily returns are in basis points.




Global Portfolio Global Portfolio
ARIMA (1, 1) -4.12** -3.71**
(-2.66) (-2.05)
ARIMA (1, 0) -4.08*** -3.60*
(-2.60) (-1.93)
ARIMA (0, 1) -4.14*** -3.71**
(-2.76) (-2.04)
ARIMA (1, 2) -4.11*** -3.73**
(-2.82) (-2.07)
ARIMA (2, 1) -4.10** -3.74**
(-2.64) (-2.09)
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Table 4.11: 30-Day Cycles and Stock Returns
This table reports the estimates of a pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE):
Rit = αi + β30daydummyt + eit for a 15-day window when lunar phases are shifted by N calendar
days. A 30-day cycle is started N days after the first full moon (N =1 to 29), and then the 30-
day cycle effect is estimated. 30daydummy takes on a value of one for 7 days before the starting
day+the starting day+7 days after the starting day, and a value of zero otherwise. The lunar cycle
is represented by N =0. T-statistics are in parentheses. The daily logarithmic returns are in basis
points. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a
two-tailed test.
N β N β
1 -3.37*** (-4.11) 16 2.73*** (3.33)
2 -3.28*** (-4.00) 17 3.40*** (4.14)
3 -2.69*** (-3.28) 18 2.53*** (3.08)
4 -3.44*** (-4.19) 19 2.54*** (3.08)
5 -3.07*** (-3.74) 20 3.17*** (3.85)
6 -3.19*** (-3.88) 21 2.39*** (2.90)
7 -0.85 (-0.03) 22 0.10 (0.72)
8 -0.27 (-0.33) 23 0.75 (0.96)
9 0.22 (0.27) 24 -0.80 (-1.03)
10 1.32 (1.60) 25 -1.49* (-1.92)
11 3.44*** (4.19) 26 -3.63*** (-4.67)
12 3.89*** (4.74) 27 -4.44*** (-5.71)
13 4.26*** (5.19) 28 -4.10*** (-5.27)
14 4.16*** (5.07) 29 -3.85*** (-4.95)
15 4.48*** (5.45) 30 -4.55*** (-5.55)
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Figure 4.1: Average daily logarithmic stock returns of the global portfolio by lunar
phases. This figure plots the average daily stock returns of an equal-weighted global
portfolio of the 48 country stock indices in a full moon period and a new moon period.
The two bars on the left are average returns of a 15-day window; the two bars on the
right are average returns of a 7-day window. All returns are in basis points.
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Figure 4.2: Average daily logarithmic return of the global portfolio by lunar dates.
This figure graphs, for each day of a lunar month, the average daily logarithmic stock
returns of an equal-weighted global portfolio of the 48 country stock indices. Day
0 is a full moon day and day 15 is around a new moon day (day 15 is around new
moon day since the length of a lunar month varies). The curved line is the estimated
sinusoidal model of the lunar effect on stock returns from the following estimated
equation: Rt = α + β cos(2πdt/29.53) + et, where d is the number of days since the
last full moon.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of macro-announcement days on full moon and new moon
phases. This figure plots the number of announcement dates in full moon and new
moon phases in the sample.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of full moon days on days of a week. This figure plots the
number of full moon days falling on each weekday during the sample period.
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Figure 4.5: 30-Day cycles and stock returns. This figure graphs the estimates
of pooled regressions with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE): Rit = αi +
β30daydummyt + eit for a 15-day window when lunar phases are shifted by N cal-
endar days. More specifically, a 30-day cycle of N days is started after the first full
moon (N =1 to 29), and then estimate the 30-day cycle effect for each specification.
30daydummy takes on a value of one for 7 days before the starting day+the starting
day+7 days after the starting day, and a value of zero otherwise. The lunar cycle is
represented by N =0. The X-axis indicates 30-day cycles ordered by N. The Y-axis
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